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ABSTRACT 
The study conceptualized Safety Management System (SMS) initiative, self-efficacy, and 
transformational safety leadership as constructs that relates to safety behavior (measured by 
safety compliance and safety participation) when mediated by safety motivation using a 
concurrent-triangulation approach. The study also evaluated the relationship between safety 
behavior and safety -related events.  Structural equation modeling techniques was used to 
derive a final measurement model that fit the empirical data and was used to test the study 
hypotheses. Utilizing a sample of 282 collegiate flight students and instructors from a large 
public university, a 46-item survey was conducted to measure respondent’s perceptions on 
the study variables. Semi- structured interviews were also conducted with 4 top-level 
management personnel to sample their opinions on the effectiveness of the SMS initiative. 
Factual safety performance data on the flight program over a six-year period was analyzed to 
complete a triangulation approach. The results indicate that perceptions of SMS policy 
implementation have direct, positive effect on safety compliance and SMS process 
engagement has direct, positive effect on safety participation. Self-efficacy had direct, 
positive effect on both safety compliance and safety participation. Safety motivation fully 
mediated the effect of transformational safety leadership on safety participation. Safety –
related events did not fully mediate the effect between safety compliance and safety 
participation. There were indications that respondents were not familiar with the Emergency 
Response Plan. An ANOVA suggests that certified flight instructors significantly had better 
safety participation and safety compliance than pre-private pilots did. Senior significantly had 
better safety participation than juniors. A T-test of mean did not reveal any significant 
differences in safety participation and safety compliance between respondents with formal 
 xx 
 
SMS training and those without.   A review of factual safety data suggests a positive effect on 
the safety reporting and safety meeting attendance among respondents due to the SMS 
initiative. Interviews revealed that top-level management support, resource provision and 
resilience are key elements in the success of any SMS initiative. The theoretical and policy 
implications of this study to improve proactive safety in collegiate aviation are discussed.   
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A reduction in General Aviation (GA) fatalities has been a top priority of the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) and that has resulted in a goal to reduce the GA fatal accident 
rate by 10 percent over a 10-year period (2009-2018). The FAA in partnership with the GA 
community intends to use safety data and proactive initiatives to identify risk, pinpoint trends 
through root cause analysis, and develop safety strategies (FAA, 2015c).  
Collegiate aviation is generically classified under GA along with other flight training 
activities and the rigorous operational dynamics of the flight training environment exposes 
students, instructors and other operational personnel to the risk of incidents and accidents 
(Hunter, 2006; FAA, 2012; Houston et al., 2012). Even though a lot of effort has been 
expended by some collegiate programs to ensure safety of flight operations, accidents and 
incidents do occur from time to time and sometimes with tragic consequences (NTSB, 2007; 
NTSB, 2010; CBS, 2014).  As part of the strategic objective to improve aviation safety, the 
FAA has also collaborated with the aviation academic community and stakeholders such as 
Aviation Accreditation Board International (AABI) and the University Aviation Association 
(UAA) to leverage their expertise and develop best safety practices for improving flight 
training (FAA, 2015c).  
The need to develop best practices and safety initiatives that will identify and 
proactively manage safety behaviors of all personnel involved in the flight training and 
operations department is one of the challenges of collegiate aviation safety managers. These 
safety managers, as part of their duties are tasked with establishing predictive relationships 
between the perceptions of flight students and flight instructors on the safety culture and how 
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it affects their safety behavior (Hudson, 2001; FAA, 2012). A favourable perception of both 
flight students and flight instructors on the effectiveness of a safety culture in an aviation-
training program has become very essential since it has a moderating influence on their safety 
behaviors (Dillman, Voges & Robertson, 2010).   
Background of the Study 
One of the challenges of ensuring proactive safety management, enhanced safety 
culture, and accident prevention in collegiate aviation programs is continuous improvement 
of the safety program and the ability to adopt effective methods in establishing a relation 
between the safety perceptions of students, flight instructors, and their safety behaviors in 
flight operations (von Thaden, 2008). Previous studies have suggested that the perceptions of 
flight personnel could influence their safety behavior in an aviation organization and some 
risky safety behaviors can serve as precursors for safety occurrences like accidents (Hunter, 
2006; Dillman, Voges & Robertson, 2010; Adjekum et al., 2015). 
 An accident in collegiate aviation programs could have a negative impact on 
effective training and lead to loss of lives, equipment, reputation, and customer confidence in 
the overall training program of a flight school (ASN, 2008; ICAO, 2009; NTSB, 2010). Some 
collegiate aviation programs in the United States (U.S.) are also engaged in international 
contract pilot training and an accident could have dire repercussions on their continuous 
engagements in such foreign training contracts.  
Some collegiate aviation programs in the US have implemented proactive safety 
initiatives to mitigate risks associated with their training operations and improve the safety 
culture (Adjekum, 2014b).  Effective safety initiatives such as Safety Management Systems 
(SMS) implementation has positively affected the safety culture, and subsequently enhanced 
the accident prevention strategies in these aviation programs (Adjekum, 2014b; Adjekum, 
2015).  
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The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) defines SMS as an organized 
approach to managing safety, including the necessary organizational structures, 
accountabilities, policies and procedures (ICAO, 2013).  The FAA defines SMS as a formal, 
top-down, organization-wide approach to managing safety risk and assuring the effectiveness 
of safety risk controls (FAA, 2015b).   SMS includes systematic procedures, practices, and 
policies for the management of safety risk. 
An SMS is a management device that uses proactive tools, in addition to reactive ones 
and relies on safety performance with a focus on processes. An SMS is an effective tool in 
hazards identification and mitigation of risks before operational safety is threatened. An SMS 
consists of four main components: Safety Policy and Objectives, Safety Risk Management, 
Safety Assurance, and Safety Promotion. These four main components comprise twelve sub-
components (ICAO, 2013). Under SMS, aviation service providers improve safety during 
service delivery mainly through two operational components. These are safety risk 
management and safety assurance, with safety policy and objectives as well as safety 
promotion playing a supporting, yet important, role (ICAO, 2009).  
An organizational safety effort cannot succeed just by the mechanic implementation 
of the referred SMS components and procedures. An effective SMS is built taking due 
account of the interaction between these components and the human element of aviation 
operations (Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2011). A successful implementation and operation of 
an SMS is highly dependent on organizational aspects such as individual and group attitudes, 
values, competencies and patterns of behavior, which are frequently referred to as elements 
of the organizational safety culture (Cooper, 2000; ICAO, 2009). A positive safety culture is 
characterized by a shared awareness of organization’s personnel of the importance of safety 
in their operational tasks 
 4 
 
Some collegiate aviation programs in the U.S, have on voluntary basis adopted 
proactive safety initiatives such as SMS. These collegiate programs have allocated resources 
and manpower to harness the inherent benefits of SMS, which is already being utilized in Part 
121 air carriers, some Part 139 airports and Air Traffic Organizations (ATO) in the US (FAA, 
2012; UND, 2012; FAA, 2015b). The FAA, as part of a proactive mandate, has been 
providing technical assistance to these collegiate aviation programs on SMS (FAA, 2012; 
FAA, 2015b).  
There could be challenges for management of collegiate flight programs to ensure that 
the SMS implementation within the organization positively influences the behavior of 
personnel such as flight instructors and students (Cooper, 2000; Adjekum, 2014b). It is 
important for senior level management of collegiate aviation programs to evaluate the 
effectiveness of SMS implementation, since a lot of time and resources would have been 
invested and returns on investments such as continuous improvements in safety performance 
are critically desired (Adjekum, 2014a). 
 Conversely, the impact of variables such as beliefs, opinions and perceptions of 
collegiate aviation personnel on transformational leadership attributes among senior level 
management, personal self-efficacy and safety motivation on safety behavior needs constant 
assessment. This assessment is essential because of the concomitant effects on safety 
performance outcomes, such as incidents and accidents (Freiwald, 2013; Adjekum, 2014b; 
Chen, 2014).  
Problem Statement 
The general aviation (GA) community of which training organizations such as 
collegiate aviation is inclusive has been plagued by a historically high accident rates. The 
preliminary estimate for Flight Year (FY) 2014 showed a fatal accident rate of 1.09 (1 per 
100,000 flight hours) with 251 GA fatal accidents and 434 resulting fatalities (FAA, 2015). In 
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an era of competition between constrained resources and increased propensity for 
productivity, SMS initiative may help to reduce losses due to undesirable safety occurrences, 
some of which are primed by the attitudes and behaviors of personnel at the “sharp end’’ 
(ICAO, 2013).  
Effective SMS implementation has been shown to have a positive effect on the safety 
perceptions of front line personnel in high reliability organizations such as aviation, and 
improved safety behaviors (von Thaden, 2008; Adjekum et al., 2015). Chen (2014) in a study 
among pilots in Taiwanese airlines suggested significant effects within the interactions 
between perceptions on SMS practice, safety leadership, self-efficacy, and safety behavior 
with safety motivation as a mediating variable. Other studies in occupational safety have also 
examined the role perceptions of personnel on safety climate in various organizations 
influence safety behaviors (DeJoy, Schaffer, Wilson, Vandenberg, & Butts, 2004; Griffin & 
Neal, 2000; Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2003; Zohar & Luria, 2004).  
Transformational safety leadership is another variable that has been suggested to 
influence safety behavior and invariably safety related outcomes like violations, incidents and 
accidents. In studies by Zohar (2002), for example, the role of leadership has been 
emphasized as a factor in improving safety. Additionally, studies by Barling, Loughlin, and 
Kelloway (2002) have focused on the effects of transformational leadership on safety 
promotion.   
A challenge and gap in research is establishing a coherent and cogent relationship 
between these variables using a comprehensive triangulation approach in aviation and 
specifically collegiate aviation program in the US. This current approach will provide a 
holistic analysis of quantitative surveys, documentary artifacts and semi-structured interview 
of senior level management to build a three-dimensional framework of the safety status 
within a collegiate aviation program in the U.S.  
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This approach will also afford a clearer picture of gaps both laterally and horizontally 
within the collegiate aviation safety program. The identification of these disjoint between 
senior level management view of safety and the operational level personnel view of the safety 
status of the collegiate aviation program will provide the information needed for the 
development of safety purpose, realignment and controls to fix these gaps (Patankar, 2003). 
Purpose of the Study 
The intent of this concurrent triangulation mixed methods study was a follow up on 
recommendations for further studies on previous works by Freiwald (2013) and Chen (2014). 
These two researchers recommended further studies on the inter-relationships between SMS 
initiatives, safety leadership, safety climate, self-efficacy, safety motivation and safety 
behavior among demography in health and aviation. In terms of specificity of demography, 
this study builds up on recommendations from previous studies in collegiate aviation safety 
culture and safety behavior by Adjekum (2014b) and Adjekum et al. (2015).   
The study aims to fill a gap in research on SMS initiatives in collegiate aviation 
programs, reduce the paucity of existing literature, and establish a coherent relationship 
between these variables using a comprehensive triangulation approach in a collegiate aviation 
program in the US. The study also establishes a proactive operational safety benchmarks for 
continuous monitoring and improvements in SMS implementations within collegiate aviation 
programs. 
In this study, a quantitative survey instrument was used to examine the relationship 
between the perceptions of collegiate aviation flight personnel (Flight students including 
those with certified flight instructor ratings employed in the program) on Safety Management 
System (SMS) initiatives, transformational safety leadership (TSL), self-efficacy (SE), and 
self-reported safety behaviors while mediating with safety motivation. Safety behavior was 
measured by safety compliance (SC) and safety participation (SP). 
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 Path Models (PA) and Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) technique were used to 
establish paths and determine the strengths of relationship of these variables.   The study also 
compared a proposed theoretical measurement model with a final measurement model. The 
analysis would also look at the magnitude of interactions of variables. The relationship 
between these indicators of safety and safety outcomes (safety behavior and self -reported 
safety events) will be also be explored.  
Concurrently, the strategic perspectives of a selected group of senior level 
management personnel of the collegiate aviation program (An accountable executive, two 
functional department heads/process owners and a faculty member with management 
oversight) on the state of the SMS initiative in the program was assessed through semi-
structured interviews. The final triangulation process to integrate the quantitative data, 
qualitative data and document analysis included a review of documented aggregate data 
(statistics) of safety performance indicators since the implementation of the SMS initiative in 
the aviation program of the university.  
The forty-six survey items (Appendix A) representing the seven constructs for the 
quantitative section of this study and six demographic variables are fully described in Chapter 
IV and are outlined below:  
a) SMS initiative- Chen and Chen (2012), Chen (2014), Transport Canada (2005). 
b) Self-efficacy – Schwazzer and Jerusalem (1995).  
c) Safety motivation- Neal and Griffin (2006).  
d) Safety behavior (Safety compliance and Safety participation) - Neal, Griffin, and Hart 
(2000), Neal and Griffin (2006). 
e) Transformational safety leadership – Survey of Transformational Leadership (STL) 
developed by Edwards, Knight, Broome and Flynn (2010).  
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f) Safety- related events – Collegiate Aviation Perception of Safety Culture Assessment 
Scale (CAPSCAS) developed by Adjekum (2014). 
The required permissions were sought from the copyright owners of these 
instruments. Some items from these validated instruments were used in their entirety, albeit 
in a randomized order. Slight modifications to some instrument items; to cater to the unique 
demography of collegiate aviation respondents were made.  A beta testing of the composite 
instruments was done through a pilot study, using a selected sample of respondents within the 
collegiate aviation program. The composite instrument has been outlined in the Appendix. 
Research Questions 
The quantitative aspect of this research, which involved a survey instrument 
administered to flight students and flight instructors in the collegiate aviation program sought 
to answer the following questions: 
1. What are the factors that measure the latent construct of SMS initiative?  
2. What are the strengths of the relationship between SMS initiative, 
transformational safety leadership, self-efficacy, safety motivation and the 
outcome variable safety behavior measured by safety compliance and safety 
participation?  
3. What is the effectiveness of a proposed measurement model as compared to 
that of a final measurement model that assesses the relationships between 
SMS initiative, transformational safety leadership, self-efficacy, and the 
outcome variable safety behavior measured by safety compliance and safety 
participation, when mediated by safety motivation?  
4. What are the strengths of the relationship between Safety behavior (Safety 
participation and Safety compliance) and Safety-related events? 
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5. What are the differences in perceptions among the demographic variables 
(years in program, age group, SMS training status, and flight certification) on 
safety behavior and self-reported safety events? 
Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
The following questions was posed to selected senior management personnel during 
the semi-structured interview in order to find out the leadership perspective on levels of 
implementation of the SMS initiative and the current safety performance of the collegiate 
aviation program: 
1. What roles have leadership played in the safety policy implementation and 
expectations of the SMS program? 
2. What are the effects of SMS implementation on the operational performance 
(number of unstable approaches captured in flight data monitoring (FDM), 
runway incursions, ground collision events, flight holds due to alcohol, number of 
voluntary safety reports filed and participation in safety meetings) of the aviation 
program? 
3. What have been some of the challenges in the implementation process of SMS in 
the aviation program? 
4. How are continuous monitoring and improvement of the SMS, sustained in the 
aviation program? 
5. What recommendations do you have for collegiate aviation programs that intend 
to implement or are in the process of implementing SMS? 
The final phase of this research was a discussion and recommendation section that 
involved a concurrent –triangulation of the quantitative findings, qualitative findings and 
artifact/document analysis to identify degrees of convergence or divergence on the overall 
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SMS initiative status of the collegiate aviation program. A hypothetical model as shown in 
Figure1 provides a relational path way between the variables that were measured. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.   Hypothetical model of the relationship between transformational safety  
 
Figure 1. A hypothetical model showing the relationship between Transformational 
safety leadership, SMS initiative, Self-efficacy, Safety motivation and Safety behavior 
(Safety compliance and Safety participation). 
 
Statement of Hypotheses 
SMS Initiatives, Safety Motivation and Safety Behavior 
On the basis of existing literature (Neal, Griffin & Hart, 2000; Neal & Griffin, 2006; 
Freiwald, 2013; Chen, 2014) this study predicted that a better perception of the SMS 
initiative implemented in their collegiate aviation programs, by pilots will provide a stronger 
motivation to engage in proactive safety behaviors. This study also predicted that there 
existed a relationship between SMS initiative and safety behavior (safety compliance and 
safety participation). This study hypothesized that safety motivation will mediate the 
relationship between SMS initiative and pilots’ safety behaviors (safety compliance and 
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safety participation). The direct and indirect effects of SMS initiative on these variables were 
hypothesized, as follows: 
H1:  Pilots’ perceptions of their collegiate aviation program SMS initiative are related 
to their safety motivation. 
H2: Pilots’ perceptions of their collegiate aviation SMS initiative are related with to 
safety compliance. 
H3: Pilots’ perceptions of their collegiate aviation SMS initiative are related with to 
safety participation. 
H4: Pilots’ safety motivation mediates the relationship between their perceptions of 
their collegiate SMS initiative and safety compliance. 
H5: Pilots’ safety motivation mediates the relationship between their perceptions of 
their collegiate SMS initiative and safety participation. 
Transformational Safety Leadership, Safety Motivation and Safety Behavior 
Extant literature suggested that a higher level of transformational leadership would 
motivate subordinate personnel to put more effort into their work and go above and beyond 
the call of duty for their leaders (Barling & Kelloway, 2002). Consistent with the suggestion 
of prior research that transformational leadership is positively related to flight crew’s 
operational safety behavior (Chen, 2014), it was hypothesized that collegiate aviation 
program flight supervisory management’s transformational safety leadership styles would 
motivate flight students and instructors to exhibit acceptable safety behaviors with greater 
diligence.  The hypotheses outlined below explored the relationships and the mediating effect 
of safety motivation on these relationships: 
H6:  Collegiate aviation program transformational safety leadership style is related to 
pilot’s safety motivation. 
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H7. Collegiate aviation program transformational safety leadership style is related to 
pilot’s safety compliance. 
H8. Collegiate aviation program transformational safety leadership style is related to 
pilot’s safety participation. 
H9. Collegiate aviation program transformational safety leadership style is related to 
pilot’s safety compliance when mediated by safety motivation. 
H10. Collegiate aviation program transformational safety leadership style is related to 
pilot’s safety participation when mediated by safety motivation. 
Self-Efficacy, Safety Motivation and Safety Behavior 
This study explored the relationships between pilots’ perceived self-efficacy, safety 
motivation and safety behaviors. The related hypotheses proposed are as follows: 
H11: Collegiate aviation pilots’ perceived self-efficacy is related with their safety 
motivation. 
H12: Collegiate aviation pilots’ perceived self-efficacy is related to their safety 
compliance. 
H13: Collegiate aviation pilots’ perceived self-efficacy is related to their safety 
participation. 
 H14: Collegiate aviation pilots’ safety motivation mediates the relationship between 
perceived self-efficacy and safety compliance. 
H15: Collegiate aviation pilots’ safety motivation mediates the relationship between 
perceived self-efficacy and safety participation. 
Safety Behavior, Safety –Related Events and Safety Motivation 
In this study, the relationship between safety behavior (safety compliance and safety 
participation) and safety-related events was examined. Finally, the relationship between 
safety motivation and safety behavior was explored. The related hypotheses are stated below: 
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H16: Collegiate aviation pilot’s safety motivation is related to safety participation. 
H17: Collegiate aviation pilot’s motivation is related to safety compliance. 
H18: Collegiate aviation pilot’s safety compliance is related to safety participation. 
H19: Collegiate aviation pilot’s safety compliance is related to safety participation 
when mediated by safety –related events. 
H20: Collegiate aviation pilot’s safety compliance is related to safety –related events. 
The hypothesized SEM-PA models of all the study variables and their inter-
relationships are shown in Figures 2 and 3. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. SEM-PA of hypothesized measurement model of relationship between SMS, TSL, 
SE, SM, SP and SC.  
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Figure 3.  Hypothesized Path Model for Relationship between Safety Compliance, 
Safety Participation and Safety-Related Events. 
 
Concurrent Triangulation Mixed Method Approach 
A concurrent triangulation strategy of mixed-methods design was used to collect 
quantitative, qualitative and documentary/artifactual data. A comparison of the three 
databases was done to determine whether there exists convergence, divergence, or some 
combinations. This approach has been found helpful in comparing and cross-validating 
multiple-source findings. This approach generally uses separate quantitative and qualitative 
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methods as a means to offset the inherent weaknesses in one method with the strength of the 
other (Creswell, 2009).  
The quantitative method can also add to the strength of the qualitative method and in 
this approach, data collection was done concurrent, happening within the same collection 
phase of the other. Using this approach, normally the weight is generally equal among the 
methods, even though after the collection of data, there might arise some skewness in favor 
of one over the others (Plano Clark & Creswell, 2008). The findings from the data were 
integrated and further analyzed during the discussion and recommendation section of this 
study.   
Rationale for Method 
This approach was particularly selected for this study because in collegiate operations 
safety while quantitative evidence may depict a specific state of safety, the qualitative data, 
may reveal a more comprehensive and holistic understanding of why that state existed. Also 
the qualitative data from senior level leadership on safety within an organization presumably 
added strategic and corporate level insight to the normal operational safety details available 
through the artifacts and perceptions of personnel.  
The advantages of this approach were rooted in the fact that it was cost effective and 
familiar to the researcher (Creswell, 2009). This approach also resulted in well-validated and 
substantiated findings and helped to triangulate diverse information to provide evidence for 
the effectiveness of a process or policy in an organization (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007). 
The approach also helped to align gaps of safety within the collegiate aviation program 
(Patanker, 2003). It also had a shorter data collection period, since all the data were collected 
at the same time and within the same organization.  
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Limitations of the Concurrent Triangulation Mixed Method Approach 
The approach required great effort and expertise in attempting to conduct an enquiry 
with separate methods. The other challenge faced was comparing the results of analysis from 
different methods. Resolving discrepancies that arose during the comparative analysis of the 
findings was also a challenge and some adapted remedies included a thorough overview of 
the both qualitative and quantitative database to clarify the disparity in the data (Creswell, 
2009).  
Research Assumptions and Limitations 
The proposed path model for this study was subjected to critical testing for goodness-
of-fit to estimate relationships among the constructs, resulting in a final path model that 
aimed at adequately representing the constructs under investigation. Another limitation was 
the use of factor analysis (Exploratory and Confirmatory) as a data reduction tool and that 
resulted in a series of modifications of the final path model relative to the proposed model. 
 The concepts of transformational safety leadership and self-efficacy are highly 
subjective and were measured as the perceptions of the respondents. Neither the instrument 
nor the study differentiate among levels of management relative to the respondents, as they 
may come into various contacts with diverse people, who at any particular time may 
represent operational safety leadership. Even though all the respondents in this study were 
flight students, there may have been respondents who may have acquired additional 
aeronautical experience outside the confines of the program and that experience may have 
affected their safety behavior.  
Cross-sectional studies, unlike longitudinal studies, may be constrained in 
determining cause and effect relationships. The method was also limited to a snapshot of 
perceptions of SMS initiative implementation within the study period and may not have 
reflected the general trend over a long period.  The dynamic nature of flight operations and 
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the real-time occurrence of a safety –related event during the study period may have 
unfavorably skewed the perceptions of respondents.  
Scope of Research and Exclusive Criteria 
This study did not attempt to address all possible safety behaviors or safety events that 
were likely to be observed in the collegiate aviation operational environment. Although not 
every possibility could be examined, the prevalent conditions evaluated were hypothesized to 
be representative of the constructs under examination. This study was limited to respondents 
from the collegiate aviation program. Data collection was purposefully limited to a three-
week period of the 2016 fall academic semester.  
Non-flight students, graduate students, management pilots, faculty and staff were 
excluded from the survey instrument phase of this study. Details of the populations are 
addressed in Chapter IV. Finally, due to the scope of this study, factual safety performance 
data from the collegiate program were compared to self-reported data, even though the 
ultimate value existed in the relationship between the self-reporting of safety events and 
individual respondents’ perception of SMS, self-efficacy, safety transformational leadership, 
safety motivation, and safety behavior. 
Acronyms 
AMOS- IBM® SPSS® AMOS Version 23 SEM software package 
CFI -Comparative Fit Index 
CMIN -Minimum Discrepancy or Model Chi-Square 
GFI- Goodness of Fit Index 
IFI -Incremental Fit Index 
MI -Modification Indices 
ML -Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
NFI- Normed fit index 
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PA- Path Analysis 
PCFI- Parsimony Comparative Fit Index 
PNFI- Parsimony Normed Fit Index 
RMSEA- Root Means Square Error of Approximation 
SE – Self –Efficacy Scale Items 
SEM -Structural Equation Modeling 
SEV – Safety Events Scale Items  
SC - Safety Compliance Scale Items  
SM – Safety Motivation Scale Items  
SMS- Safety Management System 
SMS Initiative - SMS initiative Scale Item  
SMSPol.Imp- SMS Policy Implementation Scale Items 
SMSPro.Eng- SMS Process Engagement Scale Items 
SP – Safety Participation Scale Items  
TLI -Tucker Lewis Index 
TSL - Transformational Safety Leadership Scale Items   
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CHAPTER II 
SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS) CONCEPTS AND IMPLEMENTATION 
       The FAA has outlined four basic components for the SMS structure. These 
components are safety policy, safety risk management, safety assurance and safety promotion 
(FAA, 2015a). All the four components must exist and be implemented in order to have a 
fully effective and functional SMS. A basic understanding of the role of each component is 
crucial to any aviation service provider’s SMS implementation drive and sustainability. The 
four components must be implemented on the baseline that there would be the highest 
leadership commitment and support in providing the necessary financial, human and material 
resources required for the implementation process (ICAO, 2009; FAA, 2015b). 
Safety Policy 
       The foundation and bedrock on which any SMS stands is its policy. An organizational 
management system must clearly define policies, procedures and structures to be able to 
attain its stated goals (IATA, 2011). The policy statement for any SMS must explicitly 
describe core responsibility, authority, lines of accountability and pursuable targets. Safety 
must assume a core value and a requisite business management function within the 
organization (Wood, 2003). The roles, responsibility and relationship outlined in safety 
policies of collegiate aviation programs can have a manifold effect on the sustenance of high 
operational safety standards. These roles must be clearly defined for an effective SMS 
implementation (ICAO, 2009). 
      The SMS policy statement must originate from the highest echelon of authority in the 
organization and have ample evidence of top leadership initiatives, commitment and support 
for the implementation drive (FAA, 2015b). The safety policy statement must be documented 
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and enshrined in the core mission and vision statement. The safety policy must be visible, 
communicated wide across the structures of the organization, and must be widely known and 
accepted by all employees as a bona-fide safety policy (Wood, 2003; IATA, 2012). The 
policy must be explicit on the personal and material involvement of top leadership in safety 
activities. 
       The safety policy statement should outline the key safety goals and objectives, which 
must be attainable and pragmatic (Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2008). The safety goals must be 
included in the overall corporate strategic plan. The safety goals should be subjected to 
periodic management review. Policy documentation should include guidelines and 
requirement for all departments to document their procedures, controls, training, processes, 
and measurement and change management systems. (ICAO, 2009). Even though the safety of 
any aviation operation depends on a collective responsibility of all employees, the ultimate 
accountability for safety in collegiate aviation operation is the preserve of the top leadership 
and cannot be delegated (Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2011). 
Safety Risk Management 
       In order for an implementation of an SMS in collegiate aviation operations to be 
effective, there should be a well-designed safety risk management (SRM) system that 
describes operational processes across departmental and unit boundaries, identifies key 
performance indicators and periodically measures them (IATA, 2011). A formal hazard 
identification and risk management is essential to bring inherent high risk of flight training 
operations to a level that is tolerable for the collegiate program (Transport Canada, 2005)   
Hazard identification falls under risk management. Once the process is well 
understood, inherent hazards associated with any operation and in the system can be 
identified, documented and controlled (ICAO, 2009). The identification of every possible 
hazard in collegiate aviation operations may be impractical, but the onus lies on program 
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management to make every effort to identify significant and reasonably predictable hazards 
related to their operations (Adjekum, 2014b). 
Collegiate aviation operators should create a system for risk analysis and assessment. 
These are very important aids to decision making when accepting risk. Risk is inherent in 
every aspect of flight operation. The systematic and consistent process of acceptance criteria 
needs to be lined with a designation of authority and responsibility for risk management 
decisions (ICAO, 2009). Top management of collegiate aviation programs juggles the merits 
of efficient productivity and the essential need to protect assets through effective safety 
management systems (Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2008).  
The rationale for safety management as a core business function can be extended into 
one final argument that bears considerable relevance to the processes underlying hazard 
identification and safety risk management. This rationale underscores the need for effective 
risk identification and analysis. After the process of identifying the risk and conducting 
analysis, there would be the need for control measures (FAA, 2012).  Risk management 
should aim at providing a proactive and predictive safety approach and environment (FAA, 
2012). Risk management can be an effective means of auditing, analyzing and reviewing the 
results of a safety program (ICAO, 2002; Transport Canada, 2005).  
Safety Assurance 
          Safety assurance is that component of SMS that validates the effectiveness of the 
stated safety goals in any collegiate aviation SMS implementation (FAA, 2015c; IATA, 
2012). The establishment of policies, procedures, measures, assessment and controls will 
require periodic organizational management review to assure the top management that safety 
goals are being achieved and are in line with the overall strategic corporate benchmarks of 
productivity and safety (FAA, 2015b; Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2011).  
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       There are various means of implementing safety assurance program in collegiate 
aviation operations and notably are safety performance monitoring, internal audits and 
external audits (ICAO, 2009). Internal audits are normally the preserve of the line managers 
and process owners (Transport Canada, 2005). They normally have domain technical 
experience in the aviation operations and are more versed with the technical intricacies of the 
processes involved (ICAO, 2002). Line managers should therefore be assigned the 
responsibility for monitoring their own process. (Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2008). 
  The aim of any safety evaluation is to ensure that the processes and procedures 
outlined in the safety policy and plan are accomplishing the collegiate aviation operational 
goals (ICAO, 2002). A safety evaluation program gives top management the information for 
decision-making required to sustain the overall SMS (IATA, 2012). All the various assurance 
systems and the relevant oversight system should be subject to periodic management review 
(IATA, 2011). An external audit can also provide a collegiate aviation operator an objective 
and unbiased evaluation of safety processes from a third party source (ICAO, 2002). There is 
the need to continually monitor the operational environment to assess new threats. The safety 
assurance component in the SMS must provide the assessment on a routine basis (FAA, 
2015b). 
Safety Promotion 
 Safety promotion is a major component of the Safety Management System (SMS) 
(ICAO, 2009) and together with the collegiate aviation safety policy and safety objectives are 
important enablers for continuous safety improvement. Safety promotion sets the tone that 
predisposes both individual and organizational behavior and fills in the blank spaces in the 
organization’s policies, procedures and processes, providing a sense of purpose to safety 
efforts (IATA, 2011). Through safety promotion, a collegiate aviation operator adopts a 
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culture that goes beyond merely avoiding accidents or reducing the number of incidents, 
although these are likely to be the most apparent measures of success (Wood, 2003).       
Safety Promotion supports and advocates positive safety culture, communication, 
dissemination of lessons learnt and enables a continuous improvement in the safety process 
(FAA, 2010). Safety promotion initiatives should include all efforts to modify structures, 
environment, attitudes and behaviors aimed at improving safety. Safety Promotion should be 
geared toward matching competency requirements to system requirements (FAA, 2012). 
Finally, an important aspect of safety promotion is training in SMS. Collegiate aviation 
programs must endeavor to include SMS training as part of their academic curriculum and 
have students and personnel grounded in the core principles and basics of SMS (Adjekum et 
al., 2015). Figure 4 shows all the SMS components in a single frame. 
 
Figure 4. The SMS Components adapted from FAA Model (FAA, 2012). 
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Safety Management System (SMS) Implementation Methods 
There are basically three types of safety management system implementation methods 
available to collegiate aviation programs in the US. These are Reactive, Proactive and 
Predictive methods (Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2008; ICAO, 2013). It is the responsibility of 
every aviation service provider to utilize any of these methods to assure both the regulator 
and customers of the capacity to deliver safe services and products. All aviation service 
providers retain the responsibility for safety management and for integrating SMS into their 
business model (IATA, 2012). 
Reactive Method   
       Reactive safety management makes use of investigatory tools to find out the 
contributory factors that caused the problem in the aftermath of an accident or incident. It is 
forensic in nature and scientific methods are applied to understand the relevant factors. 
Accident and incident investigations, incident analysis, and the determination of contributory 
factors and findings as to risk are all examples of reactive methods (ICAO, 2013). 
Proactive Method 
       This method aims at actively probing a system for potential safety problems, before 
they actually happen. The major examples are trend analysis, hazard analysis; operational 
monitoring, surveys and safety audits are effective. In airline operations statistical analysis, 
visualization and reporting programs have contributed to improving safety (FAA, 2011). 
Some viable and effective proactive safety management methods among aviation service 
providers such as Part 121 airlines in the US are Flight Operations Quality Assurance 
(FOQA), Line Operation Safety Audits (LOSA), and Aviation Safety Action Program 
(ASAP).  
 Other proactive safety initiatives are Internal Evaluation Program (U.S Federal 
Register, 2015). Line Operational Safety Audits (LOSA) has gained worldwide use. In 1999 
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ICAO endorsed LOSA as the primary tool to develop countermeasures to human error in 
aviation operations and made LOSA the central focus of its Flight Safety and Human Factors 
Program for the period 2000 to 2004 (ICAO, 2002).  The techniques of LOSA can easily be 
adopted in collegiate aviation programs (Adjekum, 2014b). 
Predictive Method 
       In the complex and technologically advanced environment that aviation service providers 
operate, there would be the need for the highest form of safety. Safety improvements and 
accident rates for airlines have reduced drastically, however that for general aviation (GA) 
has not been very good (FAA, 2015c). Since collegiate aviation operations fall under GA, 
new and sophisticated tools for safety trend analysis are required (Adjekum, 2014b). The 
advantage of predictive safety methods is that it pushes the bar higher by using probabilistic 
tools and models to analyze complex systems and predict where the failures will manifest 
(FAA, 2015a). Predictive safety enables safety analyst to find those failure points and 
eliminate them. Monte- Carlo Simulations, Stochastic models, Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
and Data Mining are examples of predictive methods. (Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2008, 
ICAO, 2013). 
Phased SMS Implementation Approach 
The three implementation methods that have been highlighted are the building blocks 
for a phased or level-based SMS implementation recommended by both ICAO and FAA to 
ensure an effective and sustainable safety initiative. These implementation levels also ensure 
that metrics and acceptable benchmarks are monitored and attained (FAA, 2015a; IATA, 
2011; ICAO, 2013). The implementation levels also provide aviation service provider such as 
airlines, the flexibility to implements the SMS in a step-wise pattern according to the scale 
and complexity of operations (FAA, 2015b).   
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FAA SMS Implementation Level One - Planning and Organization   
Level one begins when a service provider’s top management commits to providing the 
resources necessary for full implementation of SMS throughout the organization (FAA, 
2015a; FAA, 2015b; ICAO, 2013). Level one includes a thorough understanding of the 
service provider’s organizational structure and a comparison (gap analysis) between the Part 
5 requirements and the service provider’s organizational structure (FAA, 2015a). The service 
provider will develop an implementation plan to bridge identified gaps. The final 
implementation plan must be approved by a Certificate Maintenance Team (CMT) (FAA, 
2015b).  
The first step in developing an SMS is for the service provider to analyze its existing 
programs, systems, and activities with respect to the SMS functional expectations found in 
the SMS Framework. This analysis is a process and is called a “gap analysis”.  The “gaps” are 
those elements in the SMS Framework that are not already being performed by the service 
provider (IATA, 2012). The Gap Analyses process would consider and encompass the entire 
organization (e.g., functions, processes, organizational departments, etc.) to be covered by the 
SMS (ICAO, 2009).  The Gap Analysis should be continuously updated as the service 
provider progresses through the SMS implementation process (FAA, 2015b). 
  Once a gap analysis has been performed, an implementation plan is prepared. The 
implementation plan is simply a “road map” describing how the service provider intends to 
close the existing gaps by meeting the objectives and expectations in the SMS Framework.  
The service provider organizes resources, assigns responsibilities, sets schedules and defines 
objectives necessary to address all gaps identified.  It should be noted that at each level of 
implementation, top management’s approval of the implementation plan must include 
allocation of necessary resources (FAA, 2015a, 2015b; ICAO, 2013). 
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FAA SMS Implementation Level Two- Basic Safety Management 
At level two, the service provider develops and implements a basic SRM process and 
plan, organize and prepare the organization for further SMS development. Information 
acquisition, processing, and analysis functions are implemented and a tracking system for risk 
control and corrective actions are established (Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2011). At this 
phase, the service provider corrects known deficiencies in safety management practices and 
operational processes and develops an awareness of hazards and responds with appropriate 
systematic application of preventative or corrective actions (FAA, 2015a). This allows the 
service provider to react to unwanted events and problems as they occur and develop 
appropriate remedial action. For this reason, this level is termed “reactive.”    
FAA SMS Implementation Level Three: Fully-Functioning SMS  
The SMS Framework expects Safety Risk Management to be applied to initial design 
of systems, processes, organizations, and products, development of operational procedures, 
and planned changes to operational processes (Wood, 2003; Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 
2008). The activities involved in the SRM process involve careful analysis of systems and 
tasks involved; identification of potential hazards in these functions, and development of risk 
controls (FAA, 2015a). The risk management process developed at level two is used to 
analyze, document, and track these activities.  Because the service provider is now using the 
processes to look ahead, this level is termed “proactive”.  At this level, however, these 
proactive processes have been implemented but their performance has not yet been proven 
(ICAO, 2013) 
FAA SMS Implementation Level Four: Continuous Improvement   
The final level of SMS maturity is the continuous improvement level. Processes have 
been in place and their performance and effectiveness have been verified. The complete SA 
process, including continuous monitoring and the remaining features of the other SRM and 
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SA processes are functioning (Transport Canada, 2005). A major objective of a successful 
SMS is to attain and maintain this continuous improvement status for the life of the 
organization. Figure 5 shows the FAA recommended implementation levels. 
 
Figure 5. Safety Management System (SMS) Implementation Levels (FAA, 2015a). 
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mandatory requirements of the Part 5 SMS program to voluntary initiate and implement SMS 
programs, the FAA has a program that provides assistance to such service providers (FAA, 
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coordinated by a Certificate Maintenance Team (CMT) which is responsible for validating 
the certificate holder’s management system applications during both the implementation 
process and after full implementation (FAA, 2015a; FAA, 2015b).  The CMT also gets 
guidance from the SMS Program Office (SMSPO) whose primary objective is to assist CMTs 
in validating SMS development and certificate holders maintain their “active conformance” 
status.  The SMSPO also has sole authority to authorize or withdraw recognition of a 
certificate holder’s SMS (FAA, 2015b).  
 The following categories denote the progress expected from the SMSVP participants 
and the implementation phase is different from certificate holders under the SMS Part 5 Rule. 
The implementation stages for the voluntary programs are as follows: 
1. The first level of SMSVP Active Applicant is when the certificate holder and 
CMT have committed to sufficiently support the SMS implementation and 
validation processes.   
2. The second phase of SMSVP Active Participant is the actual level, where the 
certificate holder officially begins and maintains its implementation efforts. 
3. The third level of SMSVP Active Conformance is attained when the CMT and 
SMSPO acknowledge full implementation of the certificate holder’s SMS. By 
this stage, the certificate holder is expected to use and continually improve its 
safety management processes. 
 When a certificate holder fails to meet SMSVP standards, it becomes an SMSVP Non 
Active Participant.  One of the important phases of the preliminary implementation process is 
the use of Job Aids by the CMT to track progress. Some of the important Job Aids are the 
Design Job Aids which will be used to evaluate certificate holder’s documentation describing 
its SMS applications. The Design Job Aids encompass the operational SMSVP conformance 
requirements.  These Job Aids are considered the minimum performance validation activities 
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to be used during the design validation phase (FAA, 2015b). Figure 6 shows the SMSVP 
implementation levels. 
  
 
Figure 6. SMSVP Levels of Implementation (Based on FAA, 2015b). 
Another very important requirement in SMSVP is the use of Performance Job Aid 
which is used to evaluate the certificate holder’s safety management performance.  Where 
actual field performance cannot be assessed (e.g., emergency response plans), the CMT is 
permitted to use simulated processes (sometimes called “table top exercises”) allowing CMT 
to evaluate the certificate holder’s capabilities without an actual performance demonstration.   
Once a certificate holder has satisfied all the requirements for validation and implementation 
and SMS has been integrated into every facet of operations of the certificate holder, the CMT 
manager would request for recognition of the SMS by the SMSPO.  
The SMSPO would conduct a review of the request and upon satisfactory review; the 
SMSPO will change the certificate holder’s status from “SMSVP Active Participant” to 
“SMSVP Active Conformance” and issue the certificate holder a current status letter.  The 
SMSPO will post a record of the certificate holder’s “SMSVP Active Compliance Status” on 
Active Applicant
Active Participant
Active Conformance
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the internal FAA SharePoint® site. This will constitute evidence of “state recognition” of the 
certificate holders SMS (FAA, 2015b).  
The challenge for the certificate holder is the Continuous Operational Safety (COS) 
phase. This stage is basically continuous monitoring and surveillance of the certificate 
holder’s technical processes and the responsibility now falls on the CMT to broaden the 
scope of its normal surveillance activities to include safety management assessment (FAA, 
2015b; ICAO, 2013).   
Collegiate Aviation Programs and Safety Management System (SMS) Implementation 
An important facet of a positive safety culture is geared toward the nurturing of good 
safety behavior and practices (von Thaden, 2008).  A strong positive safety culture is also 
essential to a collegiate aviation program because it is one of the most effective and 
systematic ways to reduce accidents and incidents within the flight training organization 
(ICAO, 2009). There has been an imperative need to control risk through an assessment of 
the prevalent safety culture inherent in such collegiate flight programs (Patankar, 2003).  
Evans, Glendon & Creed (2007) suggested that a safety culture assessment could also provide 
the needed data and feedback to build a predictive model aimed at continuously improving 
safety and ensuring an integrated system wide safety net for training organizations. 
In trying to generate an organizational framework to effectively manage safety and 
serves as the structure that generates a positive safety culture (von Thaden, 2008), the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
has recommended that aviation service providers should adopt Safety Management Systems 
(SMS).  Safety Management System is a structured and systematic quality based management 
approach to aviation safety (FAA, 2008; ICAO, 2009). Safety Management Systems would 
provide an organized approach to safety procedures, processes and performance management 
(von Thaden & Gibbons, 2008).  Safety Management System has the potential to reduce the 
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safety risk of flight operations to a level that is tolerable for sustainable and productive 
operations (ICAO, 2009).  
Safety Management System frameworks has been effective when adopted as part of a 
core business function by aviation service providers (FAA, 2008).  Even though presently 
Safety Management System (SMS) and SMS components such as safety culture assessment 
are not a regulatory requirement in the United States for collegiate aviation programs (Part 
141) and Part 61 flight training schools (FAA, 2015a), a number of SMS voluntary programs 
are being run by some proactive university aviation departments due to the immense positive 
benefits it has provided (UND, 2012; FAA, 2015a).  
Benefits of SMS Implementation in Collegiate Aviation Programs 
Some of the benefits of SMS have been the enhancement of a good safety culture and 
collection of real time safety information. The collection of safety information has been 
through non-punitive safety reporting mechanisms, voluntary safety reporting system and 
flight data monitoring system (FDM). The safety information system has identified risky 
operational trends and helped to proactively mitigate the risk due to such unsafe conditions 
and actions to a level acceptable for operation (UND, 2012; Adjekum, 2014a).  
Other benefits have included students’ confidence in the operational safety of the 
flight program. A Safety Management System and a positive safety culture would be 
advantageous to collegiate aviation because they perform standardized activities towards 
established goals (FAA, 2013). Finally, proactive and corrective measures have saved flight 
schools the detrimental cost of accidents that can result in, loss of students, aircraft and 
reputation (Adjekum, 2014a; CBS, 2014).   
Evaluation of the effectiveness of SMS Initiative in Collegiate Aviation Programs 
With the adoption of Safety Management System by collegiate aviation programs, it 
would be important to evaluate how effective the espoused benefits have been to personnel. 
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That will fall within the level four of the implementation hierarchy recommended by the 
FAA. One of the means for evaluation is through perceptions on the merits of this safety 
initiatives and how it has influenced the safety attitudes and behavior of personnel. Studies on 
the perceptions of operational personnel of collegiate aviation related to the safety culture 
within their programs would provide an end users perspective on the effectiveness of the 
organizational management of safety (von Thaden, Kessel & Ruengvisesh, 2008; Adjekum, 
2014b; Adjekum et al., 2015).    
Previous safety culture assessment studies carried out by Patanker (2003) and the 
Australian Transportation Safety Bureau (2004) on aviation maintenance organizations 
suggested that a good indicator for organizational safety culture required the identification, 
analysis, and prioritization of information to mitigate hazards and risks. As aviation 
organizations like collegiate aviation become diversified to include contract training for 
foreign airlines and international students (Patankar, 2003; Australian Transportation Safety 
Bureau, 2004) safety initiatives assessments should become routine and consistent.  
The increased risk of safety occurrences in an environment of high tempo flight 
training of domestic US students and international flight student in US collegiate aviation 
programs, has made it imperative to find the effect of how SMS and variables such as ethical 
leadership, self-efficacy, and safety motivation interact to influenced the safety behaviors of 
these students. 
  Challenges and Perceptual Gaps in SMS Implementation in Collegiate Aviation 
When promoting SMS, in collegiate aviation programs, the critical issues that may 
emerge are how senior-level policy makers would identify with, and provide support for the 
key components of the SMS. Other thorny areas are how inter-mediate and supervisory level 
managers weigh the importance of its various dimensions and steps, and how front-line 
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employees are taught to evaluate the effects of their safety behaviors and practices (Adjekum, 
2014; Freiwald, Lenz-Anderson & Baker, 2013; Chen, 2014).  
Previous studies have indicated that occasionally, there exist perceptual gaps in 
regards to the successful implementation of the SMS initiative and safety culture between top 
level managers and operational personnel in the aviation industry (Patankar, 2003; von 
Thaden, 2008; Chen & Chen, 2011; Adjekum, 2014a; Adjekum et al., 2015).  It is therefore 
very important to continuously evaluate and monitor any SMS initiative for gaps and provide 
the necessary controls to close those gaps especially within collegiate aviation programs that 
are currently part of the FAA voluntary SMS initiative (Patankar, 2003; FAA, 2015b).  
Another challenge that collegiate aviation programs may face is the constant 
balancing act between resources for training/operational activities and safety initiative 
implementations (ICAO, 2009). Most collegiate aviation programs are expected to comply 
with regulatory operational safety standards (14CFR Part 141 and other relevant Federal 
Aviation Regulations). These standards are the safety baseline/threshold and are mandatory. 
Any form of non-compliance by these collegiate programs may result in enforcement actions 
such the revocation of operational certificates or punitive fines by the FAA.  
Safety initiatives such as SMS aim at ensuring that the certificate holder meets and 
exceeds the minimum regulatory safety compliance requirements (FAA, 2015b). The aim is 
to keep operational activities within the safety risk tolerability region, where hazards have 
been identified and associated risk to flight operations have been subjected to effective 
mitigations and controls (Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2011; ICAO, 2013). The residual risk is 
deemed tolerable and as low as reasonably practical (ALARP) for operations (ICAO, 2013).  
Another important aspect of the SMS initiative in collegiate aviation program is the 
need for continuous monitoring when the active compliance level is attained. There may be 
periods when the Perceived Level of Safety (PLoS) as depicted in safety policies and 
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proposals may differ from the Actual Level of Safety (ALoS), within the program. The use of 
safety assurance tools for periodic evaluation of safety performance can reveal these 
perceptual gaps (SMS performance gaps). Remedial tools such as policy reviews, changes in 
procedures, process control managements, and training can be used to align and bridge the 
gap (Patankar, 2003).  
There may also be periods, when the congruence of high tempo flight operational 
demands and limited resources may adversely constrain investments in safety. Allocation of 
resources for sustaining proactive safety measures and defenses may stagnate or even decline. 
This management level decision can easily lower the safety margins by creating latent unsafe 
conditions that pre-disposes the program to potential safety occurrences (Reason, 1997).  
The latent conditions can increase the probability of more active failures of front -line 
operational personnel such as flight students and instructors through the promotion of errors 
and violations. The active failures of frontline personnel are able to create gaps through 
existing safety defenses such as Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). The latent conditions 
can also aggravate the severity of the unsafe act by the adverse effects on the already 
weakened system defenses, barriers and safeguards (Reason, 1997; Dekker, 2014).  
 When a collegiate aviation program determines that there are increases in safety non-
compliances and violations, it may be a signal that there is operational safety slack and the 
accident potential is high (Adjekum, 2014b). It may also indicate that the program is in the 
safety risk vulnerability region. Figure 7 shows a plot of safety initiative and operational 
activities interaction. 
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      Figure 7. Interaction between Safety Initiatives and Productive/Operational 
Activities (Self designed from ideas adopted from ICAO, 2013). 
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CHAPTER III 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter describes the review of literature related to the study, including SMS 
initiatives, the effects of transformational safety leadership on safety behavior, self-efficacy, 
safety motivation, safety compliance, and safety participation. The chapter also explores the 
literature that grounds how these constructs are related to self-reported safety events. The 
theoretical construct presented in Figure 1 shows the relationships between transformational 
safety leadership, perceptions of SMS initiative, self-efficacy, safety motivation, safety 
behavior, and safety events. These relationships in collegiate aviation operations have not 
been explored in existing literature. The mediating role of safety motivation and the other 
endogenous variables such as SMS perceptions and self-efficacy on safety behavior are of 
particular interest in the construction of a model for the evaluation of the effects of the 
perceptions of SMS constructs on safety behavior and events. 
Theoretical Foundation 
Safety Management System Initiatives, Implementation and Practices 
  Safety Management System initiative, implementation, and practices are the policies, 
strategies, procedures and activities implemented or followed by the management of an 
organization targeting safety of their personnel (ICAO, 2013). These practices are the 
essential elements permitting an effective management of safety in organizations and are 
designed to comply with the existing legislations applicable to the organization. Nominally 
safety management has focused on prescription- based regulation compliance, and 
accordingly the main tool used for safety improvement is guaranteeing compliance with 
prescriptive regulations (ICAO, 2009; FAA, 2013).  
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This mode of safety management approach using prescriptive regulations can be 
defined as the “regulatory compliance-based approach”. Prescriptive regulations undoubtedly 
play an important role in improving aviation safety and normally mandate controls in 
response to hazards in the aviation system (Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2008). They are 
important since they ensure that a fundamental set of hazards is addressed. On the other hand, 
prescriptive regulations are general tools that cover all relevant service providers at the 
national, regional and international level (ICAO, 2013). Consequently, prescriptive regulation 
may not address all the specific hazards that are likely to exist in different aviation 
organizations and contexts, and may not be effective enough against certain specific hazards 
and risks that may arise specific to a context in organizations, each of which may be 
considered a socio-technical system (Reason, 1997; Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2008; Dekker, 
2011).  
 Therefore, although regulatory compliance is achieved, organizational and contextual 
factors may cause people to make errors and thereby imperil organizational safety (Reason, 
1997). Reflecting on this approach, it may suffice that personnel within a normatively well-
designed system can always carry out operational duties required within the organization 
safely under all contextual conditions (Reason, 1997).  
Performance -Based Safety Management System Approach 
There has also been a contemporary advocacy by ICAO, for a shift from prescription -
based safety management to a performance- based management of safety, where the goal is to 
achieve safety performance metrics, such as higher frequency of personnel safety training and 
awareness will exceed the requirements of existing regulations (FAA, 2012; Remawi, Bates 
& Dix, 2011; ICAO, 2013). The extent to which these practices are implemented in an 
organization will be manifested through various actions and programs of the management and 
will be clearly visible to an insider like an employee. Safety Management System (and its 
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practices) can be regarded as an antecedent of an organization’s safety culture (Stolzer, 
Halford & Goglia, 2008; FAA, 2012; Adjekum, 2014b).  
A performance-based approach combines prescribed standards with performance 
standards. What is essentially expected from companies is a continuous improvement in 
safety performance, as well as compliance with regulations (ICAO, 2013). Companies use 
proactive tools such as hazard identification and risk analysis, safety measurement, safety 
performance monitoring and prediction in order to fulfill these expectations. Aviation 
organizations demonstrate that they know and manage their own customized hazards and 
risks in a contextual dynamic environment, and the regulatory authority oversees the 
effectiveness of the service provider’s SMS (FAA, 2012; ICAO, 2013).  
Performance-based safety approach is predicated on the notion that regulations should 
focus on the achievement of regulatory objectives and that regulated entities should be left to 
determine how best to achieve them. The performance-based approach may bring about 
organizational, as well as effective context-specific solutions, for hazard identification and 
safety risk mitigation (May, 2010). 
In furtherance of the performance -based safety approach, currently in the U.S, a final 
rule on SMS implementation (Part 5) requires air carriers operating under 14 Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) Part 121 to develop and implement a safety management system (SMS) to 
improve the safety of their aviation-related activities (U.S Federal Register, 2015). Air 
carriers authorized to conduct operations under Part 121 must develop and implement an 
SMS within three years of the effective date of the final rule. 
 To demonstrate that the air carrier’s SMS will be fully implemented by the end of 
this three-year period, the air carrier will be required to submit an implementation plan within 
6 months of the effective date of the final rule. The implementation plan should include any 
existing programs, policies or procedures the air carrier intends to include in its SMS, such as 
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continuing analysis and surveillance systems, aspects of quality management systems, and 
employee reporting systems. As part of the new rule, this implementation plan must be 
approved by the FAA within 12 months of the effective date of the final rule (U.S Federal 
Register, 2015; FAA, 2015a). 
SMS Implementation Cost Concerns 
 One of the principal concerns among aviation service providers about the 
implementation of SMS in the US is the cost related to initiating and implementing SMS 
even though the FAA suggests through cost-benefit analysis that one of the expectations of 
the requirements of the rule is to help airlines identify safety problems (FAA, 2015b).  It has 
also been suggested that if airlines take steps to mitigate these safety problems, there could be 
estimated benefits from that mitigation ranging from $205.0 and $472.3 million over 10 years 
($104.9 to $241.9 million present value at 7 percent discount rate) (US. Federal Register, 
2015). However, the costs of the rule’s provisions (excluding any mitigation costs, which 
have not been estimated) are estimated to be $224.3 million ($135.1 million present value at 
7 percent discount rate) over 10 years (U.S Federal Register, 2015). 
Global Application of SMS in other Allied Industries 
Interestingly, SMS has not only been limited to the aviation industry. SMS has also 
found wider acceptance in a variety of industries, such as the chemical, oil, construction, 
occupational health, food, highway, electrical, fire protection, and other industries to improve 
safety (Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón, Vázquez-Ordás, 2007; Remawi, Bates & Dix, 2011; 
Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2011, Dekker, 2014). SMS has been a key tool used for the 
management of safety by high reliability organization (HROs), where the consequences of 
accidents and incidents can lead to high fatality rates (Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2011).  
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Review of some SMS related Studies 
Within the collegiate aviation operational environment in the United States, the 
number of studies related to the SMS is relatively limited (Adjekum, 2014b) and most of the 
reviews would be on the broader perspective of SMS in high reliability organizations, 
inclusive of aviation.  McDonald et al. (2000) proposed a self-regulatory model to examine 
how different organizations manage safety. However, their study was aimed mainly at 
exploring the relationship between different aspects of safety culture and safety management 
systems, not exploring the critical success factors of the SMS or the problems related to its 
implementation.  
Gill and Shergill (2004) studied employee perceptions of safety management and 
safety culture in New Zealand’s aviation industry and tried to develop a scale to assess the 
management of safety. Their study also focuses on safety culture. Furthermore, rather than 
define what the components and elements of a successful safety management system are, the 
scale took into consideration the organizations’ current approach to safety management in a 
general manner.  
Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón, Vázquez-Ordás (2007) found out that there have 
been various studies that emphasized the importance of Safety Management Systems (SMS), 
and how to implement them, but there are very few works providing a specific tool to 
measure the degree of implementation of the policies and practices making up this 
management system in organizations.  The authors conceptualized SMS, followed by a risk 
management process that described the essential elements making up the SMS. This 
management process provided the basis for identifying, in turn, a set of variables that would 
be used to develop an instrument to measure the degree of implementation of such a process. 
Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón, Vázquez-Ordás (2007) constructed a scale made up 
of 29 items structured in eight first-order factors; policy, incentives, training, communication, 
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preventive planning, emergency planning, internal control and benchmarking techniques. A 
second-order Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) confirmed that the dimensions preventive 
planning and emergency planning, internal control and benchmarking and converged on two 
factors, labelled planning and control, respectively.  
Finally, a third-order CFA confirmed that the measurement dimensions: policy, 
incentives, training, communication, planning and control do indeed underlie a single major 
dimension: The Safety Management System. The results of the study suggest that SMS, apart 
from improving the working conditions of personnel, has a positive impact on their safety 
behavior. The results also suggested that the organization’s accident rate is reduced, both 
directly and indirectly, through the reduction in unsafe worker behavior, minimizing the 
human and material losses associated with accidents. 
In a study on the effect of employee perceptions on six SMS practices and self-
reported safety knowledge, safety motivation, safety compliance and safety participation, 
Vinodkumara and Bhasib (2010) conducted a survey using questionnaire among 1566 
employees belonging to eight major accident hazard process industrial units in Kerala, a state 
in southern part of India. The researchers found out that the reliability and unidimesionality 
of all the scales were acceptable. 
 In that particular study, path analysis using AMOS-4® software showed that some of 
the SMS practices had direct and indirect relations with the safety performance components, 
namely, safety compliance and safety participation. Safety knowledge and safety motivation 
were found to be the key mediators in explaining these relationships. Safety training was 
identified as the most important safety management practice that predicted safety knowledge, 
safety motivation, safety compliance and safety participation.  
 Within a framework of assessing the impact of SMS implementation in aviation, 
Remawi, Bates and Dix (2011) measured the extent to which the introduction of SMS at an 
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international airport in the Middle-East would influence the safety attitude and culture of 
employees. A Safety Culture Survey was used as the pre and post-test measure over a 12-
month period to determine the extent of influence of the introduction of the SMS at Sharjah 
Airport, United Arab Emirates. The average score reported by participants at Sharjah Airport 
increased significantly from pre-test measure to post-test measure in relation to 
communication, safety rules, supportive environment, personnel risk appreciation, work 
environment, and involvement. 
The results from the study indicated that participants at Sharjah Airport recorded a 
significant positive shift in attitude to the safety factors covered in the Safety Culture Survey, 
whilst at the same time responses from a second airport (control without SMS) showed no 
such shift in attitude. The second airport showed neither decline nor improvement in 
responses and the results suggested that the introduction of an SMS at Sharjah Airport has 
effected positive changes not observed at the second airport. 
 There have also been several academic studies aimed at identifying the critical 
components and elements of the SMS, such as Liou and Chuang (2010) who mapped out 
structural relationships among diverse components of SMS and identified key factors in their 
model. A similar study was conducted by Hsu, Li and Chen (2010) to develop an analytical 
framework for defining the key components and dimensions of an airline SMS and their 
interaction.  
Chen and Chen (2012) developed a customized SMS evaluation scale for the airline 
industry based on the perceptions of aviation experts and airline managers, since their earlier 
exploratory qualitative research (Chen & Chen, 2011) showed that there is a clear perception 
gap regarding the implementation of the SMS between managers and hands-on employees in 
the airline industry. 
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One of the keys to achieving successful implementation of an SMS is to ensure that 
every employee participates in the system and fulfills their designated roles, as Galotti et al. 
(2006) noted that such a ‘‘system’’ represents the concept of an integrated set of processes 
which manage safety across intra-departmental boundaries. When promoting SMS, especially 
in the collegiate aviation environment, some of the critical issues are how program policy-
makers can identify the key components of the system, how managers weigh the importance 
of its various dimensions and steps, and how personnel are taught to evaluate the effects of 
these safety practices.  
Pilots’ evaluations of their collegiate program SMS initiatives may thus be interpreted 
as their perceptions of how greatly the program values safety and the effects of adopting such 
a proactive safety model at an organizational level. This study will investigate the effects of a 
collegiate aviation actual SMS initiative on pilots’ safety behaviors for two reasons. The first 
is that even though SMS is gradually becoming an industry accepted benchmark for safety 
and reliability and is getting a lot of advocacy from both the FAA, industry and, ICAO), there 
is still limited research examining SMS related issues (Adjekum, 2014b; Chen, 2014). 
 The second reason is that the success of any SMS initiative depends on a continuous 
action of improvement and a better understanding of personnel perceptions regarding the 
particular system their organization adopts.  Previous studies verify the relationship between 
the implementation of an SMS and the attitudes of employees toward safety behaviors in 
aviation (Remawi, Bates & Dix, 2011).  
It will also be insightful to have a comprehensive understanding of the 
implementation framework as outlined for service providers by regulatory agencies such as 
the FAA. This understanding of the implementation framework will provide organizations 
and service providers such as collegiate aviation programs, who are voluntary participants in 
SMS initiatives, the necessary tools and resources for successful SMS implementation as 
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outlined in the revised Safety Management System for aviation service provider’s manual AC 
120-92B and Safety Management System Voluntary Program Guide (AFS-900-002-G201) 
(FAA, 2015). 
Paucity of Literature in Collegiate Aviation SMS Initiatives 
Generally, there has been a paucity of literature and studies on SMS in collegiate 
aviation, due to only few programs implementing the voluntary FAA SMS initiative, since it 
is not a mandatory regulatory requirement in the US (FAA, 2015a; FAA, 2015b; UND, 
2012). Some of the indirect studies on SMS in collegiate aviation have been targeted at safety 
climate/culture assessments (Dillman, Voges & Robertson, 2010; Adjekum, 2014b; Adjekum 
et al., 2015; Freiwald, Lenz-Anderson & Baker, 2013).  
In terms of validated survey instruments to conduct evaluations of SMS within the 
aviation industry and specifically airlines, Chen and Chen, (2012) developed an SMS 
measurement scale from the perspective of aviation experts and airline managers to evaluate 
the performance of airline’s safety management system. The results revealed a five-factor 
structure consisting of 23 items. The five factors included documentation and commands, 
safety promotion and training, executive management commitment, emergency preparedness 
and response plan, and safety management policy.  
Chen (2014) examined the effects of pilots’ perceptions of Safety Management 
System (SMS) practices, fleet managers’ morality leadership and pilots’ self-efficacy on 
flight crews’ safety behaviors through the mediation of safety motivation. Using a sample of 
239 Taiwanese commercial pilot participants, and Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) 
technique, the results indicated that both perceptions of SMS practices and self-efficacy have 
direct, positive effects on pilots’ safety behaviors (safety participation and safety 
compliance), while the effect of fleet managers’ morality leadership on such behavior was 
fully mediated by pilots’ safety motivation. 
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Leadership and Organizational Safety Performance 
 A substantial number of studies has investigated leadership, both as a construct and as 
a concept, which plays an important role in successful organizational change and is one of the 
key driving forces for improving safety performance (Zohar, 2002; Kelloway, Mullen, & 
Francis, 2006; Kapp, 2012; Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón & Vázquez-Ordás, 2014; 
Pilbeam, Doherty, Davidson & Denyer, 2016).  It can rather be a challenge to define 
leadership out of context, and there have been many definitions based on varying fields of 
studies. Greenberg (2013) defines leadership as “A process whereby one individual 
influences other group members in a non-coercive manner towards the defined group or 
organizational goals, pg. 335).  
Burns (1978) notes that although leadership concepts and theories richly abound in 
extant literature, no central concept of leadership has emerged, because scholars are working 
in separate disciplines to answer specific questions unique to their specialty. Burns asserts 
that due to the influence of research conducted in the field of humanistic psychology, it may 
be possible to make generalizations about leadership across cultures and time. According to 
Burns (1978), the concept of leadership must be aligned with a collective purpose and 
effective leaders must be judged by their ability to make social changes.  
Burns further suggests that the role of the leader and follower be united conceptually 
and that the process of leadership is the interplay of conflict and power. Burns delineates two 
basic types of leadership: transactional and transformational. Transactional leaders approach 
followers with the intent to exchange one thing for another, for example, the leaders may 
reward the hard-working employees with an increase in budget allowance. On the other hand, 
“The Transforming leader looks for potential motives in followers, seeks to satisfy higher 
needs, and engages the full person of the follower” (p. 4).  
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The result of this leadership is a mutual relationship that converts followers to leaders 
and leaders into moral agents. The concept of moral leadership is proposed as a means for 
leaders to take responsibility for their leadership and to aspire to satisfy the needs of the 
followers. Finally, Burns posits that leaders are neither born nor made but rather evolve from 
a structure of motivation, values, and goals.  Martínez-Córcoles, Gracia, Tomás and Peiró 
(2011) conducted a review of the definitions of leadership and concluded that ‘‘a common 
element is present in all of them, namely, that the leader does by means of others or induces 
others to perform activities that they would not carry to completion if this influence were not 
present in the first place’’. 
Eid, Mearns, Larsson, Laberg and Johnsen (2012) suggest that existing safety 
leadership studies published in a variety of academic journals, books and policy documents 
have focused on either transformational–transactional leadership or leader–member exchange 
(LMX). Most of these safety leadership behaviors have been inferred from the reports given 
by subordinates through quantitative survey instruments and both transformational and 
transactional leadership styles are often assessed by completing the MLQ survey developed 
by Avolio and Bass (2004).  
The MLQ measures a broad range of leadership types from passive leaders, to leaders 
who give contingent rewards to followers, to leaders who transform their followers into 
becoming leaders themselves and has been adapted to focus on safety by researchers such as 
Barling, Loughlin, & Kelloway (2002). Studies by Kelloway, Mullen, & Francis (2006) and 
Christian, Bradley, Wallace & Burke (2009) examined the relationship between leadership 
and safety and suggested that safe behavior had an effect on reducing organizational 
accidents. These studies also suggest that leader and sub-ordinate relations has a vital effect 
on the personnel actions.  
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Christian, Bradley, Wallace & Burke (2009) further suggest that generally, front line 
personnel who have high-quality relationships with their leaders are more likely to have more 
positive safety behaviors because the leader and the personnel would have connected to solve 
problems together. They also suggest that personnel who have positive interactions with their 
leaders are more likely to respond to their leaders positively than their colleagues who do not 
have such positive interactions.  
Within the earlier concepts of systems safety and accident prevention strategies, there 
has been a focus on shared leadership. Shared Leadership is another management strategy 
that reflects the change from a top-down management approach to a shared leadership. 
Normally in the regular top-down setting, the individual at the top of an organization or an 
organization unit is the leader and plans, organizes, and directs. The idea of shared leadership 
invites other members in a group to contribute ideas for safety improvement within an 
organization and to take responsibility for leading the rest of the group in certain aspects of 
the productive activities (Brauer, 2006).  
 As a result, the roles of people in the group vary, depending on who is leading a 
particular activity. In one activity, a person may have a leadership responsibility and in the 
next be a participant. Leadership is not limited to only one person. This however may be at 
variance with much more modern concepts, where there is shared responsibility and 
accountability for safety at various levels in the organization but ultimately within the 
organization, there would have to be an accountable executive, who will be the final authority 
when it comes to responsibility and accountability for extremely high risk decision making 
within the organizational hierarchy (ICAO, 2013). 
Effects of Transformational and Transactional Leadership on Safety Performance 
There has been several studies and disparate discourse over which style of leadership 
is best suited for safety performance in organizations (Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1996; Lowe, 
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Kroeck, & Sivasubramaniam, 1996; DeGroot, Kiker & Cross, 2000; Dvir, Eden, Avolio, & 
Shamir, 2002; Zohar, 2002; Kelloway, Mullen, & Francis, 2006; Avolio, Walumbwa & 
Weber, 2009; Inness, Turner, Barling & Stride, 2010; Kapp, 2012; Fernández-Muñiz, 
Montes-Peón, Vázquez-Ordás, 2014).   
Bass and Avolio (1994) suggest that transformational leadership motivates followers 
to improve performance by transforming followers’ attitudes, beliefs, and values as opposed 
to simply gaining compliance. Other the contrary Zohar (2000) suggests that transactional 
leadership helps organizations achieve their current objectives more efficiently by linking job 
performance to valued rewards and by ensuring that employees have the resources they need 
to carry out their work.  
Several studies have found relationships between safety-specific transformational 
leadership (i.e. Transformational leadership specifically focused on enhancing individual and 
organizational safety) and safety-related outcomes, including perceived safety climate, safety 
events, safety consciousness (Kelloway, Mullen, & Francis, 2006), and safety citizenship 
behavior (Conchie & Donald, 2009).  Empirical evidence suggests that transformational 
leadership predicts positive performance outcomes in field experiments, field studies, 
laboratory studies, and meta-analytic studies (Hater & Bass, 1988; Keller, 1992; Howell & 
Avolio, 1993; Barling, Weber, & Kelloway, 1996; Fuller, Patterson, Hester & Stringer, 1996; 
Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1996; Lowe, Kroeck, & Sivasubramaniam, 1996; DeGroot, Kiker & 
Cross, 2000; Dvir, Eden, Avolio, & Shamir, 2002).  
According to Judge and Piccolo (2004), more than 87 studies report positive 
relationships among transformational leadership and organizational outcomes such as safety 
behaviors.  Transformational leadership has received considerable conceptual and empirical 
attention in recent times. In focusing on the scope of this research, transformational 
leadership is defined as “leader behaviors that transform and inspire followers to perform 
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beyond expectations while transcending self-interest for the good of the organization” 
(Avolio, Walumbwa & Weber, 2009, pg. 243). 
 According to Pilbeam, Doherty, Davidson and Denyer (2016) citing earlier works of 
Bass and Riggio (2006), transformational leadership comprises of four leader behaviors. 
Idealized influence is when leaders demonstrate high standards of moral conduct in their own 
behavior. Inspirational motivation occurs when leaders communicate a positive, value-based 
vision for the future state of the organization and its employees. Intellectual stimulation is 
when leaders encourage employees to challenge organizational norms and think creatively. 
Lastly, individual consideration is when leaders recognize the unique needs of followers. 
 In contrast, Zohar (2002) suggested that transactional leadership is based on non-
individualized hierarchical relationships and comprises three dimensions (constructive 
leadership, corrective leadership and laissez-faire leadership). Constructive leadership offers 
material rewards (e.g. increased salary, promotion, job security) contingent upon satisfactory 
performance and requires clear communication between leader and follower. 
 Zohar further stated that some understanding of the individual needs and abilities is 
needed in order to offer motivationally relevant rewards. Corrective leadership (or active 
management by exception) monitors individual performance against standards, detecting 
errors and correcting them. Laissez-faire leadership (passive management by exceptions) 
disowns all leadership responsibility and only engages with subordinates in an emergency. 
In adopting a transactional leadership style for safety, leaders typically establish 
appropriate safety goals, monitor performance towards these goals and reward behaviors that 
sustain or improve safety practices (Zohar, 2002; Kapp, 2012). In contrast, leaders adopting a 
transformational leadership style for safety demonstrate these actions, as outlined in the 
Kelloway et al. (2006) study. These include: expressing satisfaction when jobs are performed 
safely; rewarding achievement of safety targets; continuous encouragement for safe working; 
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maintaining a safe working environment; suggesting new ways of working more safely; 
encouraging employees to openly discuss safety at work; talking about personal value and 
beliefs in the importance of safety; behaving in a way that demonstrates commitment to 
safety; spending time to demonstrate how to work safely; and, listening to safety concerns. 
Bass and Avolio (1994) had earlier suggested that transformational leaders, by 
strongly promoting leader–member exchange, make their followers aware of the importance 
of the results obtained, improve their employees’ innovative and creative behaviors, seek new 
ways of working, seek opportunities in the face of risk, prefer effective answers to efficient 
answers, and are less likely to support the status quo. Transformational leaders generate trust 
and respect among their followers, who are motivated to achieve more than was originally 
expected and move their followers beyond their own self-interests for the sake of the group, 
organization or society (Kapp, 2012).  
The transformational style tends to be considered broader and more effective than the 
transactional style (Avolio and Bass, 2002; Bass and Riggio, 2006). But Stewart (2006) in a 
review of the works of Burns, Bass and Avolio argues that transformational leadership is 
likely to be ineffective in the total absence of a transactional relationship between a leader 
and subordinate. Stewart further advocates that both styles can be combined to achieve the 
desired aims and so can be seen as complementary rather than polar constructs in order to 
achieve their organization’s objectives and goals. 
Transformational leadership can motivate superior employee task and extra role 
performance by creating a positive vision of the organization’s future, empowering 
employees, and placing importance on their needs (Conger & Kanungo, 1998; Avolio and 
Bass, 2002; Bass and Riggio, 2006). Zohar (2002) found out that personnel in a factory who 
were exposed to transformational safety leadership had higher levels of safety compliance (as 
measured by earplug use) when compared with a control group. 
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Clarke and Ward (2006) also found out that transformational leadership was 
positively related to employee safety participation. Transformational safety leadership exerts 
the same effects on safety-specific performance, such as following rules and helping improve 
sub-ordinates safety behavior, by generating motivation to achieve positive change and 
prioritizing employee well-being (Judge & Piccolo, 2004).  
Challenges of Transformational Safety -Specific Leadership 
However, several issues remain with transformational safety-specific leadership. First, 
the salience of safety as an important outcome in the presence of safety-focused leaders is 
understandable; there has been long standing research (Cohen, 1977; Zohar, 1980) showing 
that organizations in which leaders take an active role in promoting safety enjoy better 
organizational safety records. Transformational safety-specific leadership, when used as the 
sole predictor of safety outcomes may confound safety performance and transformational 
leadership. The possibility remains that a safety climate (Wallace & Chen, 2006; Zohar, 
2002) rather than transformational leadership behaviors per se explains variance in employee 
safety performance. 
 Secondly, item content is shared across measures of transformational safety-specific 
leadership (e.g., Barling, Loughlin, & Kelloway, 2002) and employee safety performance 
(Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000) when predictor and criterion variables are collected from the 
same source (i.e., employees), all of the scales contain derivatives of the word safety in every 
item potentially inflating the relationship between predictor and criterion.  
Empirical strength of Transformational Safety-Specific Leadership  
In the Barling, Loughlin and Kelloway, 2002 study, the authors developed, tested, and 
replicated a model in which transformational safety-specific leadership predicted 
occupational injuries in 2 separate studies. Data from 174 restaurant workers (M age=26.75 
years, range=15-64) were analyzed using structural equation modeling and provided strong 
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support for a model whereby transformational safety-specific leadership predicted 
occupational injuries through the effects of perceived safety climate, safety consciousness, 
and safety-related events. 
A second study replicated and extended this model with data from 164 young workers 
from diverse jobs (Mean age=19.54 years, Range=14-24). Transformational safety-specific 
leadership and role overload were related to occupational injuries through the effects of 
perceived safety climate, safety consciousness, and safety-related events. Another study 
(Mullen & Kelloway, 2009) tested the relative effects of safety specific and generalized 
transformational leadership training on employee safety performance, and found an increase 
in transformational safety-specific leadership behaviors in the safety-focused training group. 
However, it was less clear whether there was an increase in generalized transformational 
leadership in either training group, and the relationship between generalized transformational 
leadership and employee safety outcomes was not reported. 
Using focus groups, factor analysis, and validation instruments, Edwards, Knight, 
Broome and Flynn (2010) developed and established psychometrics for the Survey of 
Transformational Leadership (STL).  Their study evaluated clinical directors on leadership 
practices by using 214 counselors within 57 programs in four U.S. regions. Nine themes 
emerged: integrity, sensible risk, demonstrates innovation, encourages innovation, 
inspirational motivation, supports others, develops others, delegates tasks, and expects 
excellence. Reliability for all first-order confirmatory factor analysis STL factors met or 
exceeded Nunally’s (1978) recommendation of (α =.70) for newly developed scales. The 
alpha coefficient (internal consistency) scores ranged from (α =.78, for Supports Others) to (α 
=.97, for Inspirational Motivation). The criterion validity showed Cronbach alphas for the 
validated factors ranged between (α =. 88) and (α =.94). 
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Freiwald (2013) did a comprehensive investigation of the effects of leadership (ethical 
aspect) on measurable safety outcomes such as safety behavior and work place related 
injuries among aviation and healthcare organizations. Freiwald suggested that as the adoption 
of safety management systems becomes mandatory in more areas of aviation, safety 
outcomes will be measured and reported to regulatory agencies for organizations of all sizes 
and types for the first time. Friewald further suggested a strong positive relationship between 
ethical leadership and sub-ordinate safety behavior. 
Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón, Vázquez-Ordás (2014) in an extensive study on 
Safety leadership, risk management and safety performance in Spanish Firms, found out that 
transformational safety leadership directly influenced employee satisfaction. The results of 
the study suggested that transformational leadership transmits to the employees the idea that 
their managers are really concerned about their safety and well-being in the workplace and 
that leads to a reduction in workers’ complaints about working conditions, greater employee 
satisfaction, and consequently, lower turnover in the organization. 
 Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón, Vázquez-Ordás (2014) also found out that, 
transformational safety leadership indirectly affected safety behavior via the proactive risk 
management and safety outcomes via safety compliance. This result was in line with Zohar 
(2002), who, using the transformational leadership model to examine safety management, 
showed that leadership predicts the injury rate through the mediation of safety climate.  
The Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón, Vázquez-Ordás (2014), in contrast, suggested 
that the transactional leadership style did not have a direct effect on safety performance even 
though it had a direct effect on the proactive risk management. The findings also suggest that 
transactional leadership can affect safety outcomes and employee satisfaction, but this effect 
is mediated by the proactive risk management which has an influence on safety participation 
and safety compliance. 
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Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón, Vázquez-Ordás (2014) finally suggest that although 
both styles are not incompatible, the study suggested that the most effective leadership style 
for reducing accidents and injuries and improving employee satisfaction is transformational 
leadership, because this leadership style has a direct effect on safety behavior and employee 
satisfaction. Interestingly, these findings of Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón, Vázquez-Ordás 
is starkly at variance with an earlier study by Inness, Turner, Barling and Stride (2010) which 
suggested that transformational leadership was not related to safety compliance and 
suggested that transactional leadership may encourage safety compliance more among 
personnel. 
In terms of the existing methodologies for assessing leadership styles in organizations, 
Pilbeam, Doherty, Davidson and Denyer (2016) in an extensive review of different safety 
leadership styles from existing literature found out that the majority of studies investigating 
safety leadership utilized scales that provided a quantitative assessment of the leaders’ 
behavior from the perspective of the follower (in this case the employee). Pilbeam et al. 
suggest that this is a clear limitation in understanding of safety leadership. Pilbeam et al. 
argue that such methods rely on both a pre-determined articulation of leader behaviors which 
may not be applicable always and rather provides a retrospective, and necessarily subjective, 
perception of employees to describe leader behaviors, which is often de-contextualized. 
  Pilbeam et al. suggest that new research should focus directly rather than indirectly 
on the leader and their actions and understanding of leadership, examine leadership ‘in the 
moment’ and take account of context, including relationships with others. They argue that 
may provide deeper insights into the important role of leadership in enhancing organizational 
safety performance indicators, such as safety compliance and safety participation. This 
position of Pilbeam et al. echoes similar suggestions by Eid, Mearns, Larsson, Laberg, & 
Johnsen (2012). 
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Based on the existing literature and the premise that there has to be a choice of 
leadership type a researcher needs to measure within the scope of a study, transformational 
leadership may suffice for this research in collegiate aviation operations. Empirical findings 
support the relationship between transformational leadership and enhanced task performance 
and safety behavior (Howell & Avolio, 1993; Barling, Weber, & Kelloway, 1996; Zohar, 
2002; Inness, Turner, Barling & Stride, 2010; Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón, Vázquez-
Ordás, 2014; Pilbeam, Doherty, Davidson & Denyer, 2016).  
These studies provide ample support of the rationale to determine the effect of 
transformational leadership on the level of safety compliance and safety participation of 
operations personnel such as flight students and instructors, within the collegiate aviation 
environment. Safety leadership can potentially influence proactive and cost- effective 
intervention in aviation operations, resulting in positive safety outcomes. It is would therefore 
be insightful to explore the relationship between transformational safety leadership as 
demonstrated by both senior level management and supervisory level managers in collegiate 
aviation programs and the resultant safety behavior of operational personnel. 
Senior Leadership Attitudes to Safety and Safety Culture Perceptions of Personnel 
Within an organization, an individual’s perception of senior managers’ attitudes 
toward safety has been proposed as an important predictor of the organization’s safety culture 
(Zohar, 1980; Seo, Torabi, Blair & Ellis, 2004; Hall, 2006; Fogarty & Shaw, 2009). Hence, 
safety culture studies have highlighted the importance of top management’s attitudes and 
leadership commitment toward safety. In an empirical study, Helmreich and Merritt (2001) 
surveyed pilots working at two airline companies to observe the variance in perceptions of 
leadership attitudes toward safety. While 84% of pilots working at one company were 
confident that top-level leadership never compromised safety, only 12% of pilots working at 
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the other company believed in the leadership’s commitment to safety (Helmreich & Merritt, 
2001).  
The authors emphasized that leadership attitudes influenced pilots ‘attitudes regarding 
safety practices and norms. Indeed, 68% of pilots working at the first company believed that 
management would seriously consider their safety suggestions, compared with 19% of the 
pilots working at the second company (Helmreich & Merritt, 2001).  The study found out that 
the causal mechanism of management attitudes influence on pilot behavior could be 
explained by the second company’s environment.  
The study also found out that up to 88% of pilots working at the second company 
believed that the management compromised safety for the sake of profit. Moreover, they 
believed that high level management ignored their suggestions to improve the organization’s 
safety processes. The study suggested that demoralized and cynical pilots are more likely to 
deviate from safety procedures and norms (Helmreich & Merritt, 2001). In other words, pilots 
develop an attitude favoring low safety standards, because it is difficult to maintain high 
safety standards when perceiving high level management to have low standards. 
  A key indicator of senior management’s commitment to safety is the adequacy of 
resources, including financial support and active involvement in safety initiatives by senior 
management (Simon, 2009). Schiff (2006) suggests that a bottom-up support and 
participation from operational level personnel is equally critical for the success of any safety 
program.  Adjekum (2014b) also posits that senior level management commitment to safety is 
normally reflected in three major areas: Safety Values (SV) which are attitudes and values 
regarding safety expressed, in words and actions, by senior level leadership; Safety 
Fundamentals (SF) which deals with the compliance with regulated aspects of safety such as 
training requirements, manuals, etc.; and Going Beyond Compliance (GBC) wherein priority 
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is given to safety in the allocation of company resources (e.g., equipment, personnel time) 
even though they are not required by regulations. 
 In a study of challenges to the success of the Safety Management System (SMS) in 
aircraft maintenance organizations in Turkey, Gerede (2014) found out that SMS experts and 
managers in rating the success of implementation of SMS initiatives underscored the 
importance of senior management support for the SMS and a real commitment by senior 
management to enhance safety.  Qualitative data were collected from thirty participants 
through an open-ended questionnaire. Both inductive and deductive methods were used for 
the data analysis.  
The study suggested that the SMS entails a cultural transformation and is likely to 
bring about certain challenges because of its new and different characteristics. The study 
suggested that senior management holds the major responsibility in safety assurance and are 
authorized to decide on goals and objectives, and the allocation of resources in the 
organization. The results also buttressed the assertion that senior management leadership 
capabilities and commitment to safety play a major role in the reinforcement of a positive 
safety culture.  
While senior management plays a role in the emergence of problems related to a “Just 
Culture”, the same senior management holds the power and resources to solve these 
problems. Senior level management is also responsible for promotion of the safety initiative 
in an organization, since a “visible” safety program helps to set the stage for improved 
employee attitude (Transport Canada, 2008). Periodic safety related training and inspections 
by top management help to convince personnel that the program is not merely administrative 
program of the month, but is an item of real concern. 
 When personnel participate in safety initiatives, the safety program evolves into an 
active force in the organization (Patankar, 2003) and these employees subconsciously 
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develop the habit of planning ahead and examining the safety, production, quality, and cost 
aspects of the task before them (Roughton, 2002). Although the physical safe-guarding of the 
workplace is a real factor in safety, the mental attitude of the employee is the ultimate key to 
avoiding incidents (Roughton, 2002).  
The quality of leadership provided by senior level management personnel within 
collegiate aviation programs is believed to have a significant influence on flight students and 
instructors’ behaviors, as there is considerable evidence to support the causal relationship 
between the leadership styles or types and the performance of subordinates (Barling & 
Kelloway, 2002; Jong & Hartog, 2007).  
Within collegiate aviation operations, the flight operational leadership consists of the 
director of flight operations, chief flight instructors and assistant chief flight instructors. 
These are the senior level management leadership that provides operational control. 
Therefore, examining whether these program managers’ transformational leadership style 
enhances pilots’ motivation to acceptable levels of safety behaviors may provide crucial 
insights into the underlying factors linking leadership and employee behaviors. 
Underlying Theories- Safety Motivation, Safety Behavior and Safety Performance 
Research has shown that people’s perceptions affect their behavior. More specifically, 
perception of risk affects the likelihood to exhibit certain behaviors (Cooper, 2000; Hunter, 
2006; Forgaty & Shaw, 2009; Dillard, Ferrer, Ubel, & Fagerlin, 2012).  Some safety 
professionals strongly advocate for a focus on safety behavior modification and behavior –
based safety (BBS) within organizations implementing SMS (Brauer, 2006; Cooper, 2009). 
BBS is defined as "A process that creates a safety partnership between management and 
employees that continually focuses people's attentions and actions on theirs, and others, daily 
safety behavior and focuses on what people do, analyzes why they do it, and then applies a 
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research-supported intervention strategy to improve what people do" (Geller, 2004; Cooper, 
2009). 
 In general, behavior-based safety techniques focus on work processes. In analyzing 
work processes, the workgroup identifies behaviors that are critical to safe process 
performance. They measure how well the group completes safe behaviors. Measurement 
typically requires observation. Analysis of performance provides feedback to the participants. 
Participants also identify and resolve other process elements that impact the ability to 
perform safely as part of the continuous improvement process (Brauer, 2006).  
To be effective, those in the workgroup need training on hazard recognition, 
evaluation, and control as well as learning how behaviors that are part of the process can 
contribute to the safety of the work. The participants may need to change their approach to 
how safety is handled in the process. It requires a shift from a top-down management style. It 
requires broad participation and collaboration among members of a work group (Brauer, 
2006; Yates, 2015). 
The aim of this organizational behavior modification approach is to ensure that a 
proactive safety initiative such as SMS is based upon the hierarchy of hazard identification, 
and safety risk mitigation strategies. However, such behavioral modification approach should 
not be used in preference to the implementation of reasonably practicable safety measures 
further up the organizational hierarchy (Krause, 2005; Cooper, 2009). Generally, 
interventions and strategies that aim at positively influencing the safety behavior of personnel 
within an organization should also have some strong theoretical bedrock of safety motivation 
that will ensure that personnel’s safety performance will meet set safety goals and objectives 
(Yates, 2015). 
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Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs Theory 
Theoretically there are competing schools of thought on the effects of safety behavior 
and motivations on safety outcomes and performance.  Abraham Maslow introduced the 
Hierarchy of Needs Theory (Maslow, 1970) to explain human motivations and needs. In this 
theory, Maslow proposed that all human beings are motivated by unsatisfied needs and that 
certain lower factors need to be satisfied before higher needs can be satisfied. Maslow 
theorized that the lower needs have to be satisfied before the next need level serves as a 
motivator. Furthermore, once the lower level need has been satisfied, it no longer serves as a 
motivator.  
Maslow’s Hierarchy Theory underpins the essence of identifying those underlying 
potential motivational factors that can enhance proactive safety behavior in collegiate 
aviation programs (McLeod, 2014). Collegiate flight student's cognitive needs, which affect 
their decision making process and largely safety behavior, can be enhanced if their basic 
physiological needs are met.  
For example, a fatigued and hungry flight student may find it difficult to focus on 
flight activities, which could be a precursor to an unsafe act.  Flight students need to feel 
emotionally and physically safe and accepted within their programs to progress and reach 
their full potential. Maslow suggests that flight students must be shown that they are valued 
and respected by their instructors and flight managers in order to create a supportive and safe 
flight training environment. 
McGregor’s Theory X and Theory Y 
Douglas McGregor postulated two theories of organization management and 
employee motivation, calling them Theory X and Theory Y (McGregor, 1960).  Under Theory 
X, McGregor states that leadership assumes the following: Motivation occurs only at the 
physiological and security levels of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. Most people are self-
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centered and as a result, they must be closely controlled and often coerced to achieve 
organizational objectives. To summarize Theory X, McGregor believed that the main source 
of most employee motivation is monetary, with security as a strong second and leaders can 
manage safety behavior by coercion, threats, or micromanagement (Stewarts, 2010; 
Sorenson, 2015).  
In Theory Y, McGregor theorizes that employees are motivated primarily at the 
esteem and self-actualization levels. Almost in contrast to Theory X, leadership in Theory Y 
makes the following general assumptions that personnel will be self-directed and creative to 
meet their work and organizational safety objectives if they are committed to them. Personnel 
will be committed to their safety and productivity objectives if rewards that address higher 
needs such as self-fulfillment are in place. This particular aspect of the Theory Y has 
profound implications for personnel to have “buy-in” and participate in safety programs 
initiated in collegiate aviation program.  
 Under Theory Y, the capacity for creativity spreads throughout organizations and 
most personnel can handle responsibility because creativity and ingenuity are common in the 
population. Under these conditions outlined by Theory Y, personnel will seek out 
responsibility and an organization can decentralize control and reduce the number of 
management levels required to operate safely.  
Under Theory Y, the scope of work by personnel can be broadened, which adds 
variety and opportunities, while engaging employees in the decision-making process. 
Personnel are allowed to set performance objectives and participate in the process of 
evaluating how well they were met (Sorenson, 2015). However, the drawback in these two 
theories is that neither of these approaches are optimal and the best management method in 
terms of safety motivation and behavior, may lie somewhere between the two approaches 
(Sorenson, 2015). 
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Frederick Herzberg’s Motivational Theory (Two-Factor Theory) 
Another important theory that underpins safety motivation and safety behavior is the 
Frederick Herzberg’s Motivational Theory (Two-Factor Theory). In this theory, Herzberg 
attempted to explain factors that motivate individuals through identifying and satisfying their 
individual needs, desires, and the aims pursued to satisfy these desires (Hines, 1973; Neil, 
2007; Greenberg, 2013). Herzberg stated that motivation can be split into two major 
categories: hygiene factors and motivation factors. The Hygiene factors affect the level of 
dissatisfaction but are rarely noted as creators of job satisfaction. However, if these factors 
are not present or satisfied, they can demotivate a person.  
Herzberg’s Hygiene factors include the following: supervision, interpersonal 
relationships, physical working conditions and salary. Job dissatisfaction, under normal 
circumstances, is not normally attributed to motivation factors. However, when they are 
present, they serve as motivational factors. Motivation factors include achievement, 
advancement, recognition and responsibility.  
The drawback of this theory and implication on safety behavior is that whenever there 
is shortage of motivation factors present in the work environment, personnel may focus on 
other factors, such as the hygiene factors and when there are unfavorable working conditions 
and production pressures under limited resources resulting in job dissatisfaction, that could be 
a recipe for unsafe behaviors and possible accidents (Schultz & Schultz, 2010).  
Another limitation of the two-factor theory is the relatively explicit assumption that 
well motivated and satisfied personnel will exhibit better safety behavior. This assumption 
might not always be the case as an individual's expectancy that a given behavior will bring a 
valued outcome may determine their choice of means and the effort they will devote to these 
means (Neil, 2007; Mazur, 2013; Greenberg, 2013). 
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Skinner’s Operant Learning Theory 
According to the Operant Learning Theory, behavior is a function of the person's 
environment and can be modified by rearranging the consequences of the behavior (Skinner, 
1953).  According to Skinner, behavior with positively reinforcing consequences (e.g., 
increased earnings or reductions in amount of effort required to do a task) tends to increase in 
frequency, whereas behavior with punishing consequences (e.g., disciplinary actions) tends to 
diminish in frequency.  
The implications of this theory for operational safety, especially in a flight training 
environment is that personnel may have a tendency to act safely, and follow training 
guidelines and safety instructions since the outcomes are positive as compared to unsafe acts, 
which may have adverse consequences. In reality this assertion may not always hold true, 
since personnel may not know the outcome of certain actions, especially in novel situations 
and would only get to know of the outcome in hindsight. Some personnel may also engage in 
some operational activities in an unsafe manner, but due to the absence of other vital pre-
cursors of accident causation, such as unsafe conditions or just plain luck, nothing adverse 
happen, creating an illusion of invulnerability (Reason, 2008). 
Thorndike's Reinforcement Theory 
The Thorndike's Reinforcement Theory states that behavioral responses to stimuli that 
are followed by a satisfactory response will be strengthened, but responses that are followed 
by discomfort will be weakened (Nevin, 1999).  The theory essentially postulates that 
behaviors that are rewarded are often repeated, and those behaviors that are not rewarded are 
less likely to occur in the future. The Reinforcement Theory looks at the relationship between 
behavior and its consequences. The defining factor of reinforcement theory is, of course, 
reinforcement, which can be either positive or negative.  
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The first component, Positive reinforcement uses favorable consequences that 
reinforce the desired behavior as the correct behavior. In terms of safety behavior, when 
personnel in an organization meet safety performance targets, such as incident free 
production over a period of time (a desired behavior), safety awards and recognition are 
given (positive reinforcement), making it more likely for personnel to repeat that same 
behavior that resulted in the positive reinforcement (Nevin, 1999; Mazur, 2013). Other 
examples of positive reinforcement may include pay raises and bonuses for flight instructors 
who undertake incident –free training over a period of time, promotions, safety awards and 
public recognition. In collegiate aviation, leadership can give free training hours to flight 
students for exemplary safety operations and behavior. The use of positive reinforcement 
could increase operational productivity and improve students and department morale. 
Evidence suggest that the use of rewards such special parking slots and inexpensive 
household items and special recognition for safe behavior of personnel can enhance 
operational productivity and safety. In a polystyrene production company, personnel earned 
safety points for accident-free productive activities within a time frame and were recognized 
and rewarded. This action on the part of management actually raised the productivity of that 
company by 16.5 percent, lowered error rates by 40percent and lowered accident rates by 
43.7 percent (Greenberg, 2013).  
The other component of the theory, Negative reinforcement, also referred to as 
avoidance, rewards a behavior by removing negative or undesirable consequences, which 
strengthens the probability of the behavior being repeated. Negative reinforcement, or 
avoidance, is used by managers to show personnel what the consequences of unacceptable 
behavior will be (Nevin, 1999; Neil, 2007). The goal of Negative reinforcement is to get the 
employee to avoid the unacceptable behavior. If an employee does not engage in the 
unacceptable behavior, then he or she will not experience the consequence. Both positive and 
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negative reinforcement have the ability to increase the likelihood of a desired behavior being 
repeated. However, in reality, both positive and negative reinforcement do not always work, 
and create the path for the use of two other reinforcement strategies such as punishment and 
extinction (Nevin, 1999; Mazur, 2013; Greenberg, 2013).  
However, it may not be reasonable to assume that generally rewards and 
reinforcements may correlate with desired safety performance. Generally, not all 
organizations have had success with such behavior modification programs, since there may 
be other confounding variables that could influence accident causation, such as unsafe 
working environment and operational and productive pressures in a resource constrained 
environment (Reason, 1998; Greenberg, 2013). Such reinforcements may prove ineffective, 
as in the case of a worker who is pushed by production pressures or inflexible technology to 
take risks or exhibit unsafe behaviors (ICAO, 2009).  
These reinforcement theories could also create a situation where personnel may feel 
reluctant or may simply not report near-misses, unsafe actions and hazards perceived to be 
attributable to them, due to the fear of losing out on rewards or smearing a determined 
unblemished safety performance record. That state of affairs in any organization could 
adversely affect a proactive safety risk management process in an SMS. 
Vroom's Expectancy Theory 
Whereas Maslow and Herzberg look at the relationship between internal needs and 
the resulting effort expended to fulfil them, Vroom's Expectancy Theory separates effort 
(which arises from motivation), performance, and outcomes and assumes that behavior 
results from conscious choices among alternatives whose purpose it is to maximize pleasure 
and to minimize pain (Vroom, 1964; Bandura, 1986; Greenberg, 2013). Vroom realized that 
an employee's performance is based on individual factors such as personality, skills, 
knowledge, experience and abilities.  
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The Expectancy Theory states that effort, performance and motivation are linked in a 
person's motivation and the variables Expectancy, Instrumentality and Valence are used to 
account for this (Greenberg, 2013; Yates, 2015). While Maslow’s Theory and other theories 
do not allow for the same degree of individuality between people. This model takes into 
account individual perceptions and thus personal histories, allowing a richness of response 
not obvious in Maslow, who assume that people are essentially all the same.  
The Expectancy Theory has implication for both personnel and leadership in an 
organization in terms of safety motivation and behavior. Personnel would change their level 
of effort according to the value they place on the bonus they receive from a process and on 
their perception of the strength of the links between effort and outcome (Bandura, 1986; 
Greenberg, 2013). Organizational leadership should use systems that tie rewards very closely 
to safety performance and leaders should ensure that the rewards provided are deserved and 
wanted by the deserving personnel (Greenberg, 2013). In order to improve the effort-
performance tie, leaders should engage in training to improve their capabilities and improve 
their belief that added effort will in fact lead to better performance. 
Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) 
Another theoretical foundation to human behavior has been proposed by Ajzen (1991; 
2005) in the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB). The theory explains the psychological 
aspects of employee behavior and the principal assumption of the TPB has to do with the 
intentions behind any human action. Ajzen posits that intentions to perform any kind of 
behavior are guided by different considerations: attitude toward behavior, subjective norm, 
and perceived behavioral control. The theory postulates that individuals’ intentions regarding 
any kind of behavior can be predicted with a high degree of accuracy by their attitudes 
toward behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control constructs. Second, the 
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predicted intentions, together with perceived behavioral control, can explain variances in 
actual behavior 
According to Fogarty and Shaw (2009), Ajzen introduced the intention variable to 
strengthen the relation between attitudes and behavior, because attitudes sometimes fail to 
become behavior due to many other factors preventing individuals from converting their 
attitudes into behaviors. In other words, an individual’s own attitude toward behavior, 
subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control can be used to predict intentions 
regarding any safety issue. Intention can in this way be used to predict actual safety behavior 
Error Management, Behavior-Based Safety and Safety Compliance Enforcement 
 There has been an ongoing debate among safety theorist and safety professionals on 
the merits and demerits of using safety behavior modifiers inclusive of disciplinary actions 
and other forms of punitive actions in error managements and other forms of non-compliance 
with safety procedures and regulations (Reason, 2008; Cooper, 2009; Dekker, 2014; Yates, 
2015). Within an SMS, the aim of enhancing a desired safety behavior among personnel is to 
build a proactive safety culture, which has one of it tenets a Just Culture that balances 
accountability with learning (Dekker, 2007).  
Within the framework of safety behavior modification, proponents, such as Geller 
(2004; 2005), Cooper (2009), and Goetsch (2010) advocates for a Behavior Based Safety 
(BBS) model that consists of seven principles, namely: intervention; identification; 
identification of internal factors; motivation to behave in the desired manner; focus on the 
positive consequences of appropriate behavior; application of the scientific method, 
integration of information; and planned interventions to control individual behavior in an 
organization. 
Even though BBS interventions have been quite effective in certain organizations in 
modifying safety behaviors (Cooper, 2009), advances in BBS should not lead one to forget 
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that behavior is only one factor in an interrelated web of safety and accident causation and 
that engineering solution rather than punitive- based compliance strategies are sometimes the 
most effective (Holden, 2009). Violations, work-arounds, shortcuts, and non-compliant 
behaviors are real –time challenges and important topics in modern performance –based 
safety management initiatives such as SMS (Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2011; ICAO, 2013). 
However, some organizational theorist and safety professionals believe that punitive 
actions for errors and safety infractions are justified to ensure organizational safety 
compliance (Cooper, 2009; Greenberg, 2013). Inness et al. (2010) even suggest that in order 
to achieve safety compliance, formal control through rewards and punishments may be more 
appropriate. These proponents place the burden of causality for errors and unsafe behaviors in 
organizations on human traits and actions. Proponents of the Person-Centered Safety Theory 
argue that if rewards can be used to systematically encourage desirable and precisely safe 
operational behavior, then punishment can be used to discourage undesirable and unsafe 
behavior (Cooper, 2009).  
Person-Centered Safety Theory 
An early proponent of the Person-Centered Safety Theory was Heinrich and his 
Domino Theory of Accident Causation, which postulates that an accident occurs only as a 
result of a personal or mechanical hazard (Hollnagel, 2009; Goetsch, 2010; Yates, 2015). The 
theory emphasizes, that personal and mechanical hazards exist only through the fault of 
careless persons or poorly designed or improperly maintained equipment. Faults of persons 
are inherited or acquired as a result of their social environment or acquired by ancestry and 
that the environment is where and how a person was raised and educated. Heinrich advocated 
that the unsafe behavior of personnel or the mechanical or physical hazard should receive the 
most attention. These attentions may include the use of enforcement measures such as 
punishment (Holden, 2009; Inness et al., 2010; Goetsch, 2010). 
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Greenberg (2013) argues that an organization should have a systematic administration 
of punishment and that the unpleasant outcome of the punishment in response to an unsafe 
behavior would send a signal to the personnel involved in the safety non-compliant behavior 
and other personnel that such behavior will not be tolerated and will curtail future incidents. 
The challenges with these practice is how an organization uses punishment to moderate 
behavior and how to effectively administer punishment.   
 Greenberg (2013)  further recommends that levels of punishment should be graduated 
and commensurate with the severity of the outcome of the actions, punishments should focus 
on the personnel’s actions and not on the personality of the personnel, punishment should be 
consistently applied to all personnel without any form of partiality and finally the reason for 
punishments should be explicitly communicated to personnel, since that help to strengthen 
the previewed connection between the undesired behavior and the consequences of the 
actions. 
 Organizational and Systems-Centered Theory 
On the other extreme are those who dismiss the Person –Centered Theory in favor of 
the Organizational and Systems-Centered Theory (Reason, 2008; Holden, 2009; Hollnagel, 
2009). These advocates opine that accidents are caused by multiple factors and occur due to 
the complex interactions of numerous work system elements, human and non-human. Some 
of these advocates against the Person-Centered Theory include Reason (1998; 2000; 2008) 
and Dekker (2003a; 2007; 2011; 2014), who argue strongly against the unbridled use of 
punishment as a safety behavior modification tool especially in high reliability organizations 
such as aviation and healthcare.  
Dekker (2007; 2011) posits that punitive actions and other attempts to keep people 
accountable for human errors and unsafe behaviors are predicated upon person-centered 
causality, reminiscent of fellow servant and contributory negligence rules of the not-so-
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distant past.  Dekker strongly makes a case that blame and punishment comes from social 
cognition research on accountability and that person-centered causal attribution of work place 
accidents need not involve blame. Even though quite unconventional, Dekker advocates that 
punishing of personnel for unsafe behavior protects false beliefs about basically safe systems 
where humans are the least reliable components. Punishment emphasizes that failures are 
deviant, that they do not naturally belong in the system and rather conditions others to not get 
caught next time.  
Bad Apple Theory 
The Bad Apple Theory of safety management “identifies bad apples (unreliable 
human components) somewhere in an organization, and gets rid of them or somehow 
constrains their activities” and this is what safety scholars such as Dekker (2014), Reason 
(2008) and Hollnagel (2009) describe as belonging to the “old view” of human error, which 
states that the system in which people work is basically safe and success is intrinsic. The “old 
view” of human error according to Dekker (2014) sees the major threat to safety as the 
inherent unreliability of people and that progress on safety can be made by protecting the 
system from unreliable humans through selection, proceduralization, automation, training and 
discipline.  
Person Attribution Theory 
Reason (2000; 2008) posits that the Person Attribution Theory that has blame and 
punishments as some of its components and is directed mainly at reducing unwanted 
variability in human behavior may have associated counter-benefits. The methods under this 
Theory advocates for appealing to people’s sense of fear, writing another procedure (or 
adding to existing ones), disciplinary measures, threat of litigation, retraining, naming, 
blaming, and shaming. 
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Human Factors Theory 
The Human Factors Theory posits that accidents are entirely the result of human error 
(Goetsch, 2010; Yates, 2015). These errors are categorized broadly as overload resulting 
from a task being beyond the capability of the worker, environmental factors (noise, 
distractions, etc.), internal factors (personal problems, emotional stress) and situational 
factors (unclear instructions, risk level). The theory posits that human error can be the result 
of inappropriate and unsafe behavior and oftentimes, undertaking a task without the requisite 
training can lead to accidents and injuries. The Human Factors Theory finally propounds that 
unfamiliarity with equipment and procedures and misjudging the degree of risk associated 
with the task are examples of unsafe activities. 
Petersen’s Theory (Accident/ Incident Theory) 
The Petersen’s Theory (Accident/ Incident Theory) is basically an extension of the 
Human Factors accident causation model with additional elements such as ergonomic traps, 
the decision to err, and system failures (Goetsch, 2010; Yates, 2015). Petersen stated that a 
decision to err by an employee may be an unconscious and based on logic, or it could be a 
conscious decision. Factors such as deadlines, peer pressure, and budget factors could make a 
person decide to behave in an unsafe manner. One important factor in the Petersen Model 
that causes a person to make a logical decision to disregard procedures is the “Superman 
Syndrome.” The Superman Syndrome leads the person to believe that he is invincible or 
bulletproof, simply because “it won’t happen to me or accidents happen to others who don’t 
pay attention.” 
The addition of system failure to the Petersen Model is an important step in 
identifying the potential for causal relationship between management decisions or 
management behaviors regarding safety. System failure helps establish and solidify 
management’s role in the accident prevention process. It also helps identify the avenues in 
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which the system can fail, such as clearly defining areas of responsibility, inspections, 
measurements, training, and orientation of employees.  
In the Petersen Model, management’s role is multilayered and responsible for setting 
policies, placing responsibility, training employees, following up on training and enforcement 
of policies with inspections to ensure compliance. Management is also charged with 
enforcing standards with corrective actions.  
Challenges of Behavior-Based Safety Approach and Error Management in SMS 
Other safety scholars such as Van den Hoven (2001) suggest that personnel 
sometimes engage in unsafe behavior because they lack the authority to make risk-based 
decisions during productive activities that they are responsible for, especially when 
constrained by goals other than safety. Klien (1998) also suggests that personnel may 
sometimes engage in unsafe behavior because time and other resources for making sense of a 
situation are lacking, information may not be at hand or may be ambiguous, and there may be 
no neutral or additional expertise to draw on. 
Helander (2006), in arguing for a systems approach to errors and unsafe behaviors, 
writes “the notion that the operator should be punished or personally made responsible is 
unwarranted, unless of course there is a clear violation of regulations” (p.340).  Woods and 
Cook (1999) also argue that undesired safety behaviors and violations are sometimes adaptive 
and not irrational. When seen through the lens of local rationality i.e., given what the worker 
knew at the time, what was the mindset, and what were the goals, most violations appear to 
be reasonable or at least understandable. 
Organizational leadership is faced with two major choices in dealing with violations 
and non-compliant safety behaviors. Non-compliant safety behavior can be treated as the 
behaviors of bad people, and mitigated with person-centered solutions, such as enforcement 
and subsequent punishments or treat such behaviors as an indicator for better design of the 
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system properties that necessitate violations (DeJoy, 2005; Reason, 2008). System design 
should also include support systems that keep personnel safe when they have to go outside of 
protocol or work around a flawed system (Dekker, 2011; 2014).  
Although many safety professionals advocate for the latter approach, the former 
person-centered approach appears to dominate in organizational set-ups, including some 
aviation organizations (Dekker, 2007; 2011). Some companies will fire or demote employees 
who are involved in accidents due to failure to follow safety procedures in an effort to show 
their commitment to safety (DeJoy, 2005).   
The downside of using this type of punishment is that it creates an adversarial 
relationship between personnel and management and may also stifle personnel proactivity in 
participating in safety initiatives or under-report safety occurrences and near-misses for fear 
of punitive action. Such a safety climate can adversely affect the implementation of an SMS 
initiative by stifling both safety participation and safety compliance (Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 
2000; Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2011).  
Relationship between Pilots’ Self-Efficacy, Safety Motivation and Safety Behavior 
Research suggests that people with high levels of self-efficacy have greater beliefs in 
their own capabilities to achieve certain goals and that pilots with higher perceived self-
efficacy are likely to better resist pressure and devote more efforts to improving their work-
related and management performance (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995). Individual self-
efficacy has been applied as the observed predictor in the number of studies that investigate 
pilots’ work-related behaviors (Parasuraman, Molloy & Singh, 1993; Prinzel, 2002).  
Prior research demonstrates that self-efficacy has effects on the level of motivation, 
learning and performance (Schunk and Pajares, 2001). Graham and Weiner (1995), for 
example, stated that self-efficacy is a consistent predictor of behavior and behavioral change. 
However, self-efficacy has been noted to be a double-edged sword which may lead to the 
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concern that pilots with high self-efficacy may be more likely to take dangerous short-cuts 
because of overconfidence (Prinzel, 2002). Within the collegiate aviation environment, that 
may be worrisome.  
As part of the SMS initiatives, some of the collegiate programs have implemented 
proactive data monitoring systems such as flight data monitoring (FDM) on their fleet (UND, 
2012). The aim of these proactive safety tools is to capture exceedances and excursions 
outside the normal flight envelopes during flight training. The data accrued are monitored and 
analyzed for trends that depict exceedances. Corrective actions in terms of changes in 
procedures and gaps in training methods closed. Therefore, within practical limits, 
overconfidence on the parts of either students or flight instructors which may creep in due to 
high self-efficacy resulting in safe flight parameters exceedances can be picked up early and 
controlled.  
Relationship between Safety Behavior and Safety- Related Events (SRE) 
 Transformational safety leadership and the resultant commitment by senior level 
management to safety may enhance operational safety performance. However, there is also a 
relationship between personnel safety performance indicators such as compliance with safety 
regulations, and safety related events (Zohar, 2002). Safety performance involves behaviors 
that directly contribute to developing a safe work environment. Therefore, behaviors that are 
characteristic of safety compliance will lead to fewer safety- related events in the workplace 
(Griffin & Neal, 2000). For example, personnel who comply with established safety 
regulations are less likely to experience safety- related events than those who do not comply 
with established safety regulations.  
The relationship between safety participation and safety related events is also 
examined in this study. Studies on the effect of individual risk perceptions on participation in 
health and safety programs illustrate that perceived risk directly predicts participation (Cree 
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& Kelloway, 1997; Goldberg, Dar-el, & Rubin, 1991). Individuals who experience close calls 
or safety related events, display higher levels of safety participation (Mullen, 2004). Cree and 
Kelloway (1997) suggest that exposure to workplace accidents or safety related events 
strongly influence an individual’s own perception of risk so that their perceived risk increases 
as exposure to the events increases. 
 Mullen (2004) found that perceived risks associated with a job tended to be 
heightened when an individual vicariously experienced or learned about an injury that occurs 
within the workplace. In such cases, an individual is at risk of becoming injured while 
performing the job. In fact, workers report that a shock or close call raises safety awareness 
and helps them realize the potential consequences of unsafe behavior (Mullen, 2004).  
Self-reported safety behavior and safety attitudes can be an alternative to relying on 
mishaps data to evaluate the effectiveness of an organization’s safety program. For example, 
Thompson et al. (1998) suggested that minor workplace accidents often go unreported, yet 
these events may be the best indicators of improving (or worsening) safety conditions that 
might eventually lead to serious injury or safety related events.  
On the flip-side, safety- related events, or close calls, resulting in the realization of the 
importance of safety in the workplace can increase the likelihood that individuals would 
voluntarily perform their work safely (Mullen, 2004; Zohar, 2002). These safety- related 
events are a direct function of the safety climate, within the organization. The call for 
increased research focused on identifying factors that are associated with safety compliance 
and participation has also come from Neal and Griffin’s (2002) review of the safety climate 
and safety events literature. 
 Findings from Neal and Griffin (2002) support the relationship between safety 
climate, safety events and safety behavior. Neal and Griffin (2002) also hypothesized that 
safety behavior could be defined by the underlying construct measures of safety compliance 
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and safety participation. While Neal and Griffin (2002) suggested that safety climate is one of 
the potential predictors of safety behavior, they further identified other potential predictors of 
safety behavior as supportive leadership and conscientiousness. In a previous study, Griffin 
and Neal (2000) suggested that conscientiousness predicted safety motivation, safety 
compliance, and safety participation. Other studies have suggested that a key component of 
conscientiousness is self-efficacy (Scwazzer & Jerusalem, 1995; Chen, 2014).  
In other studies, Neal and Griffin (2006) found that perceptions of knowledge about 
safety and motivation to perform work functions safely significantly influenced self-report of 
task and contextual safety performance, namely safety compliance and safety participation. 
For these reasons, the authors suggest that an enhanced safety climate, through SMS 
implementation could be a viable predictor of safety compliance and safety participation. The 
authors also suggest that safety behavior may be intrinsically associated with safety events.  
Summary and Conclusions 
After an extensive synthesis of literature on SMS initiatives, implementation in 
aviation, transformational safety leadership, safety motivation and self-efficacy and their 
potential inter-relationships, there is ample evidence that there exists some level of paucity of 
literature on the inter-relationships of these variables within collegiate aviation programs in 
the US. While most research has focused on the airline, maintenance and air -traffic 
organizations, there have been minimal studies focused on SMS implementation in collegiate 
aviation.  
This apparent minimal focus may be attributed to the fact that there is presently no 
regulatory requirement for aviation training organizations (ATOs) such as collegiate aviation 
programs in the US to implement SMS in their operations (FAA, 2012). However most of the 
existing SMS programs running in collegiate programs are basically voluntary and fledgling 
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in nature, and have not reached a matured point for a systematic evaluation of the processes 
and system.  
 The success of any SMS initiative depends on a continuous improvement and a better 
understanding of front-line operational personnel’s perceptions regarding the particular safety 
system their organization adopts.  Previous studies verified the relationship between the 
implementation of SMS and the attitudes of employees towards safety in airport operations 
(Remawi, Bates & Dix, 2011). It was important to replicate such studies in collegiate aviation 
operations.  Finally, it was insightful to have a comprehensive understanding through 
structural equation models of the relationship between SMS initiatives, self-efficacy, 
transformational safety leadership on safety behavior, when safety motivation was used as a 
mediating variable in collegiate aviation programs.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 RESEARCH METHOD 
The intent of this concurrent triangulation mixed-methods study was to evaluate the 
inter-relationships between SMS initiatives, safety leadership, safety climate, self-efficacy, 
safety motivation and safety behavior in a collegiate aviation program in the US. The study 
aimed at filling a gap in research on SMS initiatives in collegiate aviation programs, add to 
existing literature, and establish a coherent relationship between these variables through the 
use of a comprehensive concurrent triangulation approach. Another aim of this study was to 
establish a proactive operational safety change and benchmark for continuous monitoring and 
improvements in SMS implementations within collegiate aviation programs. 
In this study, a quantitative survey instrument was used to examine the relationship 
between the perceptions of collegiate aviation flight personnel, i.e., flight students including 
those with certified flight instructor ratings and employed in the program on Safety 
Management System (SMS) initiatives, Transformational Safety Leadership (TSL), Self-
Efficacy (SE), and Self-Reported Safety Behaviors (SB) while mediating with Safety 
Motivation (SM). Safety behavior was measured by Safety Compliance (SC) and Safety 
Participation (SP).  The various dimensions were measured using the validated scales 
outlined in chapter one and Appendix A. 
 A hypothesized measurement model was evaluated using the data from the responses 
of the sample of collegiate aviation personnel. The results were analyzed using both first –
order and second-order Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and Structural Equation 
Modeling (SEM) to determine the strengths of relationship among the variables while 
iteratively determining the quality of both the hypothesized and final measurement models 
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for the interactions. The relationship between these indicators of safety and safety outcomes 
(self -reported safety events) was also be explored. 
 Concurrently, selected senior level management personnel/process owners (Assistant 
Dean, Director of Academic Research, Director of Aviation Safety, and the Director of Flight 
Operation) perspective on the state of SMS initiative and implementation in the program was 
assessed through semi-structured interviews (Maxwell, 2005; Glesne, 2011). The rationale 
for this assessment was to provide an insight into the strategic perspective of the operational 
safety state in the aviation program. Another reason for the interview was to determine if 
there existed real-time perceptual safety gaps in the SMS initiative and the inter-relationship 
with the other research variables from the findings of the artifact/document analysis and 
students’/instructors perceptions.  
The final triangulation process was to integrate the quantitative data from the survey 
of respondents’ perceptions on research variables, over-arching themes emerging from 
coding/nodes of semi-structured interview transcripts of selected senior management 
personnel, forensic analysis of safety artifacts/documents containing aggregate data of safety 
performance indicators. Some of the safety performance indicators used was the number of 
confidential safety reports filed by personnel and closed reports/feedback from safety office, 
attendance to safety meetings, and number of students and instructors formally trained in 
SMS between the active applicant period to the active conformance stage (2012-2016) of the 
SMS initiative. 
Research Design  
Concurrent Triangulation Mixed Method Approach 
A concurrent- triangulation strategy of mixed-methods design was used to collects 
both quantitative, qualitative and documented aggregate safety data concurrently. The three 
databases were compared to determine if there existed convergence, divergence, or some 
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combinations. This approach has been found to help in comparing and cross-validating the 
multi-sourced findings. This approach generally uses separate quantitative and qualitative 
methods as a means to offset the inherent weaknesses in one method with the strength of the 
other (Creswell, 2009; Glesne, 2011).  
The results from all the analyses were integrated during the discussion /data 
interpretation phase. A side- by- side integration had the quantitative analysis done first 
followed by the qualitative analysis and then the document analysis to either support or 
disconfirm the quantitative results. Figure 8 shows a two-dimensional overview of the 
concurrent triangulation mixed-method approach. 
 
 
Figure 8. An overview of the concurrent triangulation mixed-method approach. 
Methodology 
Population 
The study focused on the responses to a survey instruments from a random sample of 
respondents enrolled in flight-related courses within a population of flight students and flight 
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instructors in an accredited four-year undergraduate degree awarding collegiate aviation 
program (49 CFR Part 141) of a public owned university in the Mid-Western United States 
(N= 800). The aviation program also offers graduate level degrees in aviation and aerospace 
sciences. The aviation program in the university has been recognized by the FAA as an 
active conformant in the implementation of the voluntary SMS program.  The concurrent 
qualitative phase of the study involved a semi-structured interview with a purposive sample 
of four senior level management personnel of the collegiate aviation program.  
Sampling Procedures 
Power Analysis and Sample Size Selection 
Several arguments have been proposed regarding the necessary sample size of a 
covariance structure model (Stevens, 2002). Boomsma and Hoogland (2001) claimed that 
200 cases constitute a reliable sample size for a correct model; one in which any problem 
related to power analysis is less likely to occur. On the other hand, smaller samples have also 
been used in the literature, while Kline (2005) suggests that sample size estimation should be 
made based on the number of parameters.  
While a ratio of 10 respondents per parameter is reasonable, a ratio of 20 respondents 
per parameter ensures adequate power for the analysis (Kline, 2005). Since in this study 
there were 14 parameters, using the criteria outlined by Kline, an estimated sample size of 
280 was determined to suffice. Normally for SEM and CFA, it is highly recommended that a 
sample size of more than 200 will ensure a more reliable model (Stevens, 2002). The sample 
size was estimated at any value greater than 280 (n >280). 
Even though the survey instrument would ensure adequate coverage and random 
chance for all the respondents, a purposive sampling strategy limited the quantitative portion 
of the study to only respondents who were either enrolled in flight related courses or 
employed as CFIs (exclusion criteria) in both the collegiate aviation program and contract 
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program. Non-flight students, graduate students, management pilots, faculty and staff were 
excluded from the survey instrument phase of this study. Data collection was purposefully 
limited to a three-week period in the fall 2016 academic semester. 
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection 
An Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval from the university was sought before 
the study commenced, since the study involved human subjects. Permission was sought from 
the chair of the aviation program to facilitate the emails of all flight students and flight 
instructors at the university. A confidential Qualtrics® generated online survey instrument 
was sent to respondent’s university issued email address.  
Faculty members were also requested to post the anonymous link to the survey on 
their class sites for easy access by their students. The respondents accessed the survey 
through a sign -in into their university email, using their username and password. After 
accessing the link to the Qualtrics® online survey, the respondents were required to digitally 
agree to and sign a consent form that explained all the rights of the respondent in the study. 
 A respondent who agreed to the consent proceeded to answer questions in the 
survey. A respondent who did not agree with the consent was logged out. Respondents who 
proceeded with the survey after consent could at any time quit the survey at their own 
choice, without any adverse repercussions. The completed responses were stored in a secure 
online database in accordance with the security protocols required by the university and the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB).  
The semi-structured interviews were done face-to- face with the top-level 
management personnel and audio-recorded. The interviewees were given ample notice (Two 
weeks) and the questionnaire for the interview and IRB consent forms were sent to them 
prior to the interview. The audio recordings were transcribed and the transcript sent to the 
interviewees for authentication and validation of contents. The validated contents were then 
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coded for emergent themes and classifications. The coding and classifications were done 
using a combination of manual means and computer –assisted qualitative soft wares such as 
the Atlasti 7®, and NVivo 11®.  
Even though the ultimate value existed in the relationship between the self-reporting 
of events and individual respondents’ perception of SMS, self-efficacy, transformational 
safety leadership, safety motivation, and safety behavior, the safety artifacts and records of 
the collegiate program assisted in the triangulation of data provided by respondents. A 
formal request was made to the relevant management personnel authorized to grant access 
for the release of factual aggregate safety performance data and existing safety survey results 
within the program. 
A forensic analysis of safety documents containing aggregate data of safety 
performance indicators i.e., number of confidential safety reports filed by personnel and 
closed reports/feedback from safety office, attendance to safety meetings, and SMS training  
of students and instructors within the active applicant period to the active conformance stage 
of the SMS initiative formed the basis of the third component of the triangulation process 
(Creswell, 2009; Patankar, Brown, Sabin & Bigda-Peyton, 2012). 
Demographic Details 
Demographic details such as age, gender, international students’ status, flight 
certificate, year group, and SMS training status was sought from respondents. The rationale 
for these demographic data was to facilitate analysis and helped to understand how 
demographic variables also influenced the phenomena under investigations. However, such 
data was collected in accordance with the requirements of the IRB and as much as possible 
no personal identifying data was collected. Due to the anonymous nature of the quantitative 
survey, it was difficult to have any form of follow -up or corroborations of submitted 
responses.  
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Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs 
The scales used to obtain the measures of the variables are described below. All scales 
were measured using a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5=strongly agree) or 
(1= very rarely; 5 = very frequent). To assess the reliability of scales, which refers to a 
variable or a set of indicators of a latent construct being internally consistent in their 
measurements (Fields, 2009), Cronbach’s coefficient was applied with a minimum alpha 
value (α= 0 .70) being considered adequate for all the results in line with social science 
research (Nunally, 1978; Stevens, 2002; Fields, 2009). 
Perceptions on SMS Initiative 
 Perceptions on the SMS initiative were measured by twenty-two items derived from 
the SMS evaluation scale developed from Chen and Chen (2012), Chen (2014), and the 
Transport Canada SMS assessment guide (2005). The Chen (2014) SMS scale is designed to 
identify the important aspects and items for airlines to develop an effective SMS and has a 
reported reliability (α = 0.95). The items were modified to reflect the scale and operational 
adaptability of a collegiate aviation program.  
Due to the modifications, another set of Factor Analysis (Principal Axis Factoring) 
was conducted on the items. An example of an item in the scale is “The safety policy is 
signed and approved by the Dean, who demonstrates a strong commitment to safety through 
active and visible participation in the safety management system”. The entire survey is 
attached in the Appendix A. The various dimensions that measured the multi-dimensional 
construct of SMS initiative was evaluated using first-order confirmatory factor Analysis 
(CFA) and a path analyses (PA)/structural equation modeling (SEM) to evolve a final 
measurement model that had a good fit of the data. 
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Transformational Safety Leadership 
 Transformational Safety Leadership (TSL) at the group level of the collegiate aviation 
program measured the quality of leadership provided by supervisory flight managers such as 
Chief /Assistant Chief Flight Instructors. The construct was measured by six items derived 
from the Survey of Transformational Leadership (STL) developed by Edwards, Knight, 
Broome and Flynn (2010). The STL is a comprehensive assessment and non-commercial 
instrument for transformational leadership that can be used to inform organizational self-
monitoring and training efforts that reflects approaches to the conceptualization and 
measurement of transformational practices. 
 The STL is available free of charge (Public Domain), reliable, valid, and examines 
five core components. These include four that are traditionally conceptualized as 
transformational domains (i.e., idealized influence, intellectual stimulation, inspirational 
motivation, and individualized consideration), plus one that is measured less frequently 
(empowerment). The instrument was validated using focus groups, factor analysis, and 
validation instruments. The Survey of Transformational Leadership (STL) utilizes a thorough 
and comprehensive approach, eliciting detailed information about specific leadership 
behaviors.  
The strength of the STL lies in the fact that it addresses adequately, some important 
components (such as empowerment), which are not routinely assessed. Additionally, most 
existing instruments include scales with only one or two marker items that reflect important 
themes within a core component. This approach works well when assessing a global construct 
of core transformational components, but is inadequate when examining components in 
greater detail for self-assessment and training purposes. Furthermore, the most commonly 
used and most comprehensive measures of transformational leadership (such as the 
Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire; Bass & Avolio, 1995) are only available for a fee.  
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Reliability for all first-order STL factors met or exceeded Nunally’s (1978) 
recommendation of 0.70 for newly developed scales. The alpha coefficient to measure the 
internal consistency of the scale had scores ranging from 0.78 (Supports others) to 0.97 
(Inspirational Motivation). The criterion validity showed Cronbach alphas for the validation 
factors ranged between 0.94 and 0.88.  A five-point frequency scale ranging from (1= very 
rare to 5= very frequent) was used for the assessment. An example of an item in the scale was 
“The Chief Flight Instructor clearly defines the steps to reach training program goals”. The 
requisite citations and acknowledgement was done. 
Self-Efficacy 
Self-efficacy was measured by the Generalized Self-Efficacy Scale developed by 
Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1995) to assess pilots’ self-beliefs with regard to coping with a 
variety of challenges. Four items in the scale were used and sample items are ‘‘I can 
solve most problems if I invest the necessary effort,’’ and ‘‘It is easy for me to stick to my 
aims and accomplish my goals.’’ The reported coefficient alpha was 0.86. 
Safety Motivation  
Safety motivation was measured with three items from Neal and Griffin (2006) which 
measures the degree to which respondents regard safety as an essential part of their flight 
training and professional development. Examples of items in this scale are: ‘‘I feel it is 
important to maintain safety at all times,’’ and ‘‘I believe that it is important to reduce the 
risk of accidents and incidents in flight operations.’’ The reported coefficient alpha for this 
scale was 0.90. 
Safety Behavior 
Safety behavior consisting of two components i.e., safety compliance (3 items) and 
safety participation (3 items) was adopted from Neal, Griffin and Hart (2000) and Neal and 
Griffin (2006). Safety compliance evaluates the core tasks that pilots have to accomplish to 
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maintain flight safety.  An example of an item in the safety compliance scale is ‘‘I pay full 
attention to the pre-flight briefing to collect sufficient data for every flight.’’ Safety 
participation assesses the extent to which pilots help develop an environment that supports 
safety.  
Some slight adjustments were made to the items to better match the characteristics of 
flight students/flight instructors and the main focus of collegiate aviation programs. An 
example of an item was ‘‘I attend aviation safety programs organized in the school.’’ The 
reported coefficient alpha values for safety compliance and safety participation are 0.91 and 
0.84, respectively. 
Safety –Related Events 
 Safety Events is a measure of the knowledge of respondents on the frequency of 
safety occurrences in the aviation program. This was used as a gauge of the safety 
performance level within the program and was corroborated with verifiable data that was 
acquired during the artifact collection stage of the study and interviews with senior-level 
management personnel.  
A relationship was also established between respondent’s knowledge about safety-
related events and their safety behavior. The five items for this scale was derived from the 
Collegiate Aviation Perception of Safety Culture Assessment Scale (CAPSCAS) (Adjekum, 
2014b). An example of an item in the scale is “Collision of aircraft with fixed ground objects 
while taxing”.  The reported reliability for the CAPSCAS was an alpha of 0.92. 
Construct Validity of Survey Instrument and Pilot Study 
 A pilot study to validate the modified survey (combination of scales into a single 
survey) and establish preliminary reliability was done using a convenience sample of flight 
students inclusive of those who are certified flight instructors at the university. Preliminary 
draft copies of the modified survey were given to a panel of three SMS subject matter experts 
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(SMEs) on faculty and at the safety department to peruse and make recommendations on 
construct validity and suitability for collegiate aviation safety assessment.  
After the review and comments by the SMEs, the requisite amendments were done 
and a target sample of fifty students and flight instructors who were enrolled in the Crew 
Resources Management (CRM) course in the program beta -tested the survey online. The 
rationale for using these participants from this course was due to the copious mixture of both 
initial and advanced flight students, some of whom were certified flight instructors. A paper 
copy of the survey was given to ten international students volunteers (South-East Asians and 
Middle Eastern/Arabic) for identification of areas that may pose comprehensibility problems. 
That strategy helped to identify the cultural sensitivity and adaptability of the survey 
instrument.   
After a period of two weeks, all the surveys were collected and descriptive statistics 
(mean, standard deviations and normality) were conducted. Factor analysis was used to 
cluster and determine items that loaded strongly on factors and measure the underlying latent 
constructs. Reliability checks were conducted and the retained items were used in the new 
survey instrument for the actual online survey for this study.  
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CHAPTER V 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Quantitative Data Analysis and Validation 
Quantitative survey data was imported from the Qualtrics ® data collection software 
into the SPSS ® software and analyzed. Significant statistical values were set at the 0.05 
alpha levels (2-tailed) for most of the analyses unless otherwise specified. The responses 
from the items in the survey were reduced using factor analysis approach and the resulting 
items that loaded strongly on factors were tested for content validity and reliability of scale.  
Descriptive and inferential analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS 23® and IBM 
AMOS Graphics 23® soft wares. The descriptive analysis included mean, standard deviation, 
standard error of the mean, normality test (kurtosis and skewness) and physical inspections of 
the resultant normal distribution curves. The inferential analysis included bivariate 
correlations, T-test of mean, analysis of variances (ANOVA) and testing of hypotheses using 
CFA and SEM-PA. 
Qualitative Data Analysis and Validation 
The qualitative portion of the study was analyzed by first validating the contents of 
the interviews by sending a copy of the audio files and transcribed interviews to the 
interviewees for their perusal and validation of the contents. Once the interviewees had 
validated the transcripts, preliminary manual coding to identify keywords, phrases and 
classifications that aligned significantly with the over-arching objective of answering the 
research questions and hypotheses was done. After the manual coding, qualitative coding soft 
wares Atlasti 7® and Nvivo 11® were used to code the interview transcripts into themes and 
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identify common trends. The results of both manual and computer aided analysis were then 
compared, validated and analyzed for relationships. 
Demographic Information 
 At the end of the response three-week period, two hundred and eighty-two (n =282) 
responses were completed beyond the consent page and used for analysis. Two hundred and 
forty-seven- male (n= 247) representing 87.6% and thirty -five female (n=35) representing 
12.4% of the total respondents’ submitted useable data for analysis. The overall online survey 
response rate was about 35 % which is adequate for most internal online surveys (Tse-Hua & 
Xitao, 2009). Twenty-five responses (n=25) were deleted because the respondents did not go 
beyond the consent page and that made the data unusable. 
 In terms of the international students’ enrollment status, there were two-hundred and 
fifty-one respondents (89.0%) identified as domestic US students as compared to thirty -one 
who were international students (11.0%). One hundred and eighty-three respondents (64.9%) 
stated that they have undergone formal SMS training while ninety-nine (35.1%) responded in 
the negative. In terms of year groups there were thirty -two freshmen (11.3%), forty-nine 
sophomores (17.4%), fifty-six juniors (19.9%) and one -hundred and forty-five seniors 
(51.4%). The respondents comprised of four flight certification groupings of forty-two pre-
private respondents (13.9%), seventy-two private pilot certificate respondents (25.5%), 
eighty-two commercial certificate respondents (29.1%) and eighty-six certified flight 
instructors (31.5%). Table 1 and Table 2 show the demographic distribution. 
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Table 1. Demographic variables of Gender, Enrollment Status, and Educational Level Group. 
   Variable Value Percentages (%) 
Gender   
Male 247 87.6 
Female 35 12.4 
Total 282 100.0 
 
Enrolment Status 
  
Domestic 251 89.0 
International 31 11.0 
Total  282 100.0 
 
Educational Level  
  
Freshmen 32 11.4 
Sophomore 49 17.4 
Junior 56 19.8 
Senior 145 51.4 
Total 282 100.0 
Note. Percentages are approximate values. 
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Table 2. Demographic Variables of Flight Certificates, Age Groups and SMS Training. 
 
Variables Values Percentages (100%) 
Flight Certificate   
Pre-Private 42 13.9 
Private 72 25.5 
Commercial 82 29.1 
Certified Flight Instructor 86 31.5 
Total 282 100.0 
Age Group   
17-21 106 37.6 
22-26 143 50.7 
27-31 19 6.7 
Others 14 5.0 
Total 282 100.0 
SMS Training   
Yes 183 64.9 
No 99 35.1 
Total 282 100.0 
Note. Percentages are approximate values. 
Question One 
What are the factors that measure the latent construct of SMS initiative?  
An Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) (Principal Axis Factoring) was conducted on 
the SMS initiative scale using a varimax rotation. An EFA is a statistical method used to find 
a small set of unobserved variables (also called latent variables, or factors) which may 
account for the covariance among a larger set of observed variables (Steven, 2002). A factor 
is an unobservable variable that is assumed to influence observed variables. Items with strong 
loading on factors were extracted from each set of items in the subscales.  
Strongly loaded items on the factors were identified after the rotation and two factors 
emerged out of SMS Initiative data. The two factors were identified using the factor loadings 
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and the scree plot of the SPSS® output.  The scree plot helped to visually verify and confirm 
the number of factors. The two factors that loaded separately were re-designated as SMS 
policy implementation (SMSPol.Imp) and SMS process engagement (SMSPro.Eng). 
Seventeen items loaded to SMSPol.Imp and five items loaded to SMSPro.Eng. Five items 
were dropped due to low loadings and most of those items were related to emergency 
response planning. The cut-off thresholds for the identified factors were any value greater 
than 0.5 and Eigen values greater than 1 was adopted to avoid ambiguity. 
 The two factors SMSPol.Imp and SMSPro.Eng explained about 46% percent of the 
variance in the initial Eigen values determined and are shown in Table 4.  The SMSPol.Imp 
denotes the actual implementation practices and strategies by the organizational leadership to 
ensure the effectiveness of the SMS initiative while the SMSPro.Eng specifies the degree of 
involvement and acceptance of organizational personnel towards the SMS initiative 
processes.  
The rotated factor loadings, scree plot and factor loading matrix in three dimensions 
are shown in Appendix C.  Internal consistency and reliability of the scales were determined 
with the Cronbach’s Alpha test in the SPSS 23® software package and pre-determined 
internal consistency baseline of an alpha (α) of .70 and above was used as a benchmark for 
high internal consistency as recommended by both Stevens (2002) and Fields (2009).  
All the items in the various scales showed good reliability above the .70 threshold and 
the descriptive statistics on the summed items in each scale were conducted. The results were 
determined to be consistent with the assumptions of normally distributed data.  The 
assumption of normality was confirmed based on histograms with normality plot.  The 
kurtosis and skewness values of the descriptive statistics tables were in the acceptable range 
of -1 to +1. The results indicate that safety compliance had the highest mean scores on a five 
point Likert-scale (M= 4.25, SD= .589) and the lowest score was awareness of involvement 
 95 
 
in a safety-related events (M= 2.57, SD = 1.007). The neutral point was 3 and any value 
above that was considered desirable. Details of the sample size, mean, Standard Deviation 
(SD), reliability and variances explained are shown in Table 3 and Figure 9.  
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Figure 9. Mean Likert Scores for all the Research Variables. 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
A first-order confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted on all the items 
describing the constructs SE, SM, SC, SP, TSL and SEV.  Additionally, the CFA was used to 
analyse the validity of these scales using a structural equation model -path analysis (SEM-
PA) techniques.  A CFA allows researchers to test hypotheses about a particular factor 
structure (e.g., factor loading between the first factor and first observed variable is zero). 
Unlike an EFA, a CFA produces several goodness-of-fit measures to evaluate the model but 
do not calculate factor scores (Brown, 2006). SPSS AMOS 23® software was used to 
evaluate the measurement models and determine the factor loadings. Details of the estimates 
for MLE, S.E., C.R., p-value and standardized regression weights (β) are shown in Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
4.01
3.15
4.06 4.25
3.75
2.57
3.21 3.31
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
SMSPol.Imp SMSPro.Eng SE SC SP SEV TSL SM
M
ea
n
 L
ik
er
t 
Sc
o
re
 
Variables
Mean Likert Score  ( n= 282)
 97 
 
Table 4. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Study Variables using CFA. 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P β 
SE 1 <--- Self-Efficacy .720 .057 12.664 *** .67 
SE 2 <--- Self-Efficacy .667 .055 12.173 *** .85 
SE 3 <--- Self-Efficacy .641 .050 12.747 *** .83 
SM 1 <--- Safety Motivation .610 .045 13.484 *** .81 
SM 2 <--- Safety Motivation .720 .046 15.672 *** .90 
 SM 3 <--- Safety Motivation .647 .047 13.868 *** .83 
SC 1 <--- Safety Compliance .648 .045 14.388 *** .85 
SC 2 <--- Safety Compliance .642 .046 13.848 *** .83 
SC 3 <--- Safety Compliance .654 .045 14.606 *** .86 
SP 1 <--- Safe Part. .673 .060 11.191 *** .74 
SP 3 <--- Safe Part. .734 .074 9.918 *** .94 
SP 2 <--- Safe Part. .922 .063 14.593 *** .66 
TSL1 <--- Trans.SafetyLeader. .799 .059 13.488 *** .81 
TSL4 <--- Trans.SafetyLeader. .770 .052 14.828 *** .80 
TSL3 <--- Trans.SafetyLeader. .782 .059 13.190 *** .86 
TSL5 <--- Trans.SafetyLeader. .751 .056 13.381 *** .80 
SEV1 <--- SafetyRelatedEvents .950 .078 12.193 *** .75 
SEV3 <--- SafetyRelatedEvents 1.021 .073 14.080 *** .89 
SEV2 <--- SafetyRelatedEvents 1.027 .065 15.785 *** .83 
SEV4 <--- SafetyRelatedEvents .816 .063 12.986 *** .78 
SEV5 <--- SafetyRelatedEvents 1.100 .089 12.290 *** .75 
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Question Two 
What are the strengths of the relationship between SMS initiative, transformational 
safety leadership, self-efficacy, safety motivation and the outcome variable safety behavior 
measured by safety compliance and safety participation?  
A Pearson’s bivariate test of correlations was used to establish the strengths of 
relationship between SMS initiative (SMS policy implementation and SMS process 
engagement), transformational safety leadership, self-efficacy, safety motivation and the 
outcome variable safety behavior measured by safety compliance and safety participation. 
This analysis was conducted, to find out variables that were linearly related, and could 
potentially become viable predictors in the subsequent confirmatory factor analysis and SEM.  
The results indicate that the highest statistically significant correlation existed 
between SMS policy implementation and self-efficacy [r (282) = .56, p < .01 (2T)] and safety 
participation and safety compliance [r (282) = .56, p < .01 (2T)]. SMS policy implementation 
and safety compliance had significant correlation [r (282) = .50, p < .01 (2T)] and self-
efficacy and safety compliance had significant correlations [r (282) = .49, p < .01 (2T)].  
The results suggested that safety motivation and SMS policy implementation had 
significant correlation [r (282) = .45, p < .01 (2T)] and self-efficacy and safety participation 
were also statistically correlated [r (282) = .38, p < .01 (2T)]. SMS process engagement and 
safety participation were significantly correlated [r (282) = .36, p < .01 (2T)] and SMS policy 
implementation and safety participation were also significantly correlated [r (282) = .35, p < 
.01 (2T)].  
Safety participation and safety motivation also had significant correlation [r (282) = 
.34, p < .01 (2T)] and self-efficacy and safety motivation were significantly correlated [r 
(282) = .34, p < .01 (2T)]. SMS process engagement and safety motivation had significant 
correlation [r (282) = .12, p < .05 (2T)] and SMS process engagement and safety compliance 
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were significantly correlated [r (282) = .12, p < .05 (2T)]. Finally, there was a significant 
negative correlation between transformational safety leadership and safety motivation [r 
(282) = -.17, p < .01 (2T)]. Details of results are shown in Table 5. 
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Question Three 
What is the effectiveness of a proposed measurement model as compared to that of a 
final measurement model that assesses the relationships between SMS initiative, 
transformational safety leadership, self-efficacy, and the outcome variable safety behavior 
measured by safety compliance and safety participation, when mediated by safety 
motivation?  
The use of exploratory factor analysis increased the number of constructs for the 
initial proposed measurement model from the initial seven to eight accounting for the 
splitting of SMS Initiative into two factors namely SMS policy implementation 
(SMSPol.Imp) and SMS process engagement (SMSPro.Eng). In order to assess the proposed 
measurement models, the covariance matrix of the variables served as the input to the 
maximum likelihood estimation procedures of IBM SPSS® Amos version 23.  
A large class of omnibus tests exists for assessing how well a model matches an 
observed data, and the chi-squared (χ2) is a classic goodness-of-fit measure to determine 
overall model fit.  However, the chi-squared is sensitive to sample size, and it becomes 
difficult to retain the null hypothesis as the number of cases increases (Kline, 2005). The χ2 
test may also be invalid when distributional assumptions are violated, leading to the rejection 
of good models or the retention of bad ones (Steven, 2002; Brown, 2006).  
Another commonly reported statistic is the Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA). A recommended value of 0.05 or less indicates a close fit of the 
model in relation to the degrees of freedom (Brown, 2006).  Another test statistics is the 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) that evaluates the fit of a user-specified solution in relation to a 
more restricted, nested baseline model, in which the covariance among all input indicators are 
fixed to zero or no relationship among variables is posited (Brown, 2006, p.86). The fit index 
CFI ranges from 0, for a poor fit, to 1 for a good fit. Finally, the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) is 
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another index for comparative fit that “includes a penalty function for adding freely estimated 
parameters” (Brown, 2006, p. 85). According to Brown (2006), TLI may be interpreted in a 
similar fashion as CFI, but can have a value outside of the range of 0 to 1.   
Hu and Bentler (1999) provided rules of thumb for deciding which statistics to report 
and choosing cut-off values for declaring significance. When RMSEA values are .05 or 
below, and CFI and TLI are .95 or greater, the model may have a reasonably good fit. 
Therefore, it is recommended to not only report χ2 but RMSEA and CFI/TLI.  In the case of 
the chi-squared goodness of fit, if the appropriate distributional assumptions are met and the 
specified model is correct, then the values of the p-values is the approximate probability of a 
chi-square statistic. The proposed measurement (fully mediated) model for the research and 
SEM-PA analysis is shown in Figure 10. 
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After the preliminary analysis was done using AMOS, the fully mediated model failed 
to produce any good or acceptable fit, as evidenced by the fit indices: CMIN = 376.458; df = 
14; P = .000; TLI = .137; CFI = .425; PNFI = .281; RMSEA = .304. The Modification indices 
(MI) in AMOS suggested major modifications produce a more adequate fit for the model. 
The substantial changes that were recommended to ensure an adequate fit were done in 
incremental steps and are as follows: 
a) Direct path between TSL and SMSPol.Imp. 
b)  Covariant path from SMSPol.Imp and SE. 
c) Covariant path from SMSPro.Eng to SMSPol.Imp. 
d) Removal of direct path from SMSPol.Imp and SP. 
However, when the analysis was re-run the direct path from TSL to SMSPol.Imp was 
found to produce additional modifications and a non-significant path coefficient. The direct 
path was then removed and a new analysis was re-run based on the first model and adding of 
covariant path from SMSPol.Imp and TSL. The resulting model was better than the initial 
model but did not produce good fit as shown by the fit indices: CMIN = 62.681; P= .000; df = 
4; TLI = .336; CFI = .873; PNFI =.125; RMSEA = .228. Figure 11 shows the new model 
after the iteration. 
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The next set of iteration to the model was done based on the recommendations from 
the MI and the theoretical consideration of getting a model that will address the research 
questions. Another covariant path was added between SMSPro.Eng and SE; SC and SP. The 
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MI also recommended the removal of the direct path from TSL to SC to improve the fit. The 
analysis was re-run and the new fit indices showed good fit: CMIN = 3.829; df = 3; P = .28; 
TLI = .987; CFI = .998; PNFI = .143; RMSEA = .031. Figure 12 shows the emergent 
measurement model.  
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The measurement model was further improved by a recommendation from the MI for 
a covariant path between TSL and SMSPro.Eng. The covariant path was added between TSL 
and SMSPro.Eng and the sum of these modifications yielded the highest incremental 
improvement to the model fit. The details of the fit index are: CMIN = 2.473; df = 2; P = 
.290; TLI = .999; CFI = .989; PNFI = .095; RMSEA = .029.  Figure 13 shows the final 
measurement model with the best fit for the data and Figure 14 shows the standardized 
regression weights and significance levels. Details of all the goodness-of-fit indices are 
shown in Table 6 and Table 7 provides a summary of the maximum likelihood estimate 
(MLE), standard error (SE), critical ratios (CR), p-values, estimated of effect sizes and 
hypotheses of the final measurement model with best goodness-of-fit. 
Table 6. Goodness-of-fit Estimates for various Measurement Models 
 
Model  
Chi-
square 
(Х2) 
df P 
 
TLI 
 
CFI PNFI RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 
Fully Mediated Model 1 376.459 14 .000 .137 .425 .281 .304 .277 .330 
Partially Mediated Model 2 62.681 4 .000 .336 .876 .166 .228 .181 .280 
Partially Mediated Model 3 3.829 3 .280 .987 .998 .143 .031 .000 .110 
Final Best-fit Model 4 1.141 1 .285 .998 .991 .067 .026 .000 .189 
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Hypothesis Testing 
The study hypothesized that there existed a relationship between SMS initiative and 
safety behavior (safety compliance and safety participation). This study hypothesized that 
safety motivation will mediate the relationship between SMS initiative and pilots’ safety 
behaviors (safety compliance and safety participation). The construct Safety Management 
System initiative was further split in to two underlying factors (SMS policy implementation 
and SMS process engagement) using factor analysis. Hypotheses 1 to 16 were tested using 
the final measurement model obtained from the SEM-PA.   
Hypothesis 1. The first hypothesis tested the relationship between respondents’ 
perceptions of their collegiate aviation program SMS initiative and safety motivation.  The 
results indicated that the relationship between SMS policy implementation and safety 
motivation was statistically significant (β= .360; SE = .047; C.R. = 5.644; p = .000), and 
supported the hypothesis. The coefficient of the direct path was .360 and indicates a medium 
to large effect. There was no coefficient for the mediated path. 
However, the results indicated that the relationship between SMS process engagement 
and safety motivation was not statistically significant (β= .020; SE = .027; C.R. = .377; p = 
.706). The final measurement model only supported the path that connects SMS policy and 
safety motivation. There was no path for SMS process engagement and safety motivation in 
the final measurement model. The overall results indicated that the relationship between SMS 
Initiative and safety motivation was partially supported within the study population. 
Hypothesis 2. The hypothesis tested the relationship between respondents’ 
perceptions on SMS initiative and their safety compliance. The results indicated that the 
relationship between the SMS policy implementation and safety compliance was statistically 
significant (β= .191; SE = .050; C.R. = 3.486; p = .000). The coefficients of the direct path 
were .191 and the mediated path was .103 yielding a total effect of .294.  
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The relationship between SMS process engagement and safety compliance was not 
statistically significant (β= -.001; SE = .030; C.R. = -.030; p = .976). The results suggested 
that the model only supported the relational pathway between SMS policy implementation 
and safety compliance within the study population. The overall results indicated that the 
relationship between SMS initiative and safety compliance was partially supported within the 
study population. 
Hypothesis 3. The hypothesis tested the relationship between respondents’ 
perceptions on SMS initiative and their safety participation. The results indicated that the 
relationship between the SMS process engagement and safety participation was statistically 
significant (β= .290; SE = .046; C.R. = 5.631; p = .000). The coefficients of the direct path 
were .290 and the mediated path was .005 yielding a total effect of .295.   
The results support the hypothesis that there exist a positive relationship between 
SMS process engagement and safety participation and the total effect was small to medium. 
The model however did not support any relational path between SMS policy implementation 
and safety participation. The net effect was that the hypothesis about the relationship between 
SMS initiative and safety participation was partially supported. 
Hypothesis 4. The hypothesis stated that respondents’ safety motivation mediated the 
relationship between perceptions of their collegiate SMS initiative and safety compliance. 
The results indicated safety motivation significantly mediated the path between SMS policy 
implementation and safety compliance even though the effect coefficient was relatively small 
(.103). There was no significant relationship between SMS process engagement and safety 
compliance when mediated by safety motivation. The overall effect was that the hypothesis 
was partially supported. 
Hypothesis 5. The hypothesis tested how respondents’ safety motivation mediated the 
relationship between the perceptions of their collegiate SMS initiative and safety 
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participation. The results suggested that safety motivation significantly mediated the 
relationships between SMS process engagement and safety participation with a negligible 
effect (.005) while there was no mediational pathway between SMS policy implementation 
and safety participation by safety motivation. The results suggest that the hypothesis was 
weakly supported. 
Hypothesis 6. The hypothesis stated that transformational safety leadership was 
related to safety motivation and the results indicated that there was a significant relationship 
between transformational safety leadership and safety motivation at the .05 significant level 
(β= -.129; SE = .020; C.R. = -2.457; p = .014). The results suggested a small negative effect 
(-.129) in the relationship. The hypothesis was supported among the study population. 
Hypothesis 7. The hypothesis stated that transformational safety leadership was 
related to safety compliance. The final model did not have any relational pathway between 
the two variables and the hypothesis was not supported among the study population. 
Hypothesis 8. The hypothesis stated that transformational safety leadership was 
related to safety participation. The results suggested that there was a significant relationship 
between transformational safety leadership and safety participation (β= .110; SE = .031; C.R. 
= 2.385; p = .000). The direct effect coefficient was .080 and the overall effect was .110. The 
hypothesis was supported within the study population. 
Hypothesis 9. The hypothesis stated that transformational safety leadership was 
related to safety compliance when mediated by safety motivation. The results suggested that 
there was no relational path in the final model and the hypothesis was not supported within 
the study population. 
Hypothesis10. The hypothesis stated that transformational safety leadership was 
related to safety participation when mediated by safety motivation. The results suggested that 
there was a significant relationship between transformational safety leadership and safety 
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participation (β= .110; SE = .031; C.R. = 2.385; p = .000) when mediated by safety 
motivation. The mediated effect coefficient was -.030 and the overall effect was .110. The 
hypothesis was supported within the study population. 
Hypothesis11. The hypothesis tested how respondents’ perceived self-efficacy was 
related with safety motivation. The results suggest that there existed a statistically significant 
relationship between self-efficacy and safety motivation at the .05 significant level (β= .133; 
SE = .045; C.R. = 2.087; p = .037). The total effect coefficient was .133 and the hypothesis 
was supported within the study population. 
Hypothesis12. The hypothesis tested how respondents’ perceived self-efficacy was 
related with safety compliance. The results suggest that there existed a statistically significant 
relationship between self-efficacy and safety compliance (β= .289; SE = .050; C.R. = 5.109; p 
= .000). The direct effect coefficient was .289 and the total effect was .410. The hypothesis 
was supported within the study population. 
Hypothesis13. The hypothesis tested how respondents’ perceived self-efficacy was 
related with safety participation. The results suggest that there existed a statistically 
significant relationship between self-efficacy and safety participation (β= .256; SE = .068; 
C.R. = 4.704; p = .000). The direct effect coefficient was .287 and the hypothesis was 
supported within the study population. 
Hypothesis14. The hypothesis tested how respondents’ perceived self-efficacy was 
related with safety compliance when mediated by safety motivation. The results suggest that 
there existed a statistically significant relationship between self-efficacy and safety 
compliance (β= .289; SE = .050; C.R. = 5.109; p = .000) at indirect (mediated) effect 
coefficient was .13. The hypothesis was supported within the study population. 
Hypothesis15. The hypothesis stated that self-efficacy was related to safety 
participation when mediated by safety motivation. The results suggested that there was a 
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significant relationship between self-efficacy and safety participation (β= .256; SE = .068; 
C.R. = 4.704; p = .000) and the mediated (indirect) effect coefficient was .031. The 
hypothesis was supported within the study population. 
Hypothesis16. The hypothesis tested how respondents’ safety motivation was related 
to safety participation. The results suggest that there existed a statistically significant 
relationship between self-efficacy and safety participation (β= .231; SE = .096; C.R. = 4.236; 
p = .000). The total effect coefficient was .231 and the hypothesis was supported within the 
study population. 
Hypothesis17. The hypothesis stated that safety motivation was related to safety 
compliance. The results suggested that there was a significant relationship between safety 
motivation and safety compliance (β= .288; SE = .065; C.R. = 5.449; p = .000) and direct 
effect coefficient was .288. The hypothesis was supported within the study population. 
Question Four 
What are the strengths of the relationship between Safety behavior (Safety 
participation and Safety compliance) and Safety-related events? 
A mediation analysis was performed using the Baron and Kenny (1986) causal-step 
approach and the Preacher and Hayes (2008) bootstrapped confidence interval for ab indirect 
effect procedure using the SPSS AMOS® 23 software package. The path analysis helped to 
establish predictive causal path and relationships between safety behavior and safety-related 
events. The null hypothesis was that safety- related events will not have an effect on safety 
participation when mediated by safety compliance within the SMS initiative of a collegiate 
aviation program. 
The path models also helped to determine the causal path coefficients for the variables 
under investigations. The maximum likelihood estimates, standardized regression weights, 
critical ratios, total, direct and indirect effects were determined. Finally, the p-value was also 
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determined to find out whether the hypothesis under examination was supported. A 
preliminary data screening suggested that there were no serious violations of the assumptions 
of linearity or normality. All the coefficients reported are standardized and the statistical 
significance criterion was .05 (two-tailed).  The results from this analysis were used to test 
hypothesis 18, 19 and 20.  
Hypothesis18. The hypothesis tested how respondents’ safety compliance was related 
with safety participation. The results suggest that there existed a statistically significant 
relationship between safety compliance and safety participation within the study population 
(β= .83; SE = .041; C.R. = 20.209; p = .000). The direct effect of safety compliance on safety 
participation was 0.83 which suggest a large effect. The result indicated a failure to accept the 
null hypothesis in favor of the alternate hypothesis.  
Hypothesis19. The hypothesis tested how respondents’ safety compliance was related 
with safety participation when mediated by an awareness of safety -related events. The results 
suggest that there was no statistically significant mediational path between safety compliance 
and safety participation when mediated by an awareness of safety-related events (β= .20; SE 
= .042; C.R. = .167 p = .867). The results indicate a failure to reject the null hypothesis in 
favor of an alternate.  
Hypothesis20. The hypothesis tested how respondents’ safety compliance when there 
is an awareness of safety -related events. The results suggest that there existed a statistically 
significant relationship between safety compliance and safety-related events (β= .32; SE = 
.068; C.R. = 4.847; p = .000). The direct effect was 0.32 and the results suggest a small to 
medium effect. Details of the path estimates for the interactions between SC, SP and SEV 
and the causal model are shown in Table 8 and Figure 15 respectively. A summary of all the 
result of research hypotheses tested in questions three and four are shown in Table 9. 
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Table 8. Path Estimates for Interactions between SC,SP and SEV. 
 
Interactions 
  
 
MLE 
 
S.E. 
 
C.R. 
 
β 
 
Direct 
Effect 
 
Indirect 
Effect 
 
Total 
Effect 
 
P 
Null 
Hypothesis 
SC <--- SEV .329 .068 4.847 .32 .320 - .320 *** Reject 
SP <--- SEV .007 .042 .167 .20 .007 .265 .272 .867 Accept 
SP <--- SC .825 .041 20.209 .83 .828 - .828 *** Reject 
 
 
Figure 15.  SEM-PA of relationship between SP, SC and SEV. 
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   Table 9. A summary of all the result of research hypotheses tested.   
Hypothesis Results 
H1A:  Pilots’ perceptions of their collegiate aviation program SMS policy 
implementation are related to their safety motivation. 
 
Supported 
H1B:  Pilots’ perceptions of their collegiate aviation program SMS process 
engagement are related to their safety motivation. 
 
Not 
Supported 
H2A: Pilots’ perceptions of their collegiate aviation SMS policy implementation 
are related with to safety compliance. 
 
Supported 
H2B: Pilots’ perceptions of their collegiate aviation SMS process engagement are 
related with to safety compliance. 
 
Not 
Supported 
 
H3A: Pilots’ perceptions of their collegiate aviation SMS policy implementation 
are related with to safety participation. 
 
 
Not 
Supported 
H3B: Pilots’ perceptions of their collegiate aviation SMS process engagement are 
related with to safety participation. 
 
 
Supported 
H4A: Pilots’ safety motivation mediates the relationship between their perceptions 
of their collegiate SMS policy implementation and safety compliance. 
Supported 
H4B: Pilots’ safety motivation mediates the relationship between their perceptions 
of their collegiate SMS process engagement and safety compliance. 
 
Not 
Supported 
H5A: Pilots’ safety motivation mediates the relationship between their perceptions 
of their collegiate SMS policy implementation and safety participation. 
 
Supported 
H5B: Pilots’ safety motivation mediates the relationship between their perceptions 
of their collegiate SMS process engagement and safety participation. 
 
Not 
Supported 
H6:  Collegiate aviation program transformational safety leadership style is related 
to pilot’s safety motivation. 
 
Supported 
H7. Collegiate aviation program transformational safety leadership style is related 
to pilot’s safety compliance. 
 
Not 
Supported 
H8. Collegiate aviation program transformational safety leadership style is related 
to pilot’s safety participation. 
 
Supported 
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Table 9. Cont. 
 
 
Hypothesis Results 
 
        
H9. Collegiate aviation program transformational safety leadership style is 
 related to pilot’s safety compliance when mediated by safety motivation. 
 
 
 
Not 
Supported 
H10. Collegiate aviation program transformational safety leadership style is  
related to pilot’s safety participation when mediated by safety motivation. 
 
Supported 
H11: Collegiate aviation pilots’ perceived self-efficacy is related with their  
safety motivation. 
Supported 
H12: Collegiate aviation pilots’ perceived self-efficacy is related to their  
safety compliance. 
 
Supported 
H13: Collegiate aviation pilots’ perceived self-efficacy is related to their  
safety participation. 
Supported 
 H14: Collegiate aviation pilots’ safety motivation mediates the relationship 
between perceived self-efficacy and safety compliance. 
Supported 
H15: Collegiate aviation pilots’ safety motivation mediates the relationship 
between perceived self-efficacy and safety participation. 
Supported 
H16: Collegiate aviation pilot’s safety motivation is related to safety participation. 
 
Supported 
H17: Collegiate aviation pilot’s motivation is related to safety compliance. 
 
Supported 
H18: Collegiate aviation pilot’s safety compliance is related to safety participation. 
 
Supported 
H19: Collegiate aviation pilot’s safety compliance is related to safety participation 
when mediated by safety –related events. 
Not 
Supported 
H20: Collegiate aviation pilot’s safety compliance is related to safety –related 
events. 
Supported 
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Question Five 
What are the differences in perceptions among the demographic variables (years in 
program, age group, SMS training status, and flight certification) on safety behavior and 
self-reported safety events? 
A one-way between-S ANOVA was done to compare the mean scores on perceptions 
on safety compliance among age brackets in the flight program. An examination of a 
histogram of scores of respondent on safety compliance was approximately normally 
distributed with no extreme outliers. Prior to the analysis, the Levene test for homogeneity of 
variance was used to examine whether there were serious violations of the homogeneity of 
variance assumption across groups, but no significant violation was found: F (3, 278) = .112, 
p = .953. The overall F-value for the one-way ANOVA was not statistically significant, F (3, 
278) = 1.740, p =. 159. There were also no significant differences in the mean scores on 
safety participation among the age brackets, F (3, 278) = 2.379, p =.070 and the differences 
in the mean scores on safety -related events among the age groups, F (3, 278) = 2.216, p 
=.087. 
There were also no significant differences in mean scores on safety- related event 
among flight certification groups, F (3, 278) = 1.504, p = .214. However, there was 
significant statistical differences among the flight certificate groups in terms of mean scores 
on safety compliance, F (3, 278) = 4.965, p = .002 (2T). A Bonferroni-Tukey post-hoc test 
revealed significant differences between the mean scores of pre-private students (M=4.05, 
S.D =.578) and certified flight instructors (CFI) who had a mean value of (M= 4.44, S.D = 
.479).  
The results suggest the CFI group had a slightly higher level of safety compliance 
than the pre-private /student pilot certificate holders. There were also significant differences 
in the mean scores on safety participation in terms of flight certification, F (3, 278) = 4.911, p 
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=. 002 (2-Tail). A Bonferroni-Tukey post-hoc test revealed significant differences between 
the mean scores of pre-private students (M=3.61, S.D =.807) and CFI who had a mean value 
of (M= 4.03, S.D = .695). 
In terms of the academic year groups, there was significant differences in mean scores 
of safety compliance, F (3, 278) = 3.047, p =. 029 (2-Tail). The differences in scores were 
between the seniors (M=4.32, S.D =.593) and the freshmen (M=4.0, S.D =.598) and shows 
that relatively seniors had higher safety compliance than freshmen. There was statistical 
significance in the differences in mean score on safety participation F (3, 278) = 3.114, p =. 
027 (2-Tail).  
 A Bonferroni-Tukey post-hoc test showed that seniors (M=3.86, S.D =.762) 
significantly had a relatively higher participation in safety activities than juniors (M=3.56, 
S.D =.869). Finally, there was statistical significance in terms of mean scores on awareness 
and involvement in safety-related events F (3, 278) = 3.273, p =. 022 (2-Tail). A Bonferroni-
Tukey post-hoc test showed that seniors (M=2.70, S.D =1.050) significantly were more aware 
or involved in safety -related events than juniors (M=2.18, S.D =.947). 
An independent t-test of mean was done to determine if there were any differences in 
the mean scores on safety compliance, safety participation and safety -related event between 
respondents who had been formally trained in SMS and those who had not. The results 
showed there were no statistically significant differences in mean scores on safety 
compliance [t (280) =1.63, p = .097, two-tail] among those trained in SMS and those who 
have not. The results also indicate no statistical significance in mean scores on safety 
participation [t (280) =1.45, p = .149, two-tail] and safety-related events [t (280) = .392, p = 
.695, two-tail]. 
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Semi –Structured Interviews 
The over-arching purpose of questions posed to the selected senior management 
personnel during the semi-structured interview were to find out the leadership perspective on 
the level of implementation of the SMS initiative and current safety performance of the 
collegiate aviation program. The following themes with underlying codes emerged after the 
qualitative analysis using both manual and computer –aided methods. Some direct quotes 
from the interviewees are also added to corroborate the results which suggest the following: 
Leadership 
 There was unanimous agreement among the top level management personnel 
interviewed that leadership at the highest level (The Dean), who happens to be the 
accountable executive for the SMS initiative was and continues to be very instrumental in 
getting the initiative on a very strong pedestal. The results suggest that the Dean has provided 
the vision, resources and transformational leadership to both start and sustain the SMS 
initiative.  
Commitment and Acceptance. The results also suggest that leadership at all levels 
within the organization (Top-level and Supervisory) “bought –in” completely to the initiative 
and continue to fully support the initiative. The acceptance of the SMS at all levels of 
leadership has also evolved a higher level of commitment to the objectives and goals of the 
SMS initiative. One of the top level management personnel, who is also a process owners 
intimated that at the initial stages of the SMS implementation, some of the top leadership 
could not fully understand the concept due to the technical nature of SMS and lack of 
literature.  
 One of the top management personnel interviewed who was a major player in the 
SMS initiative stated that even though there was acceptance among the top level 
management, some did not fully make it a priority and were a bit reluctant to accept the 
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change from the status quo that SMS presented.  The top level manager further stated that 
these process owners and managers wanted the benefits of SMS, however, they continued to 
be content with the status quo at times so getting them to buy in to the SMS concepts was 
sometimes a little bit more difficult than would have been expected. Below is a direct quote 
from this top level management person: 
As far as the process managers go, they accepted the SMS process; however, most of 
them were happy to let a small core people do all of the work. And it turned out to be 
a situation where about 10 percent of the people did 90 percent of the work on the 
SMS development. So to kind of summarize that first question, I think everyone was 
very, very supportive.  
However, not everyone made it a priority; not everyone was involved. And 
again, at times, I think there are still process owners and managers that sometimes 
appear to be happy with the status quo of how things were done in the past, relative to 
how things should be done as it relates to SMS. 
The opinions of the above mentioned top level management personnel was however 
divergent from that of another top level management personnel who intimated that most 
process owners and managers accepted the challenge and fully supported the Dean’s effort to 
implement the SMS initiative by using effective communication and cooperation to rally 
support. One of the direct quotes from this top level management personnel/ process owner 
clearly throws light on the level of commitment and acceptance from the top: 
The top level leadership bought in very early to the SMS program. However, I do 
think that a lot of people, leadership included, didn’t quite understand what an SMS 
program’s all about and how involved it was. But from the beginning, the higher-ups, 
the Dean, the accountable executive for the program; you know, it was very clear that 
this was the direction they wanted to go. And they did go through, the FAA came in 
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and did several days of training with them, and they sat through all that. So 
leadership played a big role, because without them this would have never gotten off 
the ground. It would have just been another science project that didn’t amount to 
much. 
Resource Provision. The results suggest that top level management; specifically, the 
accountable executive provided resources at every phase of the SMS initiative and continues 
to resource the program. A process owner stated that SMS like any organizational initiative 
that aims to transform safety can be a costly process in terms of financial, material and 
human capital during the implementation phases and it was refreshing that the accountable 
executive fully provided adequate resources necessary to get the program running.  
Another process owner directly involved with the SMS initiative intimated that the 
SMS required comprehensive organizational adjustments in operational processes and 
systems in an effort to align actual performance with desired safety performance benchmarks. 
The process owner suggested that due to these adjustments, there were some hesitancy among 
some process owners to allocate human resources from their departments to be part of the 
initial implementation team because that might affect their productive capabilities. The 
process owner however alluded to the fact that because there was a strong backing from the 
accountable executive, it served as a leverage to get these process owners to allocate the 
require human resources from their departments to be part of the initial implementing team.  
The results show that top level management provided initial indoctrination training 
for management personnel through the use of subject matter experts (SME) from the SMS 
program office of the FAA. The top level management also allocated funding for two faculty 
members and one process owner to be trained as subject matter experts. These indigenous 
SMS subsequently worked full time implementing the SMS initiative. These SME performed 
the preliminary and detailed GAP analysis as part of the active applicant phase. 
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Another top level leadership personnel /process owner interviewed intimated that 
even though the SMS initiative has been extensive, expensive and time consuming there has 
been constant provision of adequate resources to sustain the initiative. Finally, one of the top 
level management personnel/process owners was of the opinion that the proactive safety 
resource such as the flight data monitoring (FDM) program established has provided a data-
driven approach to the SMS initiative. An active quote from the top level management 
personnel succinctly provides clarity on the support from top level leadership: 
 We talked about it at some of our leadership meetings. And the Dean was always 100 
percent, let’s do this. We’ll find the money if it’s going to cost extra money. This is 
something that we’ll ensure that what we say, our safety is number one, and generally 
all organizations say that; but this is putting our effort and our money behind it. And 
so I know that was – from the Dean’s office, I know it was a high priority and never 
hesitated at all to get it going. And gave all the support necessary for those that are 
working on it day to day – day by day, to – have the full green light. Financially, 
materially, personnel wise, everything was provided. 
Responsibility and Accountability.  Two of the top level management personnel 
interviewed agreed that the SMS initiative has ensured an active awareness among leadership 
at all levels (Top and supervisory) of their responsibilities and accountabilities for safety in 
their process domains as compared to the pre-SMS initiative period. These top level 
management personnel further emphasized that safety benchmarks were clearly outlined and 
documented in a safety policy and safety management system manual signed and approved 
by the accountable executive (The Dean). A process owner stated that the safety policy 
required leadership at all levels to ensure that operational processes and activities under their 
management are conducted safely and meet the safety performance benchmarks of the 
organization.  
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The statement by the process manager was further corroborated by other top level 
management personnel, who stated that the safety policy in the SMS initiative gives clarity 
on safety accountability as a metric in the performance evaluation of leadership at all levels 
within the flight program. Another process owner also stated that the safety policy clearly 
requires leadership at all levels to be responsible for hazard identification and safety risk 
management within their operational processes. The process owner also stated that the safety 
policy requires the process owners and their supervisory leadership to use safety risk 
assessment on identified flight operational hazards and apply control strategies outlined as 
part of the SMS to minimize these safety risks to levels tolerable for flight training and 
operations.   
Operational Performance Impact 
 There was general agreement among all the top level management personnel 
interviewed that the SMS initiative has and continue to have a positive operational 
performance impact on the flight program. The notable areas that came up during the 
interviews were safety risk management, efficiency of flight operations and safety risk 
behavior among students and flight instructors. 
Safety Risk Management.  Two of the top level management personnel who were 
actively involved in the formulation of safety risk management strategies as part of the 
initiative shed light on the entire process. The consensus among these two top level 
management personnel consolidated the opinions that the organization’s knowledge of what 
actually goes on in flight operations had greatly increased due to the SMS initiative. One of 
them who double as a process owner stated that prior to initiating SMS and establishing 
proactive flight data collection strategies, the flight program’s safety management was very 
reactionary and only acted when there was a safety occurrence.  
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One of the top level management personnel who doubles as a faculty and was part of 
the initial SMS initiative team strongly supported the earlier opinion by a process manager 
that the SMS initiative had provided the capability for all flight activities and operational 
processes to be tracked and analyzed for abnormal trends so that pre-emptive remedial 
actions can be taken before any safety occurrence takes place. When asked for specifics to 
corroborate the assertion, the top level management person said:  
These are things we do track, in one way or another. And one of the cases, the 
unstable approaches, I can talk a little bit about our Phoenix op. When we were first 
sort of looking at the high-low, fast-slow tools, which is kind of the way we loosely 
defined stabilized approach in Phoenix. I mean, there were a lot more things that go 
into a stabilized approach, but at its core, we thought high-low fast-slow would be a 
good one. And so we started looking at that and we found a number of flights that 
were landing early, because these are really long runways, and the VASIS were 
displaced, you know, like two or three thousand feet down.  
And so people weren’t following the VASIS; they were just kind of landing. 
And so we made everyone aware, we showed them the data and we said, look what’s 
going on. And then it helped a little bit, and then we had a couple of safety meetings 
down there; and we were able to largely mitigate on most of the runways. There was 
one runway we were never able to solve. But that was an example of how we were 
able to specifically use the program to achieve a desired result. 
A top level management person interviewed who was directly involved in the SMS 
initiative stated that the flight program had all the essential components of an SMS in place 
prior to the formal active applicant level. This top level management person stated that safety 
reporting system, flight data monitoring, safety meetings, safety training and a safety council 
were already in existence but did not meet the FAA specifications and guidelines. The top 
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level management person stated that the SMS initiative has brought these components into 
conformance with FAA specifications and guidelines. 
The top level management personnel also stated that performance metrics such as 
safety reporting has remained fairly constant over the past five years since the SMS initiative 
started. However, the top level management person was of the view that the introduction of 
SMS in the academic syllabus was a positive one even though it was elective and not a core 
requirement for flight students. This top level management person was of the opinion that 
SMS should be made a co-requisite or pre-requisite for other mandatory flight courses to 
increase the level of training in SMS. 
Safety Risk Behavior.     In terms of safety risk behavior among students and flight 
instructors, the general consensus among all the top level management personnel interviewed 
was that the SMS initiative was positively having an impact on safety risk behavior. One of 
the top level management personnel who also double as a faculty member was of the opinion 
that the SMS initiative has helped to track and remedy mitigation decay and specifically 
organization safety behavior over time. The faculty member stated that:  
We corrected the organization’s behavior; I also could track over time, the return of 
the organization back to the old behavior which was the pre-mitigation behavior. And 
demonstrated that many cases, after – it was roughly, give or take, depending on the 
situation, it was around six months. If we didn’t continue to remind, they returned to 
their unsafe and old behavior.  
And so – I’m sorry, it was more like eight months. So my recommendation 
was, every six months, sit down and review this data again and reset everything. So it 
was kind of – it was a very data driven, very interesting way to manage your safety. 
The old fashion way would have been to wait for someone to go off the end of the 
runway. 
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One of the top level management personnel who is also a process owner with a lot of 
experience in flight operations stated that effective communication and cooperation has 
helped to ensure that safety risk to flight operations are discussed in a candid and constructive 
manner with all stakeholders. The process owner stated that there was good liaison between 
safety department staff and operational department staff in in promoting a cultural change in 
safety reporting behavior and the great benefits of safety reporting among students and flight 
instructors. The process owner was of the opinion that safety reporting among flight students 
and instructors had relatively improved due to the safety communication process and these 
improved safety reporting has enabled proactive analysis for high accident potential 
conditions and attitudes.  A statement from the process owner sums up the point:  
The safety reports, I read all those; and I find them interesting. And everything that 
happens, it seems like that is – becomes certainly a single occurrence, or if they see 
some trends – they, meaning the flight operations people, get that out as quickly as 
possible. One of them just came out last night about a somewhat near miss on an 
approach. Two planes coming in. And that could be something just to – no, that’s not 
good so let’s not talk about it. But no, they’re right up front with everything. And 
everything that needs to be talked about seems like it is, and presented very, very well. 
Another top level management personnel who is directly involved in students’ 
administrative issues and a member of the review committee on drugs and alcohol violations 
within the program stated that there were relatively lower cases of drugs and alcohol 
violations among flight students and instructors as compared to previous years and attributed 
it to the enhanced safety awareness created by the SMS initiative. The top level management 
personnel also reiterated the effectiveness of the proactive data-driven approach to managing 
safety within the program that effectively identify hazards and used safety risk management 
techniques to mitigate and control these risks before safety occurrences hamper flight 
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operations. Finally, to affirm the robustness of the drug and alcohol policy, the top level 
management personnel stated:  
Again, my role on the review board for alcohol and drug and behavioral issues, we 
take that very seriously. And we work very closely with the students when the – in fact, 
we had one yesterday at review board and I – just sitting through the process, I’m 
going – you know – it’s amazing how much – how the organization takes this so 
seriously. And we just don’t pay lip service to it.  
Efficiency.  A process owner who has extensive oversight of flight operational 
activities stated that even though the initial investment into the SMS initiative may have been 
high, the impact on efficiency of flight operations has been positive. The fact that flight 
hazards can be identified early and risk mitigated and controlled through an effective data 
monitoring system has reduced the potential “down- time” an accident or incident could have 
on both personnel and equipment.  
The process owner also intimated that the SMS initiative had brought about a 
relatively high level of standardization in procedures and documentation of all processes, 
which even though may seem cumbersome, was very good at ensuring that losses and 
inefficient operational procedures and practices are tracked and mitigated. Another process 
owner with in-depth experience in flight training and operations was of the opinion that due 
to the collegiate program’s SMS initiative, there has been greater investments in modern 
training aircraft fleet with enhanced safety technology such as digital navigational and flight 
deck displays, automated dependence surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) and global position 
systems (GPS).  
The process owner stated that though these technologies had greatly improved safety 
and efficiency of flight training, the investments had relatively also increased the direct 
operational cost for flight training and opined that there should be a good cost -benefit 
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analysis between extensive investments in latest safety technology and cost over-runs and 
transfer to flight students who eventually pay for these safety enhancements. 
Implementation Challenges 
 The SMS initiative obviously has not had it all smooth and there have been some 
challenges during the implementation and sustenance. Some of the challenges identified 
during the interviews were operational productivity and safety balance, technicality of SMS 
training and technical expertise and guidance from the FAA. 
Operational Productivity and Safety Balance.  Two process owners were of the 
opinion that one of the biggest challenges faced in the SMS initiative is a collaborative 
agreement on the acceptance of a tolerable level for safety in flight operations among 
stakeholders involved in making safety risk decisions relating to flight. A process owner 
stated that on some occasions there have been disagreements with the aviation safety 
department over safety risk assessments and remedial measures recommended by the 
department.  
The process owner was of the opinion that even though the personnel at the aviation 
safety department did a good job most of the time, they also had to balance their safety 
recommendations with operational productivity that commensurate with the needs and reality 
of the flight operations business. Another process owner interviewed was of the opinion that 
sometimes risk control measures recommended by the aviation safety department required 
costly and unrealistic financial input that was counterproductive in respect to a good return on 
investment for flight training as a business. 
The process owner was of the opinion that disagreements over safety risk 
assessments, control strategies and cost implications have sometimes resulted in a perception 
that some of these leaders do not fully support the SMS initiative. The process owner also felt 
that at times personnel of the aviation safety department tries to encroach into the domain of 
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other process owners by attempting to implement risk mitigation and control measures 
recommend by the same aviation safety department, when in actual fact that should be the 
preserve of the respective process owner. These actions sometimes result in friction between 
the process owners and the aviation safety department. A top level management person who 
doubles as a process owner had the following comments: 
I also have to worry about the business side. I have to balance production with safety. 
When all you look at is safety, it’s easy. But when you have to balance the two, and 
that’s where the challenge comes in.  But myself and safety will at times struggle 
together because I feel, not necessary. Example, we’re currently – we’re having a 
meeting on hangar occurrences; we call it hangar rush. Where lining pulls out an 
aircraft and they might hit a wingtip; okay. And it happens.  
We do thousands of aircraft moves a day, okay. And we go through and we 
calculate X amount of damage a year. So example, say we do $10,000 to $15,000 of 
damage a year to aircraft by moving them in or out. Safety says this is a problem, we 
have to address it. And we look at the safety risk assessment; we look at it and I’ll go 
through and they make all the recommendations to me, and their recommendations 
will be you must hire more line personnel so we have wing-walkers on every wing, 
when we move an airplane in or out.  So I say, okay I have to hire four additional 
people. You pay them $30,000 a year plus fringe, so that’s $45,000 a year. I hire four 
people, that’s $200,000 a year it’s going to cost me to stop $15,000 of damage. So 
when do you accept such assessments? 
Another process owner with extensive flight training responsibility was of the opinion 
that the structured nature of the SMS initiative and the need to document every process 
sometimes inhibited initiative and flexibility in safety risk decisions as supervisors and mid-
level managers have to periodically resort to either their bosses or the safety department for 
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clearances on operational issues with safety implications that could have been easily dealt 
with at their level. The process owner stated that: 
At some point, you have to trust your managers to make decisions, and they have to 
do things. But when some people lean fully on this SMS program, everything they feel 
has to go back to the Safety Management System. And I feel sometimes that takes 
away the ability of your managers to make decisions to work within your 
organization.  
Technicality of SMS Training.  Two of the top level management personnel 
interviewed were of the opinion that due to the technical and sometimes complex structure of 
the SMS initiative, there was a lot of apprehension and lack of understanding of the entire 
process among some management personnel. Even though the accountable executive (The 
Dean) arranged for experts from the FAA regional offices and headquarters to conduct 
orientation training for most of the leadership, some of these management personnel still 
struggled with the entire SMS concept.  A top level management person also stated that even 
though SMS training has been implemented as part of the training course outline in the flight 
program, there were still some training gaps in terms of making it a compulsory requirement 
for all flight students as compared to the present state where it is an elective course.  
The top level management personnel however noted that most of the flight instructors 
in the flight program had been extensively trained in the SMS concepts as part of the flight 
instructors’ standardization program. The top level management person however stated that 
areas with least SMS training were the line and maintenance departments where most of the 
personnel are not graduates from the collegiate aviation program of the university. 
In the opinion of the top level management personnel, a lot of work has to be done to 
simplify the technical verbiage of SMS manuals and processes and make it comprehensible to 
the various personnel within the program who may not have extensive technical background. 
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The top level management personnel reiterated the need for concepts under the SMS 
initiative to be simplified and correlated with real-time operational activities so that it will be 
effectively utilized by flight students, flight instructors, faculty and other personnel. A quote 
from the top level management personnel sum up the points: 
The second thing, of course, was the time and the effort. I also think that a lot of 
people didn’t understand what an SMS was or what it entailed; so a lot of people kind 
of saw this like, I don’t really want to participate in that or don’t know about it. So 
there was a little bit of that too. Those are probably the biggest challenges. 
Technical Expertise and Guidance from FAA.  There were some conflicting views 
among three of the top level management personnel interviewed on the role of the regulator 
(FAA) in the SMS initiative. One of the top level management personnel was of the opinion 
that the FAA was very active and instrumental in the initial training and technical assistance 
provision during the active applicant through to the active conformance levels, while two top 
level management personnel ( One is a process owner and the other doubles as a faculty 
member) were of the opinion that the certification maintenance team (CMT) out of the Fargo 
Flight Safety District Office (FSDO) which locally oversees the SMS implementation 
program was not well resourced with SMS technical experts. These top level management 
personnel were of the opinion that this factor delayed and stifled the initial efforts and 
subsequent oversight of the SMS initiative in the flight program. A quote from one of the top 
level management personnel gives insight to the point: 
Yeah, there were definitely challenges. I mean, both in the implementation and 
presently. I personally believe the biggest challenge has been the governmental or the 
policy side; because the folks that oversee our SMS, they’re down in Fargo, the Fargo 
[FSDO.] And they probably were not properly resourced. And so they ended up kind 
of not really being trained for SMS, and it was difficult because they had to sign off on 
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our SMS and we had to surveil it and everything. And so to me that was one of the 
biggest things.  
The sentiments shared by the top level management personnel was further re-echoed 
by another process owner and top level management personnel who stated that the 
documentation required for the SMS initiative was cumbersome, some of the processes were 
changed mid-stream and some of the principal inspectors from the local FAA who were 
supposed to ensure oversight over the SMS initiative were not trained nor technically capable 
of the oversight resulting in implementation delays. A quote from the process owner 
highlights the point: 
The FAA documents were very cumbersome; they were hard to understand; they 
changed halfway through – the FAA changed the whole process halfway through. 
With all due respect to our local flight standards district office; they weren’t involved; 
they had nobody there that had training. So that again, created a lot of challenges. 
We weren’t able to deal with our local FAA office in Fargo for example. When we 
had questions we had to deal with a regional office, and it was sometimes hard to get 
feedback or get them involved or schedule them to come to meetings.  
We had a couple of meetings with the FAA’s SMS experts from regional and 
national offices. But there were times where it would take six or seven or eight weeks 
to get them to respond to an e-mail, for example. So yeah, there were a lot of 
challenges internally in our organization and we had challenges outside the 
organization, primarily with our FAA office. None of those inspectors were trained in 
the SMS concept. They knew what it meant, but they couldn’t answer any questions 
for us. 
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Sustainability 
 Within the backdrop that the flight program has been recognized by the FAA as a 
fully-fledged voluntary collegiate SMS program with all the components functional (Active 
conformance level) there is a need to sustain that level through evaluation, monitoring and 
continuous improvement. The top level leaders interviewed were asked to share their 
opinions on strategies adopted to ensure the sustainability of the SMS Initiative. Some of the 
key areas that emerged were evaluation and monitoring, data-driven analysis and 
improvements and active personnel involvement and process ownership. 
Evaluation and Monitoring.  There was a general agreement among all the top level 
management personnel interviewed that some positive effort has gone into the area of 
actively monitoring the SMS initiative and the processes aligned with it. One process owner 
was of the opinion that there had been a constant awareness of safety risk assessment in every 
facet of operational processes and also the effectiveness of the confidential and non-punitive 
reporting systems put in place to identify hazards and risk to safety.  
 However, the process owner was of the opinion that there were only few people with 
the expertise and normally within the safety office who were actively doing the evaluation 
and monitoring.  Two of the top level management personnel were of the opinion that the 
implementation mistakes, disagreements and set-backs have provided a lot of organizational 
learning that has further improved the SMS initiative. Below is a quote by one of the top level 
management personnel: 
There was a team doing an SRA on congested airspace. And we actually weren’t 
following the process, and it upset me in the fact this group was meeting and making 
decisions and implementing without my approval as a process owner. They wanted 
me to park airplanes to reduce congested airspace. And I said, do you realize every 
airplane out there costs $330,000 and you’re going to tell me to park them? I refuse 
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to do it; I will not do it. We will look for other ways to mitigate the safety, or you guys 
are going to have to go above me to my boss, and he’s going to tell me to park them, 
or I will not.  
 So that was a very good learning process for us as an organization. I knew I 
was going to upset some people and I was going to ruffle some feathers; but I went in 
there and said, as the process owner I don’t agree to this. You’re taking this one and 
this one off the list; you’re dealing with the rest. And it was a good thing for us to go 
through. 
Data-driven Analysis and Improvements.  Another process owner was of the 
opinion that the investment in a flight -data monitoring system (FDM) for flight operations 
has helped to increase the acquisition of real-time flight data and the use of empirical means 
to determine trends that have the potential to degrade flight operational efficiency and safety.  
The top level management personnel who has a lot of experience in safety data analysis 
stated that the data-driven analysis of risk in the flight program has helped leadership to make 
smart safety risk decision and to put in place cost effective control strategies that has 
substantially improved both the business and operational safety ends of the program. This 
was a quote from the top level management personnel: 
Now the way we’re doing it, which I think is acceptable; is we’re identifying risks, 
and we’re doing SRAs on those. And there is now a list of them that we keep track of, 
and we keep track of the SRA activities. It is based on perceived threats and hazards 
or what the data might be indicating to us. But I do think there might be a better way 
to maybe more formalize that; and to maybe use the data to actually point to what 
your biggest problems may be. So when you do a risk assessment – and I mean, I 
think we do a pretty good job. I don’t know that there’s anything that’s wrong with 
what we do. 
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Active Personnel Involvement and Process Ownership.  Three of the top level 
management personnel interviewed suggested that in order for the SMS initiative to be 
sustainable and continuously improve there should be active personnel involvement in the 
processes under the initiative and not have the perception that SMS only belongs to the 
aviation safety department. 
 One of these top level management personnel was of the opinion that some students, 
flight instructors and personnel were not knowledgeable about the components and structure 
of the SMS and the role expected of them. The top level management person was of the 
opinion that it may have been a reason for some apathy towards issues related to SMS during 
the initial phases and presently. The top management personnel opined that a continuous 
engagement between the aviation safety department and other departments and sensitization 
outreach could bridge the SMS knowledge gap.  
A process owner also stated that personal interaction with supervisory managers and 
personnel within the department highlighted a perception that the aviation safety department 
had an adversarial attitude of fault finding with their operations and activities and that has 
resulted in some resentment towards the safety personnel resulting in a need to avoid them.  
The top level management personnel recommended that mid-level and low- level 
personnel should be included in safety risk decision making, especially ones related to 
hazards these personnel have identified or filed in safety reports. The top level management 
personnel further agreed that the sense of involvement could potentially bring in acceptance 
and process ownership of the SMS initiative. This was a quote from one of the top level 
management personnel to buttress those points: 
Get the buy-in and involve everybody through the implementation process. That’s the 
important part. Don’t let one or two individuals take it and do everything, and then at 
the end say, here it is. Yeah, don’t shove it down our throats – involve.  
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Performance Review and Recommendations 
 The four top level management personnel interviewed were finally asked to review 
the performance of the SMS initiative and also make recommendations for other collegiate 
programs that intends to or are in the process of implementing SMS. The themes that 
emerged were top level leadership active commitment, effective communication and 
cooperation, scaled implementation and progressive metrics and tenacity and resilience. 
Top level Leadership Active Involvement.   There was a unanimous declaration 
from all the leaders interviewed that based on the experiences and review of the SMS 
initiative from the initial implementation to the present level, a key element for a successful 
SMS program is the active involvement of top level leadership. Almost all the leaders 
interviewed affirmed that the transformational leadership and personal involvement of the 
Dean in the SMS initiative motivated them to actively get involved in the process. The 
leaders stated that provision of financial, material and human resources is a function of top 
level leadership and they as leaders set the tone for the students, instructors, faculty and other 
personnel to “buy-in” the entire concept of SMS.  
The leaders further reiterated that it was very important for them to “walk the talk”. 
They recommended that any collegiate aviation program that intends to start an SMS 
program must have a progressive and proactive top level leadership ready to provide moral, 
financial and physical support for the SMS initiative. A quote from one of the top level 
leadership provides clarity on the point: 
If someone asked me; if another program asked me what would be – I’d say, you’d 
have to have the buy-in of your senior management team, and they have to be sincere 
about it. Because if they are not – if they’re not directing, let’s do this, and this isn’t 
just an exercise, no work committed to this; that makes it – that’s going to trickle all 
the way down.  
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Effective Communication and Cooperation.  A top level management personnel 
and process manager stated that there was an important need for effective communication 
among top level leadership and between leadership, students, flight instructors, faculty and 
personnel for any successful SMS initiative. The top level management personnel intimated 
that the vision and objectives of the SMS initiative needs to be clearly stated and outlined in a 
policy statement and documented. 
 One of the top level management person stated that due to the technical nature of 
some of the concepts of SMS, there needs to be effective communication through formalized 
SMS training and information network. Two top level management personnel also reiterated 
the point about cooperation among top level leadership in the area of safety risk mitigation 
and control strategies. They were of the opinion that communication and cooperation will 
minimize over-stretch into other process owners’ areas of responsibilities when safety 
mitigations are required.  
In the opinion of these top level management personnel that will also reduce duplicity 
of effort and inefficiency in flight operations. Overall the leaders were of the opinion that a 
culture of candor and openness will foster cordial exchange of ideas on how to optimize 
positive benefits out of the SMS initiative. One of the leaders summed up the point 
succinctly:  
I believe in SMS, I really do. I think it’s great for organizations to have it. I just think 
it’s important again that you continuously educate, and as an organization, sit down 
and evaluate how you’re using that program. So do your homework, visit operations 
that have it, take it back to your staff, get the buy-in and involve everybody through 
the implementation process. 
Scaled Implementation and Progressive Metrics.  There was agreement among two 
of the top level management personnel interviewed on the need for a step-wise or scaled 
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implementation process for the SMS initiative. One of the top level leaders stated that due to 
the size and complexity of each organization, there may be difficulties in comparing SMS 
initiatives across board. The top level management personnel and faculty member who was 
part of the initial team trained to implement the SMS initiative recommended that aviation 
collegiate programs aspiring to implement SMS must use both internal and external resources 
such as the FAA and other aviation colleges with robust and recognized SMS.  
The top level management personnel further stated that aspiring collegiate aviation 
programs should adopt strategies that will align with the scale of their operations. The top 
level management personnel also recommended that metrics should be progressive, clearly 
outlined and not lumped together since that could result in frustration within the organization 
due to un-attainable metrics. Below is a quote from the top level leader to buttress the points: 
But my advice would be to take a longer term view of everything. So yes, we have to 
always worry about tomorrow or the next day, but we also need to worry about one 
year from now or two years from now. And so make sure they stay focused on the 
longer term too. What are you trying to do for your organization? And if the goal is – 
is one year from now, we want to have a safer organization than we have today; I 
think that’s a really good way to – to that. So then that would be my recommendation; 
my advice. 
Tenacity and Resilience.  There was agreement among all the top level management 
personnel interviewed that key characteristics principal to initiating and sustaining any SMS 
initiative are tenacity and resilience. A top-level leader and process owner stated that any 
time there are organizational changes that could result in paradigm shift of institutional 
cultures, systems and processes there are normally a lot of resistance from people who may 
be accustomed to doing things the old way.  
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The top level management personnel intimated that implementing an SMS initiative 
requires some tenacious, tactful and strong-willed safety champions. Another top level leader 
and a process owner also pointed out that when implementing SMS, things will not always go 
as expected or planned. The process owner stated that during non-normal and novel situations 
that could adversely affect flight operations and organizational cohesion there needs to be 
structures in place to restore the organization back to normalcy. This was a quote from the 
top level management personnel: 
The other recommendation I’d have is not to be – to another program – I mean, not to 
be fearful of the whole process. I mean, it takes a while but it’s the right thing to do. 
It’s going to improve the program, and it’s the paradigm that students are going to 
have to learn to operate under anyway, so program shouldn’t have the fear of going 
through it.  
And if it takes them a little bit longer, that’s fine; at least you’re making 
progress towards it. Yeah, and it kind of goes back to – one of the things I was just 
saying is, don’t be fearful of starting. But then also once you’ve started, see it 
through. And it does take probably some strong personalities to kind of push it 
through. 
 A qualitative conceptual tree (hierarchical structure) of the codes and themes is shown 
below as Figure 16 and the conceptual map and word cloud of the computer assisted 
qualitative analysis can be found in Appendix C.  
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Factual Operational Performance Data 
An analysis of safety documents containing aggregate data of both historic and real-
time safety performance indicators i.e., number of confidential safety reports filed by 
personnel and closed reports/feedback from safety office, attendance to safety meetings, and 
SMS training conducted for students and instructors between the active applicant period 
(2012) to the active conformance stage (2016) of the SMS initiative was done for Grand 
Forks flight program (GFK) and Mesa Programs. The results show that the six –year average 
was 495 reports per Flying Year (FY) for GFK and 28 reports per FY for the Mesa flight 
operations.  
Factual Safety Reporting (GFK and Mesa) 
Analyzing the overall safety performance in terms of safety reporting, the results 
suggest that in FY 2014 (451 safety reports) there was a 9% increment in safety reporting as 
compared to the six-year mean safety reporting. In 2015 (556 safety reports) there was about 
12 % increase in safety reporting and then the trend dipped in 2016 (352 safety reports as at 
September 30) with a 28% reduction. The two year forecasted trend suggests a slight increase 
in safety reporting in 2017 (~ 410 safety reports) and a level trend in 2018 (~ 400 safety 
reports). Figure 17 shows the trend pattern of safety reports submitted from 2011-2016 and 
the forecast.   
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Figure 17.  GFK Operations Safety Reports Submitted (2011-2016). 
An audit of the respective annual and six-year mean performance in terms of safety 
reporting for the Mesa flight operations showed that the six- year mean for safety reports 
processed by the aviation safety office was 28. Comparing the yearly safety reports processed 
to the mean value, there was a 25% reduction in safety reporting in 2014. In 2015 there was 
about 67 % increase in safety reporting. The trend increased substantially in 2016 (Third 
Quarter) with a 100% increase. A two year forecasted trend suggests a significant increase in 
safety reporting in 2017 (~ 63 safety reports) and 2018 (~ 72 safety reports). Figure 20 shows 
the trend pattern of safety reports submitted from 2011-2016 and the forecast.   
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Figure 18.  Mesa Operations Safety Reports Submitted (2011-2016). 
The breakdown of safety reporting for the various departments in GFK such as flight 
operation, line operations, maintenance, supervisor of flight (SOF) and others suggest that 
flight operations had the highest reporting within the periods (2011-2016) with a mean safety 
reporting of 398 and SOF having the lowest of 4. At the Mesa program, the results show that 
operations had the highest mean safety reporting value of 26 as compared to line and 
maintenance with 1 each. 
 A two- year forecast suggests that there will be a slight increase in safety reporting in 
2017 and a level trend in 2018 for flight operations at GFK. A two year forecasted trend for 
Mesa suggests that there will be a substantial increase in safety reporting within the flight 
operations department. Figures 19 and 20 show the departmental safety reporting trends at 
GFK and Mesa respectively. 
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Figure 19.  GFK Operations Safety Reports Submitted by Departments (2011-2016). 
 
 
Figure 20.  Mesa Operations Safety Reports Submitted by Departments (2011-2016). 
In order to understand the safety reporting performance at the granular level, the 
number of reports per month for the period 2012-2016 was analyzed. The mean safety 
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reporting per month within the specified period was 47 for GFK operations. The results show 
that the month of September had the highest safety reporting of 69 and compared to the mean 
value shows a 47% increase in safety reporting.  
The other months with high safety reporting were March (51reports) and October (52 
reports) showing an 11% increase compared to the mean value. The month with the lowest 
safety reports was December (22 reports) which corresponds to a 53% decrease when 
compared to the mean value. The Figure 21 shows the monthly safety reporting for the 
periods 2012-2016 and the forecasted trend suggesting a decrease in safety reporting for 
January and February 2017 compared to the five-year mean values for January (36 reports) 
and February (46 reports). 
 
Figure 21.  GFK Operations Monthly Safety Reports Submitted (2011-2016). 
The number of safety reports submitted was compared to flight activities (safety 
reports/1000 hours flown) to determine the rate and identify trends both at GFK and Mesa. 
The results show that GFK program had a six-year mean rate of 0.006 (6 reports per 1000 
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hours) and the mean rate in Mesa was 0.003 (3 reports per 1000 hours). The results show that 
Flying Year (FY) 2016 had the highest rate of 0.008 (8 reports per 1000 hours) as compared 
to the lowest rate of 0.005 (5 reports per 1000 hours) for FY2013 and FY2014 in GFK.  
The results suggest a 33% improvement of the FY 2016 reporting rate over the six-
year average in GFK. The results from Mesa indicates that the highest rate was in FY2015 (5 
reports per 1000 flight hours) as compared to the lowest rate of 0.001 (1 report per 1000 
flight hours) in FY2012. The results suggest a 67% increase in reporting rate compared to the 
six-year mean value. The forecasted trends suggest a decrease in reporting rates in GFK (~ 7 
reports) in 2017 and a relatively stable rate in Mesa (~ 5 reports). The safety reports per 1000 
flight hours for the period 2012-2016 in GFK and Mesa are shown in Table 10, Figures 22, 
Table 11 and Figure 23 respectively.  
Table 10. Safety Reports per 1000 Flight Hours at GFK. 
Years Flight Hours 
Flown (1000) 
Safety 
Reports 
Safety Reports/ 
Flight hours 
Rate x 1000 
2012 87.80 667 0.007 7 
2013 102.00 510 0.005 5 
2014 90.20 451 0.005 5 
2015 86.70 556 0.006 6 
2016 42.80 352 0.008 8 
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Figure 22.  GFK Operations Safety Reports per 1000 flight hours (2012-2016). 
Table 11. Safety reports per 1000 flight hours at Mesa. 
Years Flight hours 
Flown (1000) 
Safety 
Reports 
Safety Reports/Flight 
Hours 
Rate 
x1000 
2012 4.893 5 0.001 1 
2013 6.722 28 0.004 4 
2014 11.61 21 0.002 2 
2015 19.931 47 0.002 2 
2016 12.025 56 0.005 5 
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Figure 23.  Mesa Operations Safety Reports per 1000 flight hours (2012-2016). 
Safety Meetings (Factual Data) 
A safety performance analysis of attendance to safety meetings for the periods fall 
2014 – spring 2016 suggest a mean attendance of 1047 students and other personnel. The 
highest attendance value over the four-year period was in fall 2015 (1094) as compared to the 
lowest in spring 2015 (990). The findings suggest that the value in fall 2015 was a 4.5% 
improvement over the four-year mean and the value for spring 2015 was 5.4 % reduction 
compared to the mean value. However, the forecasted trend indicates an improvement in 
safety meeting attendance in the next two reporting periods of fall 2016 and spring 2017. The 
GFK operations safety meetings attendance is shown in Figure 24. 
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Figure 24.  GFK Operations Safety Meeting Attendance (2014-2016). 
SMS Training (Factual Data) 
A safety performance analysis of number of students and instructors formally trained 
in SMS was also evaluated for the spring 2012 – spring 2016 academic semesters in both 
GFK and Mesa. The findings suggest a mean number of 157 students and 131 instructors 
were trained each semester within the stated period. The highest number of students trained 
per semester was 259 in fall 2015 (65% improvement over the mean value).  
The lowest number of students trained was 90 in spring 2012 and spring 2013 (43% 
decrease compared to mean value). The highest number of instructors was 375 in fall 2015 
and the lowest number was zero in spring 2012 and spring 2013.  The forecasted trends 
suggest that there will be an increase in SMS training for students (~230) and instructor/staff 
(~ 345) in fall 2016 and spring 2017 academic years when compared to the mean number of 
personnel who receive SMS training. The values for the number of students and instructors 
trained in SMS are shown in Figure 25. 
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Figure 25.  Number of Students, Instructors and Staff Trained in SMS (2012-2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 4 0 23
92
60
280
375
343
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
2012
Spring
2012
Fall
2013
Spring
2013
Fall
2014
Spring
2014
Fall
2015
Spring
2015
Fall
2016
Spring
St
u
d
en
ts
In
st
ru
ct
o
rs
Period
SMS Training
Instructors/Staff Students (est)
Linear (Instructors/Staff) Linear (Students (est))
 153 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, CONCLUSION 
 
SMS Initiative Construct Validation 
The results and findings from the research suggest that in attempting to measure the 
latent construct of SMS initiative using factor analysis, two underlying factors emerged 
namely SMS process engagement and SMS policy implementation. The SMS policy 
implementation (α = .93) explained about 38.2% of the total variance for the SMS Initiative 
construct as compared to SMS process engagement (α = .75) which explained about 10.8% of 
SMS Initiative construct. It was however very interesting most items on an important 
component of SMS initiative, Emergency Response Planning (ERP) had poor loadings and 
had to be dropped. These may indicate that respondents were not familiar with policies and 
processes related to ERP. 
The two factor obtained corroborates earlier findings by Chen (2014) who also found 
had two underlying factors measuring SMS among airline pilots in Taiwan. Chen (2014) 
designated the two underlying scales as SMS policy (α = .95) and SMS practices (α = .95). 
While Chen (2014) had the underlying factors explain about 71% of total variance for the 
SMS evaluation scale, the present study had about 46% explanation of total variances in the 
construct SMS.   
The higher level of experience and professionalism of airline pilots and the depth of 
knowledge about their organization’s policy implementation, practices and process 
engagement relating to SMS initiatives may have a higher effect on the perceptions of these 
professional pilots as compared to pilot trainees and flight instructors in a collegiate aviation 
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program implementing an SMS Initiative. These factors could possibly be a reason for the 
relatively high variance in Chen (2014) as compared to this study.  
The two factors identified in this study was also different from factors identified in an 
earlier study by Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón, Vázquez-Ordás (2007) in which a scale 
made up of 29 items turned out eight first-order factors; policy, incentives, training, 
communication, preventive planning, emergency planning, internal control and 
benchmarking techniques. 
 This study also differs from the number of factors identified by Chen and Chen, 
(2012) who developed an SMS measurement scale from the perspective of aviation experts 
and airline managers to evaluate the performance of airline’s SMS. The results revealed a 
five-factor structure consisting of 23 items. A reason for these differences may be the type of 
respondents used. Both the current study and Chen (2014) used front-line operational 
personnel such line pilots and flight students and flight instructors instead of senior line 
managers who may have a different perspective on SMS. 
This research also adds to existing literature on SMS construct validations in aviation 
such as Liou and Chuang (2010) who mapped out structural relationships among diverse 
components of SMS and identified key factors in their model and another study by Hsu, Li 
and Chen (2010) that developed an analytical framework for defining the key components 
and dimensions of an airline SMS and their interaction. 
SMS Policy Implementation 
A common thread in all of these studies and the current study reveals that the factor 
“SMS policy” as a key component and under pins the importance of a coherent SMS policy in 
any organization that wants to implement an SMS initiative. The findings in this study also 
highlights SMS policy implementation as essential in explicitly describing core 
responsibility, authority, lines of accountability and pursuable targets. The findings from both 
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the survey instruments and the semi-structured interviews suggest that roles, responsibility 
and relationship outlined in safety policies of collegiate aviation programs can have a positive 
effect on the sustenance of high operational safety standards and these roles must be clearly 
defined for an effective SMS policy implementation (ICAO, 2009). 
      The results also support extant literature that SMS policy implementation must 
originate from the highest echelon of authority in an organization and must have ample 
evidence of top leadership initiatives, commitment and support for the implementation drive 
(FAA, 2015b). The safety policy implementation must be documented and enshrined in the 
core mission and vision statement. The safety policy implementation strategies must be 
visible and communicated wide across the structures of the organization and must be widely 
known and accepted by all employees as a bona-fide safety policy (Wood, 2003; IATA, 
2012).  
SMS Process Engagement 
The results also suggest that sometimes safety policy implementation does not always 
result in effective SMS process engagement which is the reciprocal gesture or acceptance of 
the key tenets of the SMS policy by front-line operational personnel such as flight students 
and flight instructors. The study suggest that top level leadership must use ingenuity and 
smart promotion strategies to get the necessary “buy-ins” and acceptance from these “sharp-
end” operational personnel to get some level of parity between SMS policy implementation 
and SMS process engagement.   
The interviews with some of the top level management personnel and process owners 
revealed that the SMS policy implementation was very effective which was corroborated by 
the survey among the students and flight instructors. However, the SMS process engagement 
component seems weak and may be attributed to the fact that realistically most students and 
flight instructors are actually distal from implementation strategies and are only beneficiaries 
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of the windfalls of any of these SMS polices. Three of the top level management personnel 
interviewed suggested that in order for the SMS initiative to be sustainable and continuously 
improve there should be active personnel involvement in the processes under the initiative 
and not have the perception that SMS only belongs to the aviation safety department. 
 A top level management person interviewed was of the opinion that some flight 
students, flight instructors and personnel were not knowledgeable about the processes and 
structure of the SMS and the role expected of them and that may be a reason for some apathy 
towards issues related to SMS during the initial phases and presently. The top management 
personnel opined that a proactive and ingenious outreach and engagement between the 
aviation safety department and other departments could bridge the SMS knowledge gap and 
may reduce the perception among students and instructors of “they and us” while actively 
promoting process ownership and engagement.  
The results suggest that collegiate aviation programs with SMS initiatives must 
engage individual student, student organizations and flight instructors during the SMS 
implementation process and also in the subsequent continuous improvement processes. The 
challenges to these recommendations may be the reality of constraints due to time and 
academic activities for most collegiate aviation students, which may restrict a greater role and 
engagement in the SMS initiative. Another challenge will be the level of expertise and 
knowledge that may be required to execute the SMS policy implementation within a 
collegiate aviation program. However, it may be still beneficial to reach out to these students 
and flight instructors through SMS initial and recurrent training. 
An analysis of factual safety performance data suggested that in terms of SMS 
process engagement strategies such SMS initial and recurrent training for flight students and 
instructors, some effort has been put in place by the top level management but more needed 
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to be done and the forecasted trends suggested that there will be an increase in SMS training 
for students (~230) and instructor/staff (~ 345) in fall 2016 and spring 2017 academic years. 
Triangulated Results on SMS Initiative 
The results suggest that collegiate aviation programs could use in-house resources and 
external resources such as the FAA SMS program office to assist in policy implementation. 
However, sometimes the local FAA offices may not have SMS experts and that may stifle the 
SMS initiatives’ progress since the local FAA traditionally has oversight over the 
certification process. The results suggest that such aviation collegiate programs may need to 
establish a healthy rapport and liaison with their local FAA offices and possibly get external 
expertise from the FAA SMS office at the regional or national level to assist in the drafting of 
initial SMS policies, Gap Analysis, training, Job Aids and actual process integrations.  
The results from the factual data corroborates the findings from the survey and the 
semi-structured interviews that the SMS policy implementation has provided the flight 
program with the necessary benchmarks and tracking mechanism for safety performance. A 
critical assessment of the six-year performance data from the flight programs operations at 
both GFK and Mesa showed a substantial increase in safety occurrence reporting and safety 
meeting attendance among students and flight instructors, which may be attributed to 
enhanced safety promotion efforts outlined in the SMS policy implementation. These trends 
may be some of the data-driven behavioral benchmarks that need to be tracked in an SMS 
initiative. It was quite difficult to gauge the level of process engagement in Mesa but at least 
the results seem to indicate an effective SMS policy implementation. 
Theoretical Implications  
The theoretical implications of this study are that an attempt has been made to 
measure the dimensionality of SMS Initiative in a collegiate aviation program. The findings 
of this study may serve as a foundation and road-map for future research by further refining 
 158 
 
the dimensions through the use of a larger sample and participation of more collegiate 
aviation programs with functional SMS Initiatives. Finally, the results corroborate extant 
literature that any SMS policy should outline the key safety goals and objectives, which must 
be attainable, pragmatic, must be included in the overall corporate strategic plan (Stolzer, 
Halford & Goglia, 2008).  
Relationships between SMS Initiative and Other Study Variables 
 One of the key rational for this study was to evaluate the relationship between SMS 
initiative, self-efficacy, transformational, safety leadership, safety motivation, safety 
participation, safety compliance and safety -related occurrences. The results from the 
structural equation model and path analysis indicate that respondents’ perceptions about the 
SMS policy implementation had a positive and significant effect on their safety motivation, 
safety compliance and safety participation. The results indicate that an investment in SMS 
initiative may enhance the perceptions of flight students and instructors on the collegiate 
programs operations and safety culture.  
This result corroborates findings in earlier studies on SMS and safety culture 
(Dillman, Voges & Robertson, 2010; Adjekum, 2014b; Adjekum et al., 2015; Freiwald, 
Lenz-Anderson & Baker, 2013, Chen, 2014) which highlighted the positive benefits of SMS 
in improving organizational safety culture and specifically safety behavior in aviation. The 
results also validate findings in previous studies that indicated a positive trend in attitudes and 
behavior of employees towards safety after SMS implementation in airport operations 
(Remawi, Bates & Dix, 2011). 
Safety Policy Implementation and Safety Participation 
The results indicate that organizational indicators such as perceptions on SMS process 
engagement have a higher predictive power with regards to respondents’ safety participation 
than SMS policy implementation which did not have any significant direct path to safety 
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participation. The only significant pathway from SMS policy implementation to safety 
participation was when mediated by safety motivation. The results indicate that although 
SMS policy implementation may not directly have a positive effect on safety participation, 
the indirect effect through safety motivation may positively improve safety participation.  
The results also validate the suggestion by Neal and Griffin (2006) that SMS 
implementation could be a viable predictor of safety compliance and safety participation. The 
results further indicate that when respondents understand and associate with the SMS policies 
and how it is implemented, it may motivate them to get involved in safety related activities. 
This finding is very important since a well-defined SMS policy is very essential to drive the 
entire SMS initiative and improve the safety culture of the organization as recommended by 
Stolzer, Halford & Goglia (2008), (ICAO, 2013) and FAA (2015). 
SMS Process Engagement and Safety Participation 
The results from the final structural model supported the hypothesis that SMS process 
engagement has a significant positive direct effect on safety participation. The finding is 
supported by Mc Gregor’s Theory Y which has a profound implication for respondents to 
have “buy-in” and participate in SMS initiated in a collegiate aviation program. Under the 
conditions outlined by Theory Y, this finding may encourage flight students and instructors to 
seek out responsibility within the SMS process engagement factor and collegiate aviation 
programs can decentralize the SMS policy implementation and ensure operational level 
participation under the process owners.  
Policy Implication.  Under Theory Y, the scope of SMS process engagement by flight 
instructors can be broadened, which may add variety and opportunities, while engaging them 
in the decision-making process. In ensuring SMS process engagement, students and flight 
instructors may be allowed to set performance objectives that meet or even exceed FAA 
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requirement and participate in the process of evaluating how well they were met as 
recommended by Sorenson (2015). 
SMS Process Engagement and Safety Motivation 
 The path way from SMS process engagement to safety motivation was not 
significant, indicating that safety motivation alone may not influence personnel to actively 
engage in safety actives if they feel that they are not part of SMS process or have been 
sidelined in the SMS process implementation. The results therefore implore collegiate 
aviation programs to actively reach out and engage the students and flight instructors in the 
processes of SMS such as safety promotion, safety risk management and very importantly 
emergency response planning (ERP) which is one area that there were lots of non-responses 
from respondents. Flight instructors may be included in safety promotion councils and flight 
students may be included in flight data monitoring or event review team (ERT) memberships.  
Safety Process Engagement and Safety Compliance 
The results did not support the hypothesis that there existed a relationship between 
SMS process engagement and safety compliance. This finding was very interesting and 
suggests that getting respondents to be part of SMS process may not affect their safety 
compliance. A reason for this finding could be the idea that in collegiate aviation program, 
most of the task and operations are heavily regulated and higher compliance is required by 
the FAA in order to maintain certification status. Non-compliance with the requirements of 
regulations may elicit disciplinary actions and sanctions, hence the need to comply whether   
actively engaged in the SMS initiative processes or not. 
Self-Efficacy and Safety Compliance 
The results from the final structural model supported the hypothesis that self-efficacy 
has a strong direct effect on safety compliance and an even stronger total effect on safety 
compliance when mediated by safety motivation. This result strongly corroborates findings in 
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earlier research Schwarzer & Jerusalem (1995) which suggested that respondents with higher 
perceived self-efficacy are likely to better resist pressure and devote more efforts to 
improving their work-related and management performance.  This result also supports 
findings in earlier research (Parasuraman, Molloy & Singh, 1993; Prinzel, 2002) that applied 
as the self-efficacy as an observed predictor in the number of studies that investigate pilots’ 
work-related behaviors. 
Self- Efficacy and Safety Motivation 
The results support prior research in the field of teaching and learning in collegiate 
environment that demonstrated that self-efficacy has effects on the level of motivation, 
learning and performance and a consistent predictor of behavior and behavioral change 
(Graham and Weiner, 1995; Schunk and Pajares, 2001).  This finding suggests a positive 
trend among respondents and for attaining the performance objectives of the SMS initiative.  
Self-Efficacy and Safety Participation 
The results indicate a positive direct effect of self-efficacy on safety participation and 
a positive total effect when mediated by safety motivation. This may be good news for 
leadership in the collegiate aviation program as it may offset the rather non-direct effect of 
SMS policy implementation on safety participation in the model.  Although self-efficacy may 
be a function of an individual inherent character it may be improved by formal training which 
can ensure massive participation from flight students (Schunk and Pajares, 2001; Chen, 
2014).  
Policy Implication.  The inclusion of self-efficacy in flight course or SMS training 
programs can be adopted as a policy in the collegiate aviation program. Since the flight 
program already has a robust SMS training program as corroborated by findings of the factual 
safety data it may be intuitive to team up with the psychology department and include 
modules on self-efficacy to both initial and recurrent SMS training classes. However, it is 
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important to state that like all self-reported surveys, there may be issues of social desirability 
bias in terms of respondents’ perceptions on their level of self-efficacy.  
Self- Efficacy and Safety Compliance 
There was a significant positive relationship between self-efficacy and safety 
compliance and that is nominally very good, however some researchers have expressed 
concern that it could be a two-edged sword and that people with high self-efficacy may be 
extremely goal –oriented at the expense of safety (Prinzel, 2002).  Under deadlines, peer 
pressure, and budget factors, some flight students and instructors with high self-efficacy may 
decide to logically disregard procedures. This behavior is termed the “Superman Syndrome” 
by the Petersen Accident Theory. That is why the active engagement of students groups and 
flight instructors in the SMS initiative could equip them with a sense of process ownership 
and peer review of this undesired safety behavior.  
Transformational Safety Leadership, Safety Participation and Safety Compliance 
The results from the final measurement model indicates that there was a significant 
direct effect of transformational safety leadership on safety participation and no direct path or 
effect on safety compliance. There was a positive indirect effect of transformational safety 
leadership on safety compliance through the mediation of safety motivation. However, even 
with a small negative direct effect of transformational safety leadership on safety motivation, 
the total effect on safety participation and safety compliance were significant and positive.  
The results were contrary to earlier findings by Chen (2014) who found out that at the 
group aspect level ethical or morality leadership did show a significant direct effect on airline 
pilots’ safety compliance.  Chen (2014) suggested that pilots by virtue of their level of 
professionalism normally have their behavior dictated by their training and since most airline 
pilots actually work as a team with other crew members, sharing information and learning 
from each other, their safety behaviors may not be influenced by a single fleet manager or 
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chief pilot and recommends that the influence of leadership on pilots’ safety compliance may 
need to be interpreted from a different perspective. 
 However, the result was similar to empirical findings from extant literature that 
suggest a positive relationship between transformational leadership and enhanced task 
performance and safety behavior (Howell & Avolio, 1993; Barling, Weber, & Kelloway, 
1996; Zohar, 2002; Inness, Turner, Barling & Stride, 2010; Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón, 
Vázquez-Ordás, 2014; Pilbeam, Doherty, Davidson & Denyer, 2016).  
 A reason that could be adduced by the counter-intuitive finding of the negative direct 
relationship between transformational safety leadership and safety motivation may be the 
idea that when chief flight instructors and other senior flight supervisory staff  exhibit high 
levels of transformational safety leadership traits in a  flight program with a matured and 
functional SMS initiative, flight students and flight instructors become complacent and less 
motivated to pursue safety objectives because in their opinion the system is inherently safe 
and dependable with such transformational leadership in place. 
 That may create a spurious “Dependency Syndrome” that leadership will always 
ensure a safe operational environment even without the input of these respondents. This trend 
could potentially be detrimental to continuous improvement and sustenance of any SMS and 
could lead to operational drift and mitigation decay. It was rather interesting that the 
interview with one of the top level leadership and a faculty member with very close 
association to flight student organizations re-iterated similar sentiments about waning safety 
motivation among flight students over time.   
The top level management person was of the view that even though top leadership has 
provided transformational leadership in safety and resourced the SMS initiative, there have 
been periods of behavioral mitigation decays over time. The top leader emphasized that 
recommendations have been made to consistently use data-driven strategies to track 
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behavioral and attitudinal trends within the flight program for indicators such as lack of 
safety motivation, safety compliance and safety participation among flight students and 
instructors to pro-actively mitigate such hazardous attitudes before the flight program slips 
back to a pre-mitigation period of unsafe attitudes and behaviors.  
Another reason that may explain this result is that although top level flight 
supervisory staff may be exhibiting transformational leadership traits, they may be missing 
out on some underlying potential motivational factors that can enhance proactive safety 
behavior in collegiate aviation programs (McLeod, 2014). Two of the four elements of 
transformational safety leadership are individualized consideration and inspirational 
motivation (Bass & Riggio, 2006) and when respondents observe the other components of 
TSL such as idealized influence and intellectual stimulation but not the first two, the net 
effect may be negative perception of TSL, which could wane safety motivation. 
Sometimes respondents may not directly come into contact with some of these 
supervisory flight leaders, but will hear negative things about them from third-party sources 
and that may skew their perceptions about TSL within the organization. On the contrary there 
may be real issues of poor traits of TSL in these supervisory flight leaders but due to the 
over-arching proactive safety culture within the organization and the personal expectations 
and goals of these respondents to place higher value on safety outcomes, they may be self-
motivated to ensure safety behavior as grounded in the Vroom’s Expectancy Theory. 
 Realistically, these supervisory flight leaders have to ensure some level of 
transactional leadership based on non-individualized hierarchical relationships and 
specifically Corrective leadership (or active management by exception) that monitors 
individual performance against standards, detecting errors and correcting them (Zohar, 2002). 
Therefore, if these supervisory flight leaders exhibit transformational safety leadership traits 
most of the time, there may be periods where they could become overwhelmed balancing 
 165 
 
relationship maintenance and attaining operational goals. This becomes more challenging   
during times of high flight training periods and operational exigencies. Zohar’s Corrective 
Leadership may create a perception that these supervisory flight leaders do not identify with 
the cognitive and physiological needs of flight students and instructors such as fatigue and 
stress. These factors may adversely affect safety motivation. These observations are also 
theoretically grounded in the Maslow’s Hierarchy Theory.  
These flight students and instructors need to feel emotionally and physically safe and 
accepted within the flight program to progress and reach their full potential. These flight 
students and instructors must be shown that they are valued and their opinions respected by 
their supervisory flight leadership in order to create an environment that ensures high safety 
participation and safety compliance as recommended by Maslow.  
It was however interesting to note that the factual safety data analysis revealed that 
safety behavioral markers such as safety occurrence reporting and safety meeting attendance 
had increased among respondents over the six-year reporting period and the projected trends 
also indicated an increase in reports and attendance in Mesa and GFK respectively. These 
trends may suggest that overall the impact of transformational safety leadership provided at 
the highest level in resourcing and actively supporting the SMS initiative may be yielding 
benefits. 
Safety Motivation, Safety Participation and Safety Compliance 
The result supported the hypothesis that safety motivation has a direct positive effect 
on both safety participation and safety compliance. This finding supports extant theories that 
examined the effects of safety motivation on safety behavior such as the Frederick 
Herzberg’s Motivational Theory (Two-Factor Theory) which theoretically explains why 
safety motivational factors such as achievement, advancement, recognition and responsibility 
encourage desired and proactive safety behavior in an organization (Hines, 1973; Neil, 2007; 
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Greenberg, 2013). The results also confirm previous findings by Chen (2014) and Friewald 
(2013) that suggested that safety motivation positively influenced airline pilots and flight 
students respectively to exhibit proactive safety behavior.  
Theoretical Implication.  The theoretical implications of this finding for a collegiate 
aviation program with a functional SMS is that policies, processes and procedures may 
improve the safety motivation of flight students that can positively affect operational 
practices such as the tendency to act safely, and follow training guidelines and safety 
instructions. Safety motivation may create an awareness and incentives that operational 
outcomes are positive as compared to unsafe acts, which may have adverse consequences. 
This invariably may improve safety compliance and is well grounded in the Skinner’s 
Operant Theory. Another theoretical implication of this finding is that when respondents are 
motivated as a result of positive reinforcement from safety award programs, they may be 
more apt to engage in safety compliant behavior and participate in safety activities supported 
by the Thorndike’s Reinforcement Theory. 
Policy Implication.  Based on this finding, it may be beneficial for collegiate aviation 
programs with SMS to use some form of positive reinforcement such as bonuses for flight 
instructors who undertake occurrence –free training over a period of time. Other incentives 
such as safety awards and public recognition may improve the level of safety motivation. Top 
level leadership may also award “free” training hours to flight students for exemplary safety 
operations and behavior.  
The use of safety motivational strategies such as positive reinforcement could 
improve flight students and instructors’ safety behavior as suggested by the positive direct 
effect of the causal path in this study. However, top level leadership should be guided by the 
limitations of incentives and reinforcement especially in times of high flight training regime 
in resource constrained environment, where the potential for unsafe working conditions could 
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derail gains made from safety motivations and adversely affects safety behavior (Reason, 
1998; Greenberg, 2013). 
Safety Compliance, Safety Participation and Safety -Related Events 
The result supported the hypothesis that safety compliance was related to safety 
participation. However, the hypothesis that safety- related events mediated the causal path 
between safety participation and safety compliance was not supported. There was a 
significant positive causal path between safety -related events and safety compliance. The 
finding suggests that there exists a strong correlation between safety compliance and safety 
participation due to the fact that they are both factors that explain safety behavior (Griffin and 
Neal, 2000).  
The result supports earlier findings by Zohar (2002) that suggested a causal 
relationship between personnel safety performance indicators such as compliance with safety 
regulations, and safety- related events. The result also buttresses earlier findings by Griffin 
and Neal (2000) that suggested that behaviors that are characteristic of safety compliance will 
lead to fewer safety- related events in the workplace. For example, personnel who comply 
with established safety regulations are less likely to experience safety- related events than 
those who do not comply with established safety regulations. The findings also support 
previous findings from studies by Mullen (2004). 
The result did not support earlier findings on the relationship between safety 
participation and safety -related events.  Earlier studies by Cree and Kelloway (1997) had 
suggested that that individuals who experience close calls or safety related events, display 
higher levels of safety participation.  More current research findings by Mullen (2004) found 
that perceived risks associated with a job tended to be heightened when an individual 
vicariously experienced or learned about an injury that occurs within the workplace and these 
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safety -related events raised their safety awareness and increased their participation in safety 
activities.  
Even though the hypothesis that safety -related event mediated safety participation 
and safety compliance was not fully supported, the relationship between safety-related events 
and safety compliance was supported by the causal path model and corroborates findings by 
Neal and Griffin (2006) that knowledge about the safety climate and safety-related events 
significantly influenced self-report of task and contextual safety performance, namely safety 
compliance and safety participation.  
 Factual data on safety -related events could not be obtained for this study but the 
findings from the other factual safety performance indicators suggest that the SMS initiative 
had greatly improved the safety participation levels of respondents and one of the top level 
leadership personnel interviewed stated that even with a generally high level of safety 
compliance and participation there were still occasional cases of safety -related events such 
as aircraft in close proximity in airspace (air-prox) that required remedial and corrective 
action as part of the safety risk management program of the SMS.  
The top level management personnel also indicated that there have been some recent 
cases of safety risk behavioral issues involving alcohol that have been dealt with by a safety 
review team. It may be difficult to determine within the context of this study if the knowledge 
and awareness of such safety -related events by respondents may have significantly improved 
safety participation.  
Effects of Demographic Variables on Safety Behavior and Safety-Related Events 
 One of the essential elements of any SMS initiative is to improve the safety culture 
within the organization and especially among the various demography that make up 
collegiate aviation programs (von Thaden, 2008; Adjekum, 2014b; Adjekum et al., 2015). 
The findings from an ANOVA conducted suggested that there were significant differences in 
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terms of safety compliance between certified flight instructors (CFI) and pre-private and 
student pilots.  
This result may not be surprising since most CFI have relatively extensive experience 
with standard operating procedures (SOPs), aircraft systems and limitations and airspace 
compared to pre-private and student pilots. Another factor could be the motivation factor and 
incentives. Most CFI have worked assiduously to obtain their ratings and certificates as 
instructors and they know the repercussions of non-compliance with safety regulations and 
violations. That may serve as a motivation to ensure that they operate under full compliance 
with standards and federal regulations. The CFI may also be held to higher standards in case 
of non-compliance as compared to the student pilot or pre-private student who may not have 
any certificate to lose.  
 The findings also indicate that the CFI group had a significantly higher safety 
participation than the pre-private and student pilots group. This finding may also not be 
surprising considering the fact that most of these CFI have been well adapted to the safety 
culture and SMS initiative and may be even active in the process engagement. Another 
reason may be that CFI are required as part of their standardization to attend safety meetings 
and meets specific institutional safety requirements that are mandatory as part of their roles as 
CFI. The pre-private group may not have such roles and responsibility to actively participate 
in safety activities since some of them may not even know about the components of the SMS 
initiative nor be well adapted to the institutional safety culture. 
 It was also interesting finding that in terms of academic year groupings and safety 
compliance, there was a significant difference. The seniors had a significantly higher level of 
mean scores on safety compliance as compared to the freshmen. This was also not very 
surprising considering that facts that most of the seniors were enrolled in higher level flight 
course and actively engaged in more training flights, relatively experienced, had better 
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institutional knowledge on safety procedures and SOPs, and most likely CFI who were more 
at risk to substantially lose if their flight certifications were revoked or they face sanctions for 
non-compliance with regulations. 
 These listed factors may pre-dispose the seniors to be more compliant than the 
freshmen who may not have much, institutional knowledge on safety, SOP, aircraft systems 
and above all may have not much to lose in case of violations and non-compliance. Some of 
these freshmen in pre-private and student pilot courses may defer to their CFI who may be 
seniors to comply with procedures and standards since they deem them to be more 
experienced and responsible for the overall safety of flights during training. Another factor 
could be negative transfer of safety risk attitudes and behaviors from other domains that can 
pre-dispose these freshmen to be less compliant with safety procedures and regulations. 
In terms of the safety participation the results suggested that there were significant 
differences between the seniors and juniors. The seniors had a higher mean score on safety 
participation compared to the juniors and that may be due to the fact that relatively the 
seniors may be in a phase of their flight training where there be some flexibility in terms of 
flight schedules and academic intensity to allow them to be more involved in safety activities 
as part of the SMS initiative.  
Some of the seniors may also be CFI who as earlier adduced have to participate in 
SMS training and other safety activities as part of their certificate requirements and 
institutional standardization. On the other hand, these juniors may be at the most intensive 
phases of their flight training such as CFI training, multi-engine training and even instrument 
phase and that may not allow them the flexibility to participate in a lot of non- mandatory 
safety activities. The seniors may also be gearing up as part of their professional development 
into industry and the knowledge and participation in safety activities may enhance their 
personal safety culture while boosting their resume.  
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 There were significant differences in terms of knowledge and involvement in safety -
related-events among the academic year groups. A post-hoc test revealed that there were 
significant differences in the mean score on safety-related events among the seniors and the 
juniors. The seniors had a relatively higher exposure to safety -related events as compared to 
the juniors. This finding could also be adduced to the notion that a sizable sample of the 
seniors were CFI and that meant they had more flight activities relative to the juniors and 
more experiences with the risk of flight training. The higher level of flight operational 
engagement may account for the higher scores.  
These seniors may also be more active in safety activities such as SMS training and 
safety meetings where information on safety occurrences may be shared. These seniors as 
CFI may have better inter -phase with activities at the flight lines and safety reports from the 
flight students assigned to them and that may pre-dispose them to know more about safety-
related occurrences than the juniors. 
SMS Training Effects on Demography 
A T-test of mean was conducted to determine if SMS training had any effect on 
various demography within the flight program. The results indicate that there was no 
significant effect of SMS training on mean scores on safety participation, safety compliance 
or safety-related events. This finding was quite interesting and fascinating since extant 
literature on safety culture and SMS such as Vinodkumara and Bhasib (2010) suggested that 
SMS training was identified as the most important safety management practice that predicted 
safety knowledge, safety motivation, safety compliance and safety participation.  
However, triangulating this result with the factual safety performance data analyzed 
revealed that though there has been an aggressive action by top level management to increase 
the level of initial and recurrent training SMS among flight students, there were still training 
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gaps. The analysis from the factual safety performance data suggest a forecasted increase in 
SMS training for 2017 academic year.  
Policy Implication.  The finding identifies a training gap and need and suggests that 
training in the concepts and principles of the SMS should be expanded to cover all flight 
students and flight instructors. The findings from both the factual data and interviews suggest 
a policy change of making SMS mandatory in the academic curriculum in the flight program 
so that every flight student will have some form of initial SMS training.  
Conclusions and Future Research Direction 
The focus of this research was to establish a coherent causal relationship between 
SMS Initiative, Transformational Safety Leadership, Self-Efficacy, Safety Participation, 
Safety Compliance, and Safety-Related Events when Safety Motivation is used as a 
mediation variable the use of a comprehensive triangulation approach in a collegiate aviation 
program in the US. The study also sought to establishes a proactive operational safety 
benchmarks for continuous monitoring and improvements in SMS implementation within 
collegiate aviation programs. 
Overall the findings from the triangulation of various data sources showed a positive 
perception of respondents on the SMS initiative in the collegiate program and that was 
corroborated by factual safety performance data and interviews with top level management 
personnel. The study conceptualized the causal relationships and effects of Safety 
Management System (SMS) initiative, self-efficacy, and transformational safety leadership as 
constructs with safety behavior (measured by safety compliance and safety participation) 
when mediated by safety motivation using a concurrent-triangulation approach. The study 
also evaluated the relationship between safety behavior and safety -related events.   
Structural Equation modeling techniques and Path Analysis (SEM –PA) were used to 
derive a final measurement model that fit the empirical data after four iterations of the initial 
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conceptual model using both modification indices and theoretical considerations.  The model 
iterations allowed for the improvement of the data fit; the best-fit model accounted for the 
data and was used to test the study hypotheses and validate the conclusions. 
 Utilizing a sample of 282 collegiate flight students and instructors from a collegiate 
aviation program in a large public university in the United States with a fully functional SMS 
program that has been recognized by the FAA as attaining the active conformance level, a 46-
item survey was conducted to measure respondent’s perceptions on the study variables. 
Concurrently, semi- structured Interviews were also conducted with 4 top-level management 
personnel to sample their opinions on the effectiveness of the SMS initiative. Finally, factual 
safety performance data on the flight program over a six-year period was analyzed to 
complete a concurrent -triangulation approach.  
The results indicated that perceptions of SMS policy implementation had direct, 
positive effect on safety compliance and SMS process engagement had direct, positive effect 
on safety participation. Self-efficacy and safety motivation had direct, positive effect on both 
safety compliance and safety participation. Safety motivation fully mediated the positive 
effect of transformational safety leadership on safety participation. 
 However, the best- fit measurement model indicated that there was no direct effect of 
transformational safety leadership on safety compliance. Safety –related events did not fully 
mediate the effect between safety compliance and safety participation. Most of the survey 
items related to Emergency Response Planning (ERP) had poor loadings during the factor 
analysis and had to be dropped. That may indicate that respondents were not familiar with 
policies and processes related to ERP. 
An ANOVA suggested that certified flight instructors significantly had better safety 
participation and safety compliance than pre-private pilots. The ANOVA further revealed that 
senior students significantly had better safety participation than junior students.  The 
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ANOVA finally revealed that senior students were significantly more exposed and aware of 
safety –related events more than junior students.  
A T-test of mean did not reveal any significant differences in safety participation and 
safety compliance between respondents who had formal SMS training and those who did not.   
A review of factual safety data suggests a positive effect on the safety reporting and safety 
meeting attendance among respondents due to the SMS initiative. Interviews revealed that 
top level management support, resource provision and resilience are key elements in the 
success of any SMS initiative. SMS process ownership by respondents was also identified as 
essential for a sustainable SMS initiative. Technical expertise was identified as a major SMS 
implementation challenge.  
Overall, this study was timely and provided additional insight and literature on SMS 
to help collegiate aviation management, regulators and policy makers to establish a data 
driven approach in formulating policies for SMS implementation and continuous 
improvement on safety, while reducing safety events and accidents. This study also 
investigated the effects of a collegiate aviation SMS initiative on pilots’ safety behaviors for 
two reasons. Even though SMS is gradually becoming an industry accepted benchmark for 
safety and reliability and is getting a lot of advocacy from both the FAA, industry and, ICAO, 
there is still limited research examining SMS initiative in collegiate aviation (Adjekum, 
2014b, Chen, 2014). 
Limitations 
Some of the limitations of this study were the fact that the survey was about 
individual’s attitudes and perceptions and that inherently renders such responses to response 
bias and social desirability bias. It was assumed that the responses reflected the actual 
perceptions of these respondents within that time and moment. Some of the respondents were 
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freshmen and pre-private students who were still getting used to the institutional safety 
culture and that may have an effect on their perception on the SMS initiative. 
 The conceptual measurement model for this study was subjected to iterative 
modification to get a good- fit to estimate the strengths of relationships among the constructs, 
resulting in a final measurement model that aimed at adequately representing the constructs 
under study. The use of factor analysis (Exploratory and Confirmatory) as a data reduction 
tool resulted in a series of modifications of the final model compared to the proposed model. 
 The concepts of transformational safety leadership and self-efficacy are highly 
subjective and were measured as the perceptions of the respondents. Neither the instrument 
nor the study differentiated among flight level supervisory management relative to the 
respondents, as they may come into various contacts with diverse people, whose leadership 
traits at any particular time may represent operational safety leadership.  
The concurrent –triangulation method was also limited to a snapshot of perceptions of 
SMS initiative implementation within the study period and may not have reflected the general 
trend over a long period.  The dynamic nature of flight operations and the real-time 
occurrence of a safety –related event during the study period have a potential to affect the 
perceptions of respondents.  
Future Directions 
This particular study has established a benchmark for assessing SMS at within the 
collegiate aviation environments and provides a template for evaluation of the effectiveness 
of an SMS program with established safety performance metrics using a concurrent-
triangulation method which provide a holistic and thorough audit of the safety initiative. 
Future studies may concentrate on a longitudinal study that will assess how the 
predictive capabilities of the exogenous variables such as SMS initiative, self –efficacy, 
safety motivation and transformational safety leadership affects safety behavior and safety-
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related events over time by sampling a cohort of flight students from the freshman year to the 
senior year. Other studies may involve an inter-collegiate triangulation studies to include 
other US collegiate aviation programs with and without functional SMS programs. Another 
research area could be a comparative assessment of collegiate aviation programs in the US at 
the various levels of the FAA voluntary SMS program implementation level to gain insight 
into some of the trends and predictive relationship that may exist between the exogenous 
variables, safety behavior and safety-related events. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Permissions for Copyrighted Items and Research Documents 
 
Permission for SMS Scale (Copyright Clearance Center©) 
 
     
Order Completed 
Thank you very much for your order. 
 
This is a License Agreement between Daniel Adjekum ("You") and Elsevier ("Elsevier"). The license 
consists of your order details, the terms and conditions provided by Elsevier, and the payment terms 
and conditions. 
 
Get the printable license. 
License Number 3800600919988 
License date Feb 02, 2016 
Licensed content publisher Elsevier     
Licensed content publication Accident Analysis & Prevention     
Licensed content title Scale development of safety management system evaluation for the airline industry     
Licensed content author Ching-Fu Chen,Shu-Chuan Chen     
Licensed content date July 2012     
Licensed content volume 
number 
47     
Licensed content issue 
number 
n/a     
Number of pages 5     
Type of Use reuse in a thesis/dissertation     
Portion excerpt     
Number of excerpts 20     
Format electronic     
Are you the author of this 
Elsevier article? 
No     
Will you be translating? No     
Order reference number KwasiTheses1     
Title of your 
thesis/dissertation 
An Evaluation of the relationship between Collegiate Aviation Safety Initiatives, Safety 
Behavior and Safety Occurrences : A Concurrent Triangulation Strategy 
    
Expected completion date Dec 2016     
Estimated size (number of 
pages) 
200     
Elsevier VAT number GB 494 6272 12     
Permissions price 0.00 USD     
VAT/Local Sales Tax 0.00 USD / 0.00 GBP     
Total 0.00 USD     
 
 
 
Copyright © 2016 Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Privacy 
statement. Terms and Conditions.  
 
  
Title: Scale development of safety management system evaluation for the airline industry 
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Permission for General Self-Efficacy Scale 
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Permission for Safety Behavior (Safety Participation and Safety Compliance) Scale 
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APPENDIX B 
 
SMS Initiative Dissertation Survey 2016 (Used for Quantitative Part of Research) 
 
Demographic Details 
Q1 Year Group 
 
 Freshman  
 Sophomore  
 Junior  
 Senior  
 
Q2 Flight Certificate Held 
 
 Pre-Private/Student  
 Private  
 Commercial  
 Certified Flight Instructor (CFI, CFII, MEI)  
 
Q3 Age Group 
 
 17-21  
 22-26  
 27-31  
 32-36  
 Other  
 
Q4 Gender 
 
 Male  
 Female 
 
Q5 Are you an International Contract Student? 
 
 Yes  
 No  
 
Q6 Have you had any formal initial training in Safety Management System (SMS) in your 
program? 
 
 Yes  
 No  
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Q7. Please provide your degree of agreement regarding the following statements about the 
Safety Management System (SMS) in your flight program 
 Strongly 
disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
disagree or 
agree (3) 
Agree (4) Strongly 
agree 
(5) 
SMS1. The safety 
policy is 
documented and 
includes a 
commitment to 
involve all 
students/personnel 
at all levels in the 
maintenance of 
SMS  
 
          
SMS 2.The safety 
policy is 
communicated to 
all 
students/personnel 
to make them 
aware of their 
individual safety 
obligations.  
 
          
SMS3.The safety 
policy is signed 
and  approved by 
the Dean, who 
demonstrates a 
commitment to 
safety through 
active and visible 
participation in the 
SMS  
          
SMS4.Conditions 
under which 
punitive 
disciplinary action 
would be 
considered (e.g. 
illegal activity, 
negligence or 
willful misconduct) 
are not clearly 
defined.  
          
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Q8. Please provide your degree of agreement regarding the following statements about the 
SMS in your flight program 
 Strongly 
disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(3) 
Agree (4) Strongly 
agree 
(5) 
SMS5.There is an 
established means of 
spreading information on 
SMS related matters to 
students/personnel.  
 
          
SMS6.Safety objectives 
and goals are publicized.  
          
SMS7.Students/personnel 
are not informed on the 
primary contacts for 
aviation safety related 
matters.  
 
          
SMS8.Top level 
management allocates 
resources for achieving 
the safety objectives and 
goals of the school.  
 
          
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Q9. Please provide your degree of agreement regarding the following statements about the 
SMS in your flight program 
 Strongly 
disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(3) 
Agree (4) Strongly 
agree (5) 
SMS9.Students/personnel 
are aware of procedures 
that measure safety 
performance on a regular 
basis, with the purpose of 
improving safety.  
 
          
SMS10.The results of 
safety performance 
reviews are used by the 
program leadership as 
input for safety 
improvement processes.  
 
          
SMS11.There is a 
process that provides for 
the capture of 
information on hazards, 
incidents, accidents and 
other data relevant to 
SMS. 
          
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Q10. Please provide your degree of agreement regarding the following statements about the 
SMS in your flight program 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
(1) 
disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(3) 
agree (4) Strongly agree 
(5) 
SMS12.There is a 
feedback process to notify 
contributors that their 
safety reports have been 
received and the results of 
the analysis shared.  
 
          
SMS13.Students/personnel 
know the criteria for 
evaluating the tolerable 
level of risk the flight 
program is willing to 
accept.  
 
          
SMS14.The scope of 
safety related hazards that 
must be reported are not 
explained to 
students/personnel. 
  
          
SMS15.There is a constant 
awareness of the 
Emergency Response Plan 
(ERP) in the flight 
program.  
 
          
SMS16.Students/personnel 
are not familiar with their 
role in the Emergency 
Response Plan (ERP) of 
the flight program.  
 
          
SMS17.Student/personnel 
are part of periodic drills 
to test the effectiveness of 
the ERP.  
          
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Q11. Please provide your degree of agreement regarding the following statements about the 
SMS in your flight program 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
(3) 
Agree (4) Strongly agree 
(5) 
SMS18.There is a 
process for the 
systematic 
investigation of 
operational 
conditions that 
have been 
identified as 
potentially 
hazardous 
  
          
SMS19.Corrective 
and preventative 
actions are 
generated in 
response to event 
investigation and 
analysis  
 
          
SMS20.Safety 
professionals with 
appropriate skills, 
knowledge and 
experience 
conduct SMS 
training  
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 191 
 
Q11.Cont. Please provide your degree of agreement regarding the following statements about 
the SMS in your flight program. 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
(3) 
Agree (4) Strongly 
agree (5) 
SMS21.SMS 
training is part 
of 
indoctrination 
training upon 
enrollment or 
employment.  
 
          
SMS22.SMS 
training is kept 
current to 
reflect new 
techniques, 
results of 
investigations 
and corrective 
actions.  
          
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Q12 Please provide your degree of agreement regarding the following statements 
about yourself 
 Strongly 
disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree (3) 
Agree (4) Strongly 
agree (5) 
SMS23.I can 
always 
manage to 
solve 
difficult 
problems if I 
try hard 
enough  
 
          
SMS24.It is 
easy for me 
to stick to my 
aims and 
accomplish 
my goals 
 
          
SMS25.I am 
confident that 
I can deal 
efficiently 
with 
unexpected 
events 
 
          
SMS26.I can 
remain calm 
when facing 
difficulties 
because I can 
rely on my 
coping 
abilities 
          
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Q13 Please provide your degree of agreement regarding the following statements 
about yourself 
 Strongly disagree 
(1) 
Disagree (2) Neither agree nor 
disagree (3) 
Agree (4) Strongly 
agree (5) 
SMS26.It’s 
worthwhile 
to improve 
personal 
safety  
          
SMS27.It’s 
important to 
maintain 
safety at all 
times  
          
SMS28.It’s 
important to 
reduce risk 
of safety 
events in 
flight 
operations  
          
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Q14 Please provide your degree of agreement regarding the following statements 
about yourself 
 Strongly disagree 
(1) 
Disagree (2) Neither agree nor 
disagree (3) 
Agree (4) Strongly agree 
(5) 
SMS29.I pay 
full attention 
to pre-flight 
briefing 
during flight 
operations  
 
          
SMS30.I 
follow correct 
safety 
procedures in 
flight 
operations 
  
          
SMS31.I 
ensure the 
highest level 
of safety in 
flight 
operations  
 
          
SMS32.I 
promote the 
safety 
program 
within the 
flight 
program  
 
          
SMS33.I put 
in extra effort 
to improve 
the flight 
safety 
program  
 
          
SMS34.I 
volunteer for 
safety related 
task in the 
flight 
program  
          
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Q15 Please provide your degree of agreement regarding the following statements about the 
quality of leadership provided in your flight program by these supervisory managers (Chief 
Flight Instructor/Assistant Chief Flight Instructor) 
 Strongly 
disagree (1) 
Disagree (2) Neither agree 
nor disagree 
(3) 
Agree (4) Strongly agree 
(5) 
SMS35.Look 
out for the 
interest of the 
flight 
program over 
personal 
interest  
          
SMS36.Does 
not listen to 
students 
concerns  
          
SMS37. Can 
be trusted to 
overcome 
every obstacle  
          
SMS38. 
Clearly 
defines the 
steps needed 
to reach 
training goals  
          
SMS39. 
Considers the 
ethical 
consequences 
of decisions  
          
SMS40. Is 
disrespectful 
in handling 
students 
errors  
          
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Q16 Please state to the best of your knowledge, frequency of safety events that have occurred 
in the program this academic year 
 Very Rare 
(Has never 
occurred)  
Rare (Has 
occurred only 
once)  
Occasional (2-3 
times)  
Frequent (4-
5 times)  
Very 
frequent 
(more than 5 
times)  
SMS41. 
Deviation from 
ATC 
instructions 
under normal 
flight 
conditions 
 
          
SMS42. 
Runway 
incursions 
  
          
SMS43. Close 
proximity to 
another aircraft 
requiring 
evasive action  
 
          
SMS45. 
Collision with 
ground object 
while taxiing 
  
          
SMS46. Loss 
of flight 
privilege/Flight 
hold due to 
alcohol or 
controlled 
substance use.  
          
 
Q17 what are your opinions on the safety performance of the aviation program with the 
implementation of the SMS initiative? 
 
Q18 How can the aviation program improve the SMS initiative? 
 
Q19 Thanks for taking part in this study. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
SPSS® Outputs and Nvivo® Screen Shots 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1C. Scree Plot of factors obtained in SMS initiative. 
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Table 1C. Rotated Factor Matrix of SMS Initiative. 
 
 
Items 
Factor 
SMSPol.Imp. SMSPro.Eng. 
SMS3 - The safety policy is signed and approved by the 
Dean, who demonstrates a c... 
.752  
SMS23- Safety professionals with appropriate skills, 
knowledge and experience conduct... 
.746  
SMS14 -There is a process that provides for the capture of 
information on hazards... 
.729  
SMS13 -The results of safety performance reviews are used 
by the program leadership... 
.718  
SMS25- SMS training is kept current to reflect new 
techniques, results of investigations... 
.700  
SMS2 -The safety policy is communicated to all 
students/personnel to make them aw... 
.694  
SMS24- SMS training is incorporated into indoctrination 
training upon enrollment o... 
.677  
SMS6 -Top level management clearly articulate the 
importance of safety when addressing... 
.660  
SMS12- Students/personnel are aware of procedures that 
measure safety performance... 
.659  
SMS16 -Students/personnel know the criteria for evaluating 
the tolerable level of... 
.646  
SMS1- The safety policy is documented and includes a 
commitment to involve all students and personnel. 
.642  
SMS4- There is a policy in place that provides immunity 
from disciplinary action... 
.631  
SMS22- Corrective and preventative actions are generated in 
response to event investigations. 
.629  
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Table. 1C. Cont. 
 
Items SMS Pol.Imp. SMS Proc.Eng. 
SMS11- Top level management declares a strong 
commitment to SMS, even when SMS goa... 
.568  
SMS8 Safety objectives and goals are publicized. .561  
SMS15- There is a feedback process to notify contributors 
that their safety report... 
.552  
SMS7- There is an established means of spreading 
information on SMS related matte... 
.546  
SMS10 -Top level management allocate resources for 
achieving the safety objectives... 
.518  
SMS21- There is a process for the systematic investigation of 
operational condition... 
 Low Loading 
SMS9- Students/personnel are not informed on the primary 
contacts for aviation s... 
 .790 
SMS17- The scope of safety related hazards that must be 
reported are not explained... 
 .723 
SMS20- Student/personnel are part of periodic drills to test 
the effectiveness of... 
 .569 
SMS5- Conditions under which punitive disciplinary action 
would be considered (e.... 
 .537 
SMS18 -There is a constant awareness of the Emergency 
Response Plan (ERP) in the... 
 Low Loading 
SMS19 - Students/personnel are not familiar with their role 
in the Emergency Response... 
 Low Loading 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.   
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
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Figure 2C. Factor Plot in Rotated Space for SMS Initiative. 
 
 
Table 2C.  Estimates of Variables using CFA. 
 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P β 
SE 1 <--- Self-Efficacy .720 .057 12.664 *** .67 
SE 2 <--- SelfEfficacy .667 .055 12.173 *** .85 
SE 3 <--- SelfEfficacy .641 .050 12.747 *** .83 
SM 1 <--- SafetyMotivation .610 .045 13.484 *** .81 
SM 2 <--- SafetyMotivation .720 .046 15.672 *** .90 
 SM 3 <--- SafetyMotivation .647 .047 13.868 *** .83 
SC 1 <--- SafetyCompliance .648 .045 14.388 *** .85 
SC 2 <--- SafetyCompliance .642 .046 13.848 *** .83 
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Table 2C. Cont. 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P β 
SC 3 <--- Safety Compliance .654 .045 14.606 *** .86 
SP 1 <--- SAFEPART .673 .060 11.191 *** .74 
SP 3 <--- SAFEPART .734 .074 9.918 *** .94 
SP 2 <--- SAFEPART .922 .063 14.593 *** .66 
TSL1 <--- 
TransformationalSafety
Leadership 
.799 .059 13.488 *** .81 
TSL4 <--- 
TransformationalSafety
Leadership 
.770 .052 14.828 *** .80 
TSL3 <--- 
TransformationalSafety
Leadership 
.782 .059 13.190 *** .86 
TSL5 <--- 
TransformationalSafety
Leadership 
.751 .056 13.381 *** .80 
SEV1 <--- SafetyRelatedEvents .950 .078 12.193 *** .75 
SEV3 <--- SafetyRelatedEvents 1.021 .073 14.080 *** .89 
SEV2 <--- SafetyRelatedEvents 1.027 .065 15.785 *** .83 
SEV4 <--- SafetyRelatedEvents .816 .063 12.986 *** .78 
SEV5 <--- SafetyRelatedEvents 1.100 .089 12.290 *** .75 
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Figure 3C. Conceptual Qualitative Coding Tree (Using NVivo 11®). 
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Figure 4C. Screen shot of Qualitative Coding Word Cloud (Using NVivo 11®). 
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Figure 5C. Screenshot of Nodes Clustered by Coding Similarities (Using Nvivo 11®). 
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